



MEXICO PEACE INDEX

2018

**MAPPING THE EVOLUTION
OF PEACE AND ITS DRIVERS**

**INSTITUTE FOR
ECONOMICS
& PEACE**

INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS & PEACE

Quantifying Peace and its Benefits

The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.

IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace.

IEP is headquartered in Sydney, with offices in New York, The Hague, Mexico City and Brussels. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organisations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.

For more information visit www.economicsandpeace.org

CONTENTS

	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	2
	Key Findings	5
	2018 Mexico Peace Index: A Snapshot of Peacefulness in Mexico	6
1	RESULTS & FINDINGS	9
	Reversing the trend: building peace in Mexico	10
	Findings from the 2018 MPI	12
	State results	14
	Methodology at a glance	20
	Measuring violence in Mexico	21
	Trends and dynamics of violence in Mexico	23
2	THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO	31
	The economic value of peace in 2017	32
	Per capita economic impact of violence	34
	Trends in economic impact of violence	35
	Federal government Expenditure on Violence Containment	36
	Methodology at a glance	38
3	POSITIVE PEACE	41
	About Positive Peace	42
	Positive Peace in Mexico	44
	The 2018 Mexico Positive Peace Index	46
	Tracking progress in Positive Peace	52
4	EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS	59
	México y la Construcción de Paz: La Dimensión del Miedo, <i>Mauricio Meschoulam, Centro de Investigación para la Paz México, AC (CIPMEX)</i>	60
	El Papel del Sector Privado en la Construcción de Paz, <i>Gustavo Pérez Berlanga,</i> <i>Director de Responsabilidad Social de Grupo Toks</i>	64
	¿Tendrá fin el ciclo infernal de violencia criminal en México?, <i>Guillermo Trejo, Profesor de</i> <i>Ciencia Política en la Universidad de Notre Dame y Fellow del Kellogg Institute for International Studies</i>	66
	Hacia un Modelo Eficaz de Investigación Policial, <i>Leonel Fernández Novelo,</i> <i>Observatorio Ciudadano de Seguridad, Justicia y Legalidad, AC</i>	70
5	METHODOLOGY	72
	2018 Mexico Peace Index Methodology	73
	2018 Mexico Positive Peace Index Methodology	76
	Methodology for calculating the economic impact of violence	78
	Appendix A: Mexico's Official Crime Data	81
	Appendix B: Results	84
	Endnotes	85

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2018 Mexico Peace Index (MPI), produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), provides a comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico. The MPI is based on the work of the Global Peace Index, which is the leading measure of global peacefulness and has been produced by IEP every year since 2007. This is the fifth annual edition of the MPI, setting out the key trends, patterns and drivers of peace in Mexico, while also highlighting the most significant policy opportunities available to governments.

The report analyses the dynamics of violence in Mexico and the strengths and weaknesses of the attitudes, institutions and structures, known as Positive Peace, needed to substantially lower the rates of violence. The report also estimates the significant economic impact of violence to the Mexican economy and the need to increase the level of investment in violence containment. Finally, the report provides strong quantitative evidence to aid in the development of policies to create a more peaceful society. The research is of assistance to policymakers, researchers, business leaders and the general public in building peace in Mexico.

After two years of escalating violence, Mexico's 2017 homicide rate has reached historically high levels, at 24 deaths per 100,000 people, or over 29,000 victims. This level of violence surpasses the prior peak of 2011. The rise in the homicide rate in 2017 was accompanied by a substantial increase in the rate of gun violence, which rose by 36 percent, with 28 of the 32 states in Mexico reporting escalating rates of firearms crimes.

The report finds that not only is violence by organized crime groups rising, ordinary criminality and interpersonal violence is increasing as well. Cartel leadership has been disrupted with the removal of 107

of the 122 most influential leaders by mid-2017. This has resulted in the fracturing of the cartels, which has increased the competition amongst them. In this context, it can be assumed that many members have resorted to common criminal activity as the risk of being a cartel member increases, contributing to an increase in ordinary criminality and a rise in violence in other areas of society. Most strikingly, domestic violence has increased by 32 percent over the three years to December of 2017. What's driving this rise is difficult to ascertain, highlighting the need for more detailed data on violence.



Violence undermines trust, while deteriorations in trust contribute to violence.

Due to the severity of violence, only seven states managed to improve their peacefulness in 2017. Yucatán was once again the most peaceful state in Mexico, followed by Tlaxcala, Campeche, Coahuila and Chiapas. All of these states, other than Coahuila, improved in peacefulness.

While four of the five best performing states recorded improvements, the opposite was true for the least peaceful states, with four

out of the five least peaceful states deteriorating in 2017. All five experienced an increase in their homicide rates. Baja California Sur ranked as Mexico's least peaceful state for the first time in 2017, followed by Guerrero, Baja California, Colima and Zacatecas. Three of these states lie on key trafficking routes on the Pacific coast while Zacatecas sits just inland from it.


There is a strong political message from the report, finding that the public's concerns regarding impunity and their trust in judges rises and falls with the rise and fall in violence. This would indicate that political support is tied to building peace and will be important in the 2018 election. Earning the public's trust will be key to both winning elections and successfully implementing an effective security policy.

KEY FINDINGS

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

8x 

higher than the public investments made in health and seven times higher than those made in education in 2017.



RESPONSE TO YOUTH GUN VIOLENCE

69%

of youth who were involved in an act of gun violence reported that neither their community members or local police did anything in response to the incident.

PUBLIC SECURITY

65%

of police officers failed to demonstrate the required skills in a 2014 evaluation by the National Public Security System.

The research also shows that community cooperation is closely tied to reductions in crime. The extent to which community members trust and work with the police and local government helps to create a culture of lawfulness and to reduce crime and violence. On the other hand, corruption and impunity undermine trust, which then impinges on communities' cooperation with government, thereby eroding the ability to fight crime. Corruption is likely to be the strongest factor that undermines the public's confidence in cooperating with the police.

IEP's analysis of the relationships between violence and the factors that sustain peace, known as Positive Peace, find that reversing the trend of deteriorating peacefulness depends upon a holistic approach. "End drug violence" is not an actionable policy statement for peacebuilding. The continuing rise in violence indicates that a much broader peacebuilding strategy is needed to address the causes as well as the symptoms of lawlessness. An effective strategy will need to look at multiple dynamics and how they interact.

These relationships can best be understood through system dynamics.

IEP's systemic Positive Peace analysis finds that weak scores in *well-functioning government*, *low levels of corruption* and *free flow of information* have trapped Mexico's social system in a cycle of violence. More troubling, these Pillars are also deteriorating. Furthermore, IEP's global research has shown that balanced performance across all Pillars is a defining characteristic of highly peaceful countries. However, Mexico's scores are not balanced, and the gap between the Pillars is continuing to grow. Unless these areas are addressed, it will be difficult for Mexico to improve its levels of peacefulness.

It should also be noted that interventions in the system can produce limited results for a period of time, and then change can be very rapid. The point at which change materializes is known as a 'tipping point' and underlines the importance of maintaining the pace of peace and security efforts even when progress appears

slow. This may prove to be particularly relevant for the justice and law enforcement reform programs.

On a more positive note, ten states have brought their prison populations in line with prison capacity since 2015, reflecting efforts to improve justice processes across the country. Another positive finding from the research is that the most peaceful states tend to be those where a higher percentage of citizens' report cooperating to tackle robbery. This relationship highlights the importance of community involvement in reducing crime and that building the trust between the police and the local community is an important component in creating higher levels of peace.

Mexico is substantially underinvested in its security and judicial system. Mexico spends the equivalent of one percent of its GDP on domestic security and the justice system, which is only 60 percent of the OECD average. Additionally, federal government expenditure on violence containment activities decreased by seven percent in 2017, which further increased the gap from the OECD average. Given the high levels of violence, Mexico needs to make the appropriate investments to overcome its challenges. Reform efforts need to be adequately funded and resourced, and designed to incentivize professionalism. For example, increases in wages and the number of employees in the police and judicial system could be tied to improvements in competency tests, certifications and other measures.

The economic impact of violence in 2017 reached 4.72 trillion pesos (US\$249 billion), equivalent to 21 percent of the country's GDP and amongst the highest in the world. The lost opportunity cost is high: a 10 percent reduction in violence would free up resources equaling nearly the entire cost of the public health system. The total economic impact of violence was seven times higher than the education budget in 2017. A one percent decline in the economic impact of violence would equal the federal government's investment in activities related to science, technology and innovation last year. On a per person basis, the economic impact of violence was 33,118 pesos, more than four times the



“End drug violence” is not an actionable policy statement for peacebuilding.



KEY FINDINGS ↗

VIOLENCE AGAINST MEDIA

69

media professionals were killed in Mexico in 2017



COMMUNITY COOPERATION

34%

percent of Mexicans report cooperating to solve community problems

WOMEN IN CONGRESS



Mexico has the third highest percentage of women in congress in the OECD, 42% in 2016, representing progress in gender equality

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

average monthly salary of a Mexican worker. Taken together, the findings from the 2018 MPI indicate that a holistic, integrated public security and peace framework needs to, at a minimum:

- **Reduce corruption and impunity**
- **Build institutional capacity based on transparency and accountability**
- **Protect youth**
- **Protect public spaces**
- **Build trust by demonstrating progress**
- **Address the specific dynamics behind gun violence, illicit trade, extortion, kidnapping and different forms of homicide**

Although violence has been increasing in Mexico, and although a number of good initiatives have been introduced, it is of the highest importance to maintain pressure on organized crime groups and the momentum of change. Implementing policy frameworks that maintain the pace of institutional reform while also improving the weaker aspects of Positive Peace is likely to provide the best opportunities for improvements in peace.

On the eve of the 2018 elections, peace and security policies will play a pivotal role in determining the outcomes. The policy responses of all candidates will be important to their electoral prospects. The 2018 MPI report provides the evidence for policy makers, business leaders and civil society organizations to advance new and broader peacebuilding solutions.

KEY FINDINGS

SECTION 1: RESULTS & FINDINGS

- 2017 was the most violent year on record, with peacefulness in Mexico deteriorating by 10.7 percent.
- There were over 29,000 murders, pushing the homicide rate to nearly 24 deaths per 100,000 people an increase of 25 percent year-on-year.
- Gun violence rose for the second year in a row, with 69 per cent of all homicides in 2017 being committed with a firearm.
- Crimes committed with a firearm rose by 36 percent last year.
- The violent crime rate rose by 15.2 percent in 2017 compared to the prior year.
- The rise in organized crime related offenses (kidnapping, extortion, and narcotics crimes) was minimal, increasing by 0.9 percent.
- *Detention without a sentence* was the only indicator in the MPI to improve from 2016 to 2017. The number of inmates held without a sentence has fallen by 26 percent since its peak in 2014.
- Only seven of the 32 states improved in peacefulness in 2017, while 25 states deteriorated.
- Rates of violence in the family have risen 32 percent, suggesting a rise in general lawlessness.
- The institutional capacity for violence containment remains weak. Mexico's federal spending on domestic security as a percentage of GDP is only 60 percent of the OECD average.

SECTION 2: THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

- The economic impact of violence in Mexico was 4.72 trillion pesos (US\$249 billion) in 2017. This is equivalent to 21 percent of the country's GDP.
- The economic impact of violence was eight times higher than the public investments made in health and seven times higher than those made in education in 2017.
- A one percent decline in the economic impact of violence is equivalent to the federal government's investment in activities related to science, technology and innovation in 2017.

- On a per person basis, the economic impact of violence was 33,118 pesos, more than four times the average monthly salary of a Mexican worker.
- The largest contributor to the economic impact of violence in 2017 was homicide, accounting for 46 percent of the total impact. This is equivalent to 2.18 trillion pesos or ten percent of Mexico's GDP.
- The economic impact of violence increased by 15 percent in 2017 or 634 billion pesos.
- Mexico spends one percent of its GDP on domestic security and the justice system. This is only 60 percent of the average for OECD countries.

SECTION 3: POSITIVE PEACE

- Despite above-average performance overall, Mexico demonstrates weaknesses in three critical Pillars of Positive Peace - *well-functioning government*, *low levels of corruption* and *free flow information*. These are the only three of the eight Pillars to exhibit deteriorating trends.
- Mexico's underperforming Pillars are characteristic of the kind of institutional weaknesses that allow organized crime to thrive.
- Five out of eight Positive Peace Pillars in Mexico have been improving: *sound business environment*, *high levels of human capital*, *good relations with neighbors*, *equitable distribution of resources* and *acceptance of the rights of others*.
- However, imbalances between Pillars create risks for violence. Weaknesses in governance and corruption appear to be undermining trust and progress.
- The percentage of Mexicans reporting a high level of trust in public security institutions in 2017 fell to 18 percent, its lowest level since 2012.
- In the same year, 64 percent of Mexicans reported perceiving public security institutions as corrupt, with 70 percent reporting to perceive judges as corrupt.
- The percentage of citizens reporting impunity to be their 'most worrisome' issue nearly tripled in the last five years, going from seven percent in 2012 to 20 percent in 2017.



VERIFYING THE RESULTS

➔ Official crime data in Mexico is imperfect, and that does affect peace scores. A composite index of peace directly corrects for some of the inherent problems in measuring violence. In 2017, Mexico released a new and improved dataset, used in the 2018 index and discussed in Appendix A.


VISION *of* **HUMANITY**
visionofhumanity.org

Explore the data on the interactive Mexico Peace Index map: see how peace changes over time, compare levels of peace between states and discover how the states fare according to each indicator of peace.


2018 MEXICO PEACE INDEX

A SNAPSHOT OF THE STATE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

MPI SCORE



RANK	STATE	SCORE	RANK	STATE	SCORE
1	Yucatán	1.167	17	Quintana Roo	2.452
2	Tlaxcala	1.38	18	San Luis Potosí	2.42
3	Campeche	1.482	19	Guanajuato	2.544
4	Coahuila	1.505	20	México	2.55
5	Chiapas	1.52	21	Nuevo León	2.578
6	Hidalgo	1.57	22	Mexico City	2.693
7	Puebla	1.882	23	Tamaulipas	2.74
8	Nayarit	1.974	24	Morelos	2.888
9	Veracruz	1.998	25	Tabasco	2.973
10	Querétaro	2.01	26	Chihuahua	2.979
11	Durango	2.043	27	Sinaloa	3.051
12	Oaxaca	2.095	28	Zacatecas	3.30
13	Aguascalientes	2.223	29	Colima	3.64
14	Sonora	2.23	30	Baja California	3.91
15	Jalisco	2.341	31	Guerrero	4.153
16	Michoacán	2.42	32	Baja California Sur	4.55






SECTION 1

RESULTS & FINDINGS

KEY FINDINGS

- 2017 was the most violent year on record, with peacefulness in Mexico deteriorating by 10.7 percent from the prior year.
- There were over 29,000 murders, pushing the homicide rate to nearly 24 deaths per 100,000 people, an increase of 25 percent year-on-year.
- Gun violence rose for the second year in a row, with 69 per cent of all homicides in 2017 being committed with a firearm.
- Crimes committed with a firearm rose by 36 percent last year.
- The violent crime rate rose by 15.2 percent in 2017 compared to the prior year.
- The rise in organized crime related offenses was minimal, increasing by 0.9 percent.
- *Detention without a sentence* was the only indicator in the MPI to improve from 2016 to 2017. The number of inmates held without a sentence has fallen by 35 percent since the peak in 2014.
- Only seven of the 32 states improved in peacefulness in 2017, while 25 states deteriorated.
- Yucatán was once again the most peaceful state, followed by Tlaxcala, Campeche, Coahuila and Chiapas. Four of these states improved in peacefulness: Yucatán, Tlaxcala, Campeche, and Chiapas.
- Baja California Sur ranked as Mexico's least peaceful state for the first time in 2017, followed by Guerrero, Baja California, Colima and Zacatecas.
- The gap between the most and least peaceful states continued to increase, highlighting the growing inequality in peace in Mexico.
- In 2017, 87 percent of homicide victims were male, of which 71 per cent were adults, over 18 years in age.
- Men in Mexico typically experience a homicide rate eight times higher than that of women. However, homicide rates for both men and women have doubled since January of 2015.
- Between 2010 and 2016, nearly 1,000 new private security firms entered the market, an increase of 32 percent.
- The ratio of homicide victims to homicide investigations has risen, indicating a higher rate of mass murders in 2017.
- Rates of violence in the family have risen 32 percent, suggesting a rise in general lawlessness.
- The institutional capacity for violence containment remains weak. Mexico's federal spending on domestic security as a percentage of GDP is only 60 percent of the OECD average.



REVERSING THE TREND: BUILDING PEACE IN MEXICO

After two years of escalating violence, Mexico's 2017 homicide rate surpassed its previous 2011 peak. It was the most violent year in at least two decades, raising serious concerns for policy makers and negatively affecting trust amongst the population. The increase in violence has been driven not only by organized crime, but also by individuals likely empowered by the weak rule of law.

IEP's analysis of media reports finds that the most commonly reported cause of violence in Mexico is organized crime, with the conflict between the criminal groups being the most cited driver. There is no doubt that the most severe violence arises from conflict between the cartels and that containing and dismantling criminal organizations is the country's greatest security challenge. However, the evidence suggests that multiple dynamics are at play. Estimates from 2016 indicate that, at most, organized crime related homicides made up half of all murders that year. As the major cartels are broken up, the conflict between them becomes more intense. When the organizations are dismantled, some members will turn to common criminality. Likely as a result, high levels of violence are appearing in other arenas of society as well. Weak rule of law and high levels of impunity continue to sustain this trend.

IEP's systemic Positive Peace analysis (explained in Section 3 of this report) finds that imbalances in performance in key areas, and weak scores in *well-functioning government*, *low levels of corruption* and *free flow of information* in particular, have trapped Mexico's social system in a cycle of violence. The research found that corruption and impunity undermine trust in the government, which then impinges on communities' cooperation in solving crimes.

These relationships can best be understood through system dynamics. The reciprocal relationship between trust and violence

is a simple example of the types of feedback loops that arise between different aspects of negative peace and positive peace. Violence undermines trust, while deteriorations in trust can also contribute to violence. When crimes go unpunished, citizens' trust in government declines with it. In this context, some individuals will take advantage of the high impunity rates to commit acts of violence.




Violence undermines trust, while deteriorations in trust contribute to violence.

The research finds that there is a political dimension to this as well. When crime is increasing, perceptions of corruption increase and trust in government declines. The opposite is also true, when crime is decreasing then perceptions of corruption and trust in government also improve. This would indicate that voters are more likely to seek electoral change when violence is increasing.

These feedback loops in the system are the outcome of what are called 'encoded norms'. Encoded norms represent the current encoded responses to inputs to the system and arise from cultural factors, legislation and policy, and many other aspects of society. When these things interact, they maintain a certain 'homeostasis' or equilibrium in the system in relation to peace. Unless Mexico is able to break out of its encoded levels of corruption, impunity and weak state institutions, the cycle of violence will continue.

The system in Mexico exhibits 'attractors' that entrench violence

WHAT IS POSITIVE PEACE?



IEP's analysis of the relationships between negative and Positive Peace find that reversing the trend of deteriorating peacefulness depends upon a holistic, top-down and bottom-up approach.

and criminality, such as corruption. Attractors are the group of actions or states that a social system may take, and correspond to the normal behaviour towards which it will naturally gravitate. In systems dynamics, attractors are factors that pull individuals, groups and even institutions toward a narrow range of actions, despite positive interventions. The factors that lead to violence will do so over and over again until the mechanisms that persistently bring the system back to the 'attractor' are addressed. In order to effectively deal with the entrenched violence and the illicit economy, solutions will be needed to alter the mechanisms driving the system's dynamics.

IEP's analysis of the relationships between negative and positive peace find that reversing the trend of deteriorating peacefulness depends upon a holistic, top-down and bottom-up approach. "End drug violence" is not an actionable policy statement for peacebuilding. An effective peacebuilding framework will need to look at multiple dynamics and how they interact. From the top-down, each level of government needs to focus on institutional reform and capacity building. The continuing rise in violence indicates that the efficacy of a militarized security response is limited. A much broader peacebuilding strategy is needed to address the causes as well as the symptoms of lawlessness.

It should also be noted that changes in the system can produce limited results for a period of time, and then change can be very rapid. The point at which change materializes is known as a 'tipping point' and underlines the importance of maintaining the pace of change even when progress is slow. This may prove to be particularly relevant for justice and law enforcement reforms.

From the bottom-up, communities, civil society and municipal governments need to improve social cohesion, the free flow of information, especially government transparency, and the rule of law. Overall, Mexico needs to strengthen its institutional and social capacity to prevent and contain violence with integrated and comprehensive strategies. For example, the program "How Are We Going, Nuevo León" brings together business leaders, community organizations and the state and municipal governments to work across the dimensions of both positive and negative peace. The program has often used information and analysis developed by IEP, based on transparent government data, to support the development of evidence-based policy in the state.

The Positive Peace section of this report highlights the urgent need to tackle corruption and impunity while building transparency and accountability. The new crime data released last

year demonstrates a higher level of transparency in public security, and informs the analysis in this report. Developing that kind of information helps communities and governments in Mexico to determine what kind of solutions to pursue and who can be accountable for delivering them.

To rectify Mexico's violence, it is important to look at the different dynamics of crime and violence and the institutional capacity to halt and contain them. Importantly, no security policy framework will be complete without attention to both negative and Positive Peace at both the state and national level. Mexico needs to implement effective responses to different types of violence. For example, the rise in gun violence does not necessarily track with extortion, indicating that varying policy responses are needed. Even if gun violence can be reduced, for example, it may only have a limited impact on other forms of violence.

At the same time, the trends in crime do appear to be related to levels of community cooperation and levels of trust in society, in particular how much citizens trust their government and how well they cooperate in solving and reducing crime. Communities with higher levels of trust and cooperation have lower levels of violence. Therefore, building on community programs that have been successful in reducing crime should be encouraged. Copying these programs and implementing them elsewhere may help to reduce violence. The findings from the 2018 MPI indicate that a holistic, integrated public security and peace framework needs to, at a minimum:

- **Reduce corruption and impunity**
- **Build institutional capacity alongside transparency and accountability**
- **Protect youth**
- **Protect public spaces**
- **Build trust by demonstrating progress**
- **Address the specific dynamics behind gun violence, illicit trade, extortion, kidnapping and different forms of homicide**
- **Place greater emphasis on reform processes**

The remainder of this section details the analyses used to establish these findings.

“End drug violence” is not an actionable policy statement for peacebuilding.

“

No security policy framework will be complete without attention to both negative and Positive Peace at both the state and national level.



2018 MEXICO PEACE INDEX RESULTS

Mexico's level of peace deteriorated by 10.7 percent in 2017 due to the escalating drug war, marking the country's least peaceful year on record.

There were over 29,000 murders, pushing the homicide rate to 23.8 deaths per 100,000 people. Mexico now has the eighth highest homicide rate in the Americas. Particularly worrying was the rise in the proportion of homicides committed using a firearm, which increased from 57 percent in 2015 to 69 percent last year. Twenty-five out of 32 states recorded a deterioration in overall peacefulness from 2016.

The gap between the most and least peaceful states continued to increase, highlighting the rising inequality in peace in Mexico. Yucatán, Mexico's most peaceful state in 2017, has recorded successive improvements in peacefulness for the last three years, however the least peaceful states, Baja California Sur and Guerrero, have deteriorated over the same period.

Figure 1.1 depicts the changes in the indicators of the MPI, as well as the overall score. Nationally, four of the five indicators deteriorated in 2017, accounting for the significant deterioration in overall peacefulness. The largest change was in the weapons crime rate, which rose 36 percent, representing an increase in both assaults and homicides committed with a firearm.

The *homicide* indicator had the second largest deterioration, followed by *violent crime*, which includes robbery, assault and sexual assault. The homicide rate rose by 25 percent, while the violent crime rate rose by 15 percent from 2016 to 2017. However,

the rise in organized crime related offenses was comparatively small, with only a 0.9 percent escalation in the rate.

The only MPI indicator to improve in 2017 was *detention without a sentence*, which measures the number of people incarcerated without a sentence relative to the level of violence. In 2017, there were 8,680 fewer people in prison who hadn't been sentenced than the previous year. The two states with the largest reductions, Jalisco and Puebla, both recorded a drop of more than 1,200. Nationwide, the number of prisoners without a sentence has fallen three years in a row, to just over 21,000 in 2017, a 35 percent fall from its peak in 2014.



The gap between the most and least peaceful states continued to increase, highlighting the rising inequality in peace in Mexico. Yucatán, Mexico's most peaceful state in 2017, has recorded successive improvements in peacefulness for the last three years, however the least peaceful states, Baja California Sur and Guerrero, have deteriorated over the same period.

BOX 1.1

New crime data in Mexico

The 2018 MPI uses an updated methodology based on the federal government's new crime databases. At the end of 2017, the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SESNSP) released new data on crime incidence and victims of crime that provide more precise measures of the violent offenses used to calculate Mexico's peace scores. The new datasets include more categories of violent crime than have previously been published. Detailed analysis of the new data is presented on page in Appendix A.


While previous iterations of the MPI have presented a

time series of index scores from 2003 to the most recent year, the new database is only back-dated to 2015, limiting the trend analysis for MPI indicators.

Although the crime data can only be analyzed over the last three years, other datasets have been recorded over longer periods. In particular, the SESNSP data on the number of investigations (rather than victims) provides time-series data back to 1997 and the INEGI vital statistics database reports homicide deaths since 1990. This data has been used to confirm that the level of violence in 2017 did surpass its previous peak in 2011.

FIGURE 1.1
Change in MPI indicator scores, 2016 to 2017

Detention without a sentence was the only indicator in the Mexico Peace Index to improve from 2016 to 2017. The national rates of weapons crime, violent crime, homicide and organized crime all escalated last year.



Source: IEP


Mexican law allows pre-trial detention for so-called 'grave crimes,' including rape and murder. But prior to the 2008 judicial reform process, the practice was used for a broad variety of alleged offenses, including many minor offenses. This contributed to the severe overcrowding of detention facilities.

The detention without a sentence indicator of the MPI improved because the number of people in prison without a sentence declined even as the level of violence rose. The recent rise in violence means that some states will be holding more violent-offenders in pre-trial detention. States such as Jalisco and Puebla seem to have managed to reduce the overall number of unsentenced detainees even while increasing the pre-trial detention for serious offenders.

“
 The only MPI indicator to improve in 2017 was 'detention without a sentence'.”

FIGURE 1.2
Persons incarcerated without a sentence, 2006-2017

Nationwide, the number of prisoners without a sentence has fallen three years in a row, to just over 21,000 in 2017, a 26 percent fall from its peak in 2014.




Source: CNS

KEY FINDINGS ↗

PEACE DETERIORATION

10.7% ↘

2017 was the most violent year on record, with peacefulness in Mexico deteriorating by 10.7 percent from the prior year.



GUN HOMICIDE

69% ↗

of all homicides in 2017 were committed with a firearm, rising for the second year in a row.

INCARCERATION WITHOUT A SENTENCE

26% ↘

The number of people incarcerated without a sentence has fallen three years in a row, to just over 21,000 in 2017, a 26% fall from its peak in 2014.

MEXICO PEACE INDEX

STATE RESULTS

Table 1.1 provides the full state results for the 2018 MPI, including the rank, overall score, indicator scores, and change in score from 2016 to 2017. This section discusses the five most peaceful states and the five least peaceful states in detail.




TABLE 1.1

2017 Mexico Peace Index results

A lower score indicates a better level of peacefulness.

MPI RANK	STATE	OVERALL SCORE	HOMICIDE	VIOLENT CRIME	WEAPONS CRIME	ORGANIZED CRIME	DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE	DIFFERENCE IN OVERALL SCORE (2017-2016)
1	Yucatán	1.167	1	1.329	1	1.422	1.119	-0.079 ↑
2	Tlaxcala	1.381	1.377	1.848	1.264	1.097	1.21	-0.661 ↑
3	Campeche	1.482	1.312	1.117	1.105	1.397	4.24	-0.029 ↓
4	Coahuila	1.505	1.344	2.242	1.26	1.361	1.161	0.005 ↓
5	Chiapas	1.572	1.426	1.468	1.323	1.89	2.182	-0.01 ↑
6	Hidalgo	1.757	1.314	2.833	1.477	1.784	1.223	0.247 ↓
7	Puebla	1.882	1.825	2.382	2.065	1.506	1.318	0.21 ↓
8	Nayarit	1.974	2.322	1	2.286	1	5	0.612 ↓
9	Veracruz	1.998	2.201	1.587	2.332	1.901	1.731	0.318 ↓
10	Querétaro	2.01	1.413	4.527	1.532	1.183	1.01	0.274 ↓
11	Durango	2.043	1.576	2.902	1.579	2.116	2.5	0.069 ↓
12	Oaxaca	2.095	2.241	2.084	2.74	1.405	1.774	0.119 ↓
13	Aguascalientes	2.223	1.219	4.396	1.504	2.636	1	0.448 ↓
14	Sonora	2.23	2.294	1.89	2.545	1.661	3.586	-0.16 ↑
15	Jalisco	2.341	1.954	2.876	2.437	2.503	1.717	0.116 ↓
16	Michoacán	2.42	2.678	2.247	3.781	1.29	1.479	0.122 ↓
17	Quintana Roo	2.452	2.101	2.978	2.508	2.519	2.074	0.607 ↓
18	San Luis Potosí	2.472	1.902	3.236	2.299	3.203	1.115	0.189 ↓
19	Guanajuato	2.544	2.273	3.927	3.735	1	1.006	0.313 ↓
20	México	2.55	1.658	4.8	2.113	2.521	1.161	0.274 ↓
21	Nuevo León	2.578	1.568	2.557	2.029	5	1.435	0.025 ↓
22	Mexico City	2.693	1.629	5	3.089	2.171	1	0.151 ↓
23	Tamaulipas	2.74	2.564	2.659	2.77	3.594	1.293	0.354 ↓
24	Morelos	2.888	2.826	4.247	3.511	1.739	1.013	-0.127 ↑
25	Tabasco	2.973	1.799	4.769	2.447	4.055	1.132	0.512 ↓
26	Chihuahua	2.979	3.916	2.544	4.176	1.354	1.878	0.418 ↓
27	Sinaloa	3.051	3.775	1.981	4.759	1.977	1.697	0.251 ↓
28	Zacatecas	3.306	3.403	2.332	4.001	4.268	1.235	0.697 ↓
29	Colima	3.64	5	3.146	5	1.525	1.985	-0.26 ↑
30	Baja California	3.951	4.641	4.66	4.583	2.598	1.47	0.822 ↓
31	Guerrero	4.153	4.934	2.644	4.926	4.868	1.378	0.045 ↓
32	Baja California Sur	4.55	5	4.249	5	5	1.348	0.922 ↓
NATIONAL		2.463	2.222	3.17	2.684	2.325	1.323	0.238 ↓

Source: IEP

“

Twenty-five out of 32 states recorded a deterioration in overall peacefulness from 2016.

TOP FIVE

MOST PEACEFUL STATES



“

Yucatán was once again the most peaceful state in Mexico, followed by Tlaxcala, Campeche, Coahuila and Chiapas, with all of these states apart from Coahuila improving their peacefulness. Only seven states were able to improve in 2017..

Rank 1: Yucatán

2017 SCORE

1.167

CHANGE IN RANK 16/17:

↗ **0**

CHANGE IN SCORE 16/17:

-0.08

Yucatán was once again the most peaceful state in Mexico, followed by Tlaxcala, Campeche, Coahuila and Chiapas, with all of these states apart from Coahuila improving their peacefulness. Only seven states were able to improve in 2017. Yucatán in particular has the lowest homicide rate in Mexico and the third lowest violent crime rate. In addition, it recorded a 23 percent reduction in the combined rate of robbery, assault and sexual assault in the last year. Yucatán's largest challenges are organized crime related offenses, where it ranks tenth for its rate of kidnapping, extortion, and narcotics crimes. However, its extortion rate has halved since 2015, and its narcotics score has remained stagnant rather than worsening. Of the five most peaceful states, only Campeche has a lower violent crime rate than Yucatán, as a result of its improvement in 2017.

Rank 2: Tlaxcala

2017 SCORE

1.381

CHANGE IN RANK 16/17:

↗ **12**

CHANGE IN SCORE 16/17:

-0.66

Tlaxcala, the second most peaceful state, has maintained consistently low rates of crime and violence for the last three years. The state had the fourth lowest weapons crime rate and the third lowest rate of organized crime related offenses in 2017. The organized crime indicator score benefited from improvements in the transparency and accuracy of the new crime reporting methodology, as previous gaps in the data resulted in higher estimates than what likely occurred.¹ However, Tlaxcala did record a 13 percent rise in the violent crime rate and an increase in its homicide rate, rising from 6.5 to 8.8 deaths per 100,000 people, or 36 percent. Nonetheless, the state's homicide rate remains one of the lowest in Mexico.

Rank 3: Campeche

2017 SCORE

1.482

CHANGE IN RANK 16/17:

↑ 2

CHANGE IN SCORE 16/17:

-0.03

Campeche rose two places last year to be the third most peaceful state, thanks to an 18 percent decline in its homicide rate, a 12 percent fall in violent crime and a 9 percent reduction in crimes committed with a firearm. However, the state ranks 31st on detention without a sentence, indicating that the number of people detained is out of proportion to the level of violence faced in the state. Though the *detention without sentence* indicator performed poorly, Campeche's total incarcerated population is one of the smallest at roughly 1,400 sentenced and unsentenced inmates. Campeche, does not have the prison overpopulation problem seen in much of Mexico, with its prisons only at 78 percent capacity. Furthermore, the state has a high rate of educational and vocational programs for inmates, at 1.2 active programs per detainee.² The pre-trial detention rate will most likely fall further as the state continues to implement reforms reserving pre-trial detention for those who commit 'grave crimes'.³

Rank 4: Coahuila

2017 SCORE

1.505

CHANGE IN RANK 16/17:

↓ 1

CHANGE IN SCORE 16/17:

0.00

Coahuila was the only state in the top five to deteriorate in peacefulness in 2017. Coahuila's violent crime, weapons crime, and homicide rates reversed their 2016 decline. The rise in the violent crime rate was driven by a 20 percent increase in sexual assault, while the weapons crime indicator recorded rises in both assault and homicide committed with a firearm.

The state's high rankings are largely upheld by the fact that breakdowns in peacefulness have been more dramatic and severe elsewhere, making the state's homicide rate of 8.25 per 100,000 the fifth lowest in Mexico. However, Coahuila has improved its detention without a sentence score by eight percent from 2016 to 2017, suggesting that the justice system reforms are progressing. This US-border state has been able to contain violence better than its neighbouring states Nuevo León, ranked 21st, and Chihuahua, ranked 26th.

“

Coahuila's high rankings are largely upheld by the fact that breakdowns in peacefulness have been more dramatic and severe elsewhere.

Rank 5: Chiapas

2017 SCORE

1.572

CHANGE IN RANK 16/17:

↑ 1

CHANGE IN SCORE 16/17:

-0.01

Chiapas has risen two places in the last two years to the number five spot, boosted by a significant reduction in detention without a sentence in 2017. Although other states did have larger improvements on this indicator, Chiapas reduced the number of people in prison without a sentence by about 500, or 21 percent.

Chiapas had a four percent rise in its total violent crime rate last year, driven by rises in assault, sexual assault and robbery. The rate of sexual assault rose ten percent from 2016 to 2017. There was also a 15 percent increase in crimes committed with a firearm, mirroring the nationwide trend of rising gun violence. The total homicide rate rose as well, by about half a percentage point, but it is still lower than its 2015 level.

“

Chiapas has risen two places in the last two years to the number five spot, boosted by a significant reduction in detention without a sentence in 2017.

BOX 1.2

Organized crime in the MPI

The *organized crime* indicator in the MPI measures the combined rate of extortion, kidnapping and narcotics crimes per 100,000 people. There is no accurate and complete data on the specific activities of organized criminal groups. However, state-level data on these three crimes is known to be associated with organized crime groups and provides an indication of their presence in each state. As a result, the indicator results are often referred to as 'organized crime related offenses' in this report.

BOTTOM FIVE

LEAST PEACEFUL STATES



“

Baja California Sur had the largest deterioration in peacefulness in 2017, falling two places to rank last in the index with a score nearly ten percent worse than Guerrero, the next least peaceful state.

While the five best performing states improved in peacefulness, the opposite was true for the least peaceful states, with four out of five deteriorating in 2017. Most strikingly, all five experienced an increase in their homicide rates. Baja California Sur ranked as Mexico's least peaceful state for the first time in 2017, followed by Guerrero, Baja California, Colima and Zacatecas. These four states lie on the Pacific coast, while Zacatecas sits just inland from it.

Drug trafficking and other organized crime in this part of the country has traditionally been controlled by the Sinaloa cartel, which has experienced a violent internal power conflict in the wake of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán’s extradition to the US in January of 2017. Sources have documented the presence of drug trafficking organizations from further south attempting to expand their influence along the coast, suggesting that while the Sinaloa cartel’s second-tier leaders are fighting each other to take over El Chapo’s position, other organizations may be battling the Sinaloa rank-and-file for control of territory in Baja California Sur and other key trafficking states.⁴

“

While the five best performing states had improvements in peacefulness, the opposite was true for the least peaceful states, with four out of five deteriorating in 2017.

Rank 32: Baja California Sur

2017 SCORE

4.550

CHANGE IN RANK 16/17:

↓ 2

CHANGE IN SCORE 16/17:

0.92

Baja California Sur had the largest deterioration in peacefulness in 2017, falling two places to rank last in the index with a score nearly ten percent worse than Guerrero, the next least peaceful state. The state’s homicide rate almost tripled last year, from an already high 34 deaths per 100,000 people in 2016 to 94 deaths by the end of 2017. It also has the fourth highest multiple homicide rate in the country, with 1.3 victims per investigation last year. The rise in homicides was driven by a rise in gun violence, with 87 percent of murders having been committed with a firearm.

The state did see some improvements. The violent crime rate fell five percent, based on reductions in robbery and violent assault. However, the rate of sexual assault rose three percent year-on-year. The *detention without a sentence* indicator showed the most progress, improving in score by 24 percent.

Taken together, the high rates of multiple homicides and firearm use strongly suggest that organized crime related violence is driving the rise in violence in Baja California Sur.

Rank 31: Guerrero

2017 SCORE

4.153

CHANGE IN RANK 16/17:

↑ 1

CHANGE IN SCORE 16/17:

0.05

Guerrero rose one place in the index, from 32nd in 2016 to 31st in 2017, in part because of some improvements in the state and in part because the escalation in violence in Baja California Sur was so severe. Guerrero's homicide rate has been less volatile than other states, but remains consistently high. It rose 12 percent in 2017 to reach 69 per 100,000. Surprisingly, Guerrero was able to reduce its violent crime and organized crime rates in 2017, while the rise in homicides and gun violence was smaller than in its neighbors. However, Guerrero is consistently ranked in the bottom five in terms of homicide, weapons crime, organized crime related offenses, and critical Pillars of Positive Peace - explained in detail in Section 4 of this report.

Rank 30: Baja California

2017 SCORE

3.951

CHANGE IN RANK 16/17:

↓ 1

CHANGE IN SCORE 16/17:

0.82

Baja California, neighbor to Baja California Sur, marks the northern tip of the corridor of west-coast violence. The city of Tijuana is home to the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), sometimes called the Tijuana cartel. The AFO has roots in Sinaloa, and at various times has been either operating in concert with or in conflict with the Sinaloa cartel.⁵ The most recent intelligence suggests that AFO, supported by the Cartel de Jalisco Nuevo Generation (CJNG), has entered a renewed battle with the Sinaloa cartel for control of smuggling operations through Tijuana⁶, causing the state's homicide rate to nearly double from 36 to 64 per 100,000 in 2017.

Baja California has maintained fairly steady rates of nonlethal crime, registering no change in the violent crime rate and a one percent rise in the rate of kidnapping, extortion and narcotics crimes. However, deadly gun violence has escalated: the rate of assaults with a firearm has fallen by two points but gun deaths have reached 45 per 100,000 people.

Rank 29: Colima

2017 SCORE

3.640

CHANGE IN RANK 16/17:

↑ 2

CHANGE IN SCORE 16/17:

-0.26

Colima, the fourth least peaceful state, has the highest homicide rate in Mexico, at 106 deaths per 100,000 people. The

breakdown in peacefulness in Colima has been swift, with the homicide rate quadrupling in the last two years. Furthermore, this homicide rate is an outlier, falling so far outside the range of the rest of the states that it is reasonable to conclude that a unique dynamic is driving Colima's results.

The state sits on the border of territory controlled by the Sinaloa cartel to the north and CJNG to the south. Clashes between the two escalated in 2016 and by February of 2017, 500 military police had been deployed aimed at reducing the violence.⁷ Historically, violence hasn't been high in the state, but organized crime groups have likely exploited the weaknesses that did exist in the rule of law, in particular a high rate of impunity. The latest data shows only four percent of homicide investigations resulted in a conviction. As a small state, Colima performs moderately well in the *attitudes, institutions and structures* that typically reduce violence, known as Positive Peace. Additionally, as of mid-2016, Colima had not experienced the typical militarized law enforcement strategies, such as troop deployments or targeted removal of cartel leaders.⁸

Rank 28: Zacatecas

2017 SCORE

3.306

CHANGE IN RANK 16/17:

↓ 2

CHANGE IN SCORE 16/17:

0.70

Zacatecas has also experienced a rapid breakdown in peacefulness, with the third largest deterioration in score of any state in 2017 and falling ten places in the last two years. All five MPI indicators deteriorated last year. The rise in violent crime had the smallest deterioration, with a six percent improvement in the assault rate being offset by an increase in robberies. Zacatecas had a 24 percent rise in both the homicide and weapons crime rates. Most striking was the rise in organized crime. The rate of organized crime related offenses more than doubled last year, from 61 to 145 crimes per 100,000 people, largely driven by a 148 percent rise in extortion. Extortion data is very sensitive to changes in reporting; however, the rise in the extortion rate, alongside a rise in both kidnapping and narcotics crimes, is consistent with recent reports of increased cartel presence in Zacatecas.⁹

The sudden escalation in violence may be partially explained by the state's weak performance in Positive Peace. Zacatecas ranks 21st overall in the Mexico Positive Peace Index, with particularly weak scores in *well-functioning government, high levels of human capital* and *acceptance of the rights of others*. As a result, the state appears to have lacked the necessary resilience to withstand expanded cartel activity. Greater cartel presence in Zacatecas has acted as a shock and caused a rapid breakdown in peace. The dynamics of Positive Peace, including what states can do to improve resilience and reduce violence, are discussed in detail in Section 3 of this report.



METHODOLOGY AT A GLANCE

The Mexico Peace Index (MPI) is based on the work of the Global Peace Index, the leading global measure of peacefulness, produced by IEP annually since 2007. The MPI follows a similar methodology to the United Kingdom Peace Index (UKPI) and the United States Peace Index (USPI), also produced by IEP, and measures negative peace, which is defined as ‘the absence of violence or fear of violence’.

This is the fifth iteration of the MPI and the 2018 edition makes first use of new and significantly improved data sets released this year by the Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SESNSP). This page summarizes the methodology. Full methodological details can be found in Section 5.

The MPI is composed of the following five indicators, scored between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the most peaceful score and 5 the least peaceful:



GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2017

HOMICIDE

The number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 people.

Source: Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security/ Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SESNSP)

WEAPONS CRIME

The number of victims of an intentional and negligent homicide or assault committed with a firearm per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

VIOLENT CRIME

The number of violent crimes per 100,000 people, adjusted for underreporting. Violent crimes include robbery, assault, and sexual assault.

Source: SESNSP

DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE

The number of people in prison without a sentence, proportional to level of violent crime (including homicide).

Source: National Security Commission / Comisión Nacional de Seguridad (CNG)

ORGANIZED CRIME

The number of extortions, drug-trade related crimes, and kidnappings per 100,000 people. Extortion and kidnapping rates are adjusted for underreporting. Drug-trade related crimes include the federal crimes of production, transport, trafficking, trade, supply, or possession of drugs or other “crimes against public health,” as they are termed in Mexican law, as well as retail drug sales.

Source: SESNSP

Two of the indicators – violent crime and organized crime – are adjusted for underreporting. In 2016, 93.6 percent of crimes in Mexico did not make it into the official statistics because they were either not reported to the authorities or because no investigation was opened.¹⁰ IEP uses INEGI’s National Survey of Victimization and Perceptions of Public Security / Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) to calculate underreporting rates for each state and adjusts the official statistics for rape, robbery, assault, extortion and kidnapping to better reflect actual rates of violence. This approach helps to counter balance the high rates of underreporting, known as the *cifra negra*.



MEASURING VIOLENCE IN MEXICO

In December of 2017, the federal government introduced a new and much more comprehensive dataset for tracking crime and violence in Mexico. The new data represents the outcome of a three-year process to improve the availability, quality and transparency of official law-enforcement data.

The principal change is the addition of data on the number of victims of several crimes, rather than just the number of cases, as had been the past practice. Publishing data on both the number of victims and cases offers a more accurate assessment of the magnitude and severity of violent crime, as multiple victims can be affected by one case. This more detailed data has allowed IEP to create a more accurate analysis of peace in Mexico.

The new data has been incorporated into the MPI for more accurate peace scores. Unfortunately, however, crime data in Mexico is still not detailed enough to identify many important aspects of the violence that is taking place. The proportion and the geography of violence will influence policy responses to containing and reducing it and building and sustaining holistic peace.

Figure 1.4 highlights one of the problems. Currently, there is no way to know exactly how many deaths are drug-trade or organized crime related. None of Mexico's government agencies publish the arrest or prosecution data that would indicate whether homicides

and other crimes are related to organized crime activity. A procedure to rectify this would be to code completed court cases to indicate the involvement of organized crime groups.


Figure 1.3 shows the varying estimates of homicides related to organized crime, ranging from 20 to 50 percent in 2016 (the most recent year available). There is no official data on violence by organized crime groups in Mexico, but there are third-party estimates. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), which together produce the industry – standard armed conflict death datasets – count 4,987 fatalities from conflicts between organized crime groups and the government or each



The principal change is the addition of data on the number of victims of several crimes, rather than just the number of cases as had been the past practice.

FIGURE 1.3
Estimates of drug war homicides, 2007-2016

The highest figures estimate that 50 percent of homicides in Mexico are organized crime related.



Source: INEGI, SESNSP, Lantia, UCDP

other in 2016. Lantia Consultores, which keeps a dataset of so-called narco-executions, registered 12,224 that year. These two figures come in at 20 and 50 percent, respectively, of the total number of homicides registered by government.

Continuing to develop a systems understanding of peace uncovers what kind of inputs, encoded norms, and outcomes need to be measured and tracked to monitor and improve peacefulness. Mexico is increasingly developing and publishing the data needed for informative peace analysis, but certain indicators are still lacking, and as a result the drivers of peacefulness are partly obscured.

BOX 1.2

Homicide data in Mexico

There are three sources of official homicide data in Mexico.

1. Homicide victims, collated and published by the Executive Secretariat of the National System for Public Security (SESNSP), which are homicides reported in the field by law enforcement (available 2014 to 2017).
2. Homicide investigations as reported by law enforcement and published by SESNSP (available 1997 to 2017).
3. Homicide victims as recorded in the vital statistics database, which are homicides counted from certificates of death, collated and published by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) (available 1990 to 2017).

Each source of data is compiled at the federal level based on data submitted by states. None of the datasets include information on the perpetrator or whether the homicide is believed to be related to organized crime.



TRENDS & DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE IN MEXICO

In order to tease out the various dynamics leading to the increasing levels of violence in 2017, IEP undertook several analyses, described in detail in the remainder of this section. The starting place was a review of the factors believed to be affecting violence in 2016 and 2017.

News and journalism sources view cartel fracture as the leading cause of the rise in violence in Mexico, with the splintering of the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel and various other organizations mentioned in two-thirds of the articles reviewed. As discussed in the results for the least peaceful states, cartel conflicts have taken places in the worst affected places, especially Colima, Zacatecas and Baja California Sur.

Various factors are often mentioned in a single article, with 58 out of 66 sources citing more than one driver of violence.

Policy or judicial failure was cited the second most frequently in 39 percent of articles as a main cause of the rise in violence. This category refers to government action that is thought to have led to more violence rather than less.

One of the major focuses of government action has been the targeting of cartel leadership. The strategy was used by President Felipe Calderón alongside his policy of militarizing the fight against organized crime. Using this strategy, government officials


arrested or killed 107 of the nation's 122 most violent and high-ranking known criminals.¹¹ But the policy triggered inter-group warfare as the cartels splintered and different factions fought for supremacy. Los Zetas split from the Gulf Cartel and turned against them before themselves fracturing, leaving a void that CJNG has fought to fill;¹² the arrest of 'El Chapo' Guzman of the Sinaloa Cartel has encouraged competitors to challenge their control of Mexico's West Coast.

Data shows that the number of armed non-state groups active in Mexico has risen from three in 2006 to 12 in 2016.¹³ The splintering of the armed groups may make them easier to confront, as each smaller group will have fewer members and their webs of influence are weakened. However, at the same time, the greater number of armed groups has led to more violence in the short term. The homicide rate has doubled since the introduction of the policy in 2006.

It is important not to ease up on efforts to reduce against organized crime, as the disincentives to crime become more

FIGURE 1.4
Theories on the of cause violence

News and journalism sources view cartel fracture as the leading cause of the rise in violence in Mexico, being cited in 64 percent of sources. The second highest perceived cause is policy/judicial failure, which was mentioned in 39 percent of articles.



Note: At the time of writing, IEP's media database is limited to high-quality English-language sources. Current cited authors include Mexican analysts. Continued research will further develop the database with Spanish-language sources.

Source: IEP calculations

CARTEL FRACTURE
64%
News and journalism sources view cartel fracture as the leading cause of the rise in violence in Mexico, being cited in 64 percent of sources.

POLITICAL/JUDICIAL FAILURE
39%
The second highest perceived cause is policy/judicial failure, which was mentioned in 39 percent of articles.

prohibitive as more groups are dismantled and more leaders arrested. This type of violence may exhibit ‘tipping point’ behavior. Once a certain level of disruption, has occurred then the fight against organized crime becomes easier and more effective. Key to the solution is imposing the appropriate penalties for those convicted of leading organized criminal operations and reducing the levels of impunity.

Weak state structures are also commonly cited in the media. These sources refer to a lack of resources preventing the different levels of government from addressing issues such as homicide or extortion. An insufficient or ill-trained police force can be a symptom of a weak state. Many citizens feel unprotected by their

“ Violence inside and outside the home track together, indicating a society-wide deterioration in peacefulness.

police force, with increases in private security being a symptom of this. From 2010 to 2016, nearly 1,000 new security firms entered the market, an increase of 32 percent over six years.¹⁴

The two other most commonly cited drivers of violence are corruption and the U.S. demand for illegal drugs, especially heroin. American demand for drugs is the type of external factor that Mexican policy makers cannot control. Much of Mexico’s geography makes it

ideal for producing and trafficking drugs to the United States. As a result, Mexico needs a high level of Positive Peace to counteract the risk factors that it cannot change. Building high levels of Positive Peace requires addressing corruption and government and state weakness. Not only does it facilitate a more effective security policy, but many other social benefits are derived from high levels of Positive Peace as well.

Media sources provide insight to the dynamics of violence, however, empirical analysis of violence can provide a more robust picture, finding that the rising level of violence by organized crime is having flow-on effects into society more broadly.

IEP analysis found that:

1. The ratio of homicide victims to homicide investigations has risen, indicating a higher rate of mass murders in 2017. Organized crime related violence can be characterized by multiple homicides. A rising rate of mass violence can also suggest higher rates of violence in public spaces, another hallmark of organized crime. They are less fearful of state justice, using violence to send a public message to actual and potential opponents.

2. The distribution of homicide data shows evidence of both interpersonal violence and increased violence between organized crime groups. An increasing number of states have extreme¹⁵ homicide rates, suggesting a rise in organized crime violence. However, violence is increasing throughout society. Young men tend to be most affected by organized criminal violence, and men do face a much higher rate of homicide in Mexico than women. However, most states had increases in the homicide rate of both sexes, suggesting a society-wide deterioration in peace beyond just organized crime.

3. Gun violence is on the rise, suggesting a higher level of organized crime violence. Between 2015 and 2017, the number of homicides committed with a firearm almost doubled from 10,462 to 20,083, or from 54 percent of all homicides to 69 percent.

4. Violence inside and outside the home track together, indicating a society-wide rise in violence. Family violence is correlated with sexual assault, violent assault, and robbery, and all four have been increasing. Rates of violence in the family have risen 32 percent over the last three years, suggesting a rise in general lawlessness.¹⁶

5. Institutional capacity for violence containment remains weak. Prison overcrowding has been alleviated in ten states, but 65 percent of police officers failed a skills evaluation and the rate of judges per 100,000 people remains four times lower than the global average.

RATIO OF HOMICIDE VICTIMS TO HOMICIDE INVESTIGATIONS

Nationally, there were 1.2 victims per homicide investigation in 2017, indicating that some portion of the cases were multiple homicides. Organized crime related violence in Mexico is thought to be characterized by group executions, and the victim-to-case ratio has slightly risen over the last two years, increasing by four percent nationwide. But the latest data from SESNSP, while much improved, still does not set out in detail how many of the homicide cases involved more than one victim. As such, the overall victim-to-case ratio is the most granular statistic available.


Figure 1.7 compares the number of homicide victims to the number of homicide investigations in each state in order to highlight states that are more or less affected by multiple homicides. The further a state deviates to the left of the line, the more deaths per case it has, indicating a higher level of multiple homicides.

The right hand panel of figure 1.5 shows that 28 states have cases

KEY FINDINGS ↗

EXTREME HOMICIDE RATES
>49 per 100,000

In 2017, six states had extreme homicide rates (above 49 per 100,000), compared to one state in 2015.



VICTIMS
87%

of victims were male and 71 percent were known to be adult males.



HOMICIDE RATE
43 per 100,000

The male homicide rate was 43 deaths per 100,000 men and boys, while the female rate was five deaths per 100,000 women and girls.

FIGURE 1.5

Homicide investigations vs homicide victims, 2017

States to the left of the line have a higher number of victims per homicide case, suggesting higher levels of organized crime.



Source: ENVIPE

of multiple homicides. Nayarit has the highest ratio, at 1.38 victims per case. Tamaulipas, Guanajuato, Baja California Sur and Chihuahua all have ratios of about 1.3. Furthermore, Nayarit, Guanajuato and Chihuahua are among the five states with the largest rise in the victim rate. Nayarit's victim rate rose by 29 percent last year, from 1.08 to nearly 1.4.

Sonora, Quintana Roo, Nuevo León and Durango all reported ratios of exactly one, suggesting either that the legal systems in these states investigate one case per homicide victim or that these states have not complied with the methodology for the new crime data. Mass graves have been found in all of these states, which could be associated with mass homicides or the ongoing use of the same site. The largest number of mass graves was found in



Organized crime related violence in Mexico is thought to be characterized by group executions, and the victim-to-case ratio has slightly risen over the last two years, increasing by four percent nationwide.

Durango, where 321 victims were exhumed from 12 mass graves between 2009 and 2014 – the greatest number of bodies recovered from mass graves in any state.¹⁷

DISTRIBUTION OF HOMICIDE DATA

The number of states with very high rates of homicides increased in 2017, driving the 'peace gap,' which is the increasing distance in scores between the least and most peaceful states. Figure 1.7 (overleaf) highlights the distribution of various levels of homicide by year, with the rates shifting to the right (more violent) over time. The wider distribution in 2017 highlights that fewer states had a low or moderate homicide rate and more states had rates over 49 per 100,000. A homicide rate above 49 is a statistical outlier,¹⁸ indicating an extreme level of violence. In 2017, six states had homicide rates above 49 per 100,000, compared to one state in 2015. Colima's homicide rate reached 106 in 2017, followed by Baja California Sur at 94.

In 2017, 87 percent of victims were male and 71 percent were known to be adult males.¹⁹ The male homicide rate was 43 deaths per 100,000 men and boys, while the female rate was five deaths per 100,000 women and girls.

Figure 1.6 (overleaf) shows the three-year monthly trend in the homicide rates for men and for women. Over the last three years, the male homicide rate has consistently been between seven and

BOX 1.3

Characteristics of organized-crime related homicides

The following characteristics are associated with homicides attributed to organized criminal groups in Mexico:



- Gun battles
- Group executions
- Torture
- Dismemberment
- High powered weaponry
- Beheadings
- "Narco" messages
- Mass graves

Source: Justice in Mexico Project²⁵

FIGURE 1.6

Monthly trend in the homicide rate by sex, 2015-2017

Men in Mexico are much more likely to be victims of homicide, with rates doubling for both sexes since January of 2015. The bold lines represent a three-month moving average.




Source: SESNSP

FIGURE 1.7

Distribution of homicide rates by year, 2015-2017

In 2017, six states had extreme homicide rates (above 49 per 100,000) compared to one state in 2015.



Source: SESNSP

eight times higher than the female rate. However, both rates more or less doubled between January 2015 and December 2017. The trend lines show that the escalation in violence has affected both sexes, indicating a rise not just in the types of violence generally associated with men or with women. While women's participation in the drug trade has risen in recent years, women are typically more affected by violence that takes place inside the home. For example, 47 percent of female homicide victims worldwide are killed by family members or intimate partners.²⁰ There has been a 60 percent rise in the number of households reporting purchasing a firearm from 2011 to 2016, which could be contributing to violence in the home.²¹

“

The trend lines show that the escalation in violence has affected both sexes, indicating a rise not just in the types of violence generally associated with men or with women.

The new age-disaggregated data only identifies victims as over or under 18 years old, and as such is not useful for detailed age analysis. Nationally, four percent of homicide victims are children, a similar rate to the United States, which faces high rates of gun violence but without the same level of organized crime.²² The majority of homicide victims in Mexico – 79 percent – are adults, while 17 percent of victims are of an unknown or unspecified age. The federal data does not disaggregate further, making it impossible to know what share of victims are youth, defined as aged 15 to 29.

The lack of disaggregated data in Mexico hinders the development of policy and its design. If data from the criminal justice system reported on the number of people convicted of organized-crime related homicides, then a better understanding of the rise in homicide rates would be possible. The lack of disaggregated data makes crafting policy responses more difficult. For example, the framework that keeps women and children safe in public spaces will be very different from the framework for reintegrating gang members back into society or programs that prevent youth from joining organized crime. The solutions that prevent girls and women from joining these groups may be very different from the solutions that work for boys and men. As such, it is critical to develop a clear idea of what is driving the homicide rate for each sex.

It is unclear why the homicide rates for men and women are rising in tandem, as, historically, male deaths are more likely to be associated crime while female rates are more likely to be

associated with domestic violence. To the extent that the rise is related to organized crime, one or more of the following may be true:

- Women are becoming more involved with organized crime.
- Organized crime related violence is increasingly taking place in spaces that are likely to include both men and women, such as family gatherings, parks, churches or schools.
- The norms related to organized crime violence are shifting, such that attacks are less confined to cartel members and more likely to target family members.

There are anecdotal examples of all of these dynamics. The July 2017 murder of seven women, two men and two children at a birthday party in the relatively peaceful state of Hidalgo is presumed to be organized-crime related and likely represents both an incursion into family-oriented spaces and an increased willingness to attack “soft targets.”²³ Meanwhile, the increased use of female assassins has been documented using social media evidence.²⁴

Individual state homicide rates suggest trends may be localized as well. Both Colima and Baja California Sur had sudden and severe escalations in their overall homicide rate in 2016 and 2017. These two states had the highest homicide rates for both men and women in 2017. On the other hand, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Jalisco and Michoacán have disproportionately high male homicide rates, each at least ten times higher than the female homicide rate in the same state. Sinaloa and Jalisco are home to two major criminal organizations – the Sinaloa Federation and the New Generation Jalisco Cartel – while Michoacán and Guerrero host critical ports that are used by criminal organizations to export drugs and commodities. Zacatecas, meanwhile, has a disproportionately high female homicide rate, at 16 compared to 69 for men, suggesting different dynamics are at play.

RISING GUN VIOLENCE

The rate of crimes committed with a firearm rose 36 percent last year, with some states recording even larger increases. Nationwide, 69 percent of homicides were committed with a firearm, and the least peaceful states had rates much higher. Baja California Sur’s homicide rate tripled last year, driven by a rise in gun violence, with 87 percent of murders having been committed with a firearm. The state also has the fourth highest multiple homicide rate in the country. Figure 1.9 shows the composition of the types of weapons used in homicides in 2015, 2016 and 2017, highlighting that more and more murders are committed with guns each year.

“

Jalisco and Michoacán have disproportionately high male homicide rates, each at least ten times higher than the female homicide rate in the same state.


The percentage of total homicides conducted with a firearm has risen as violence has escalated. From 2015 to 2017, the number of homicides committed with a firearm doubled from 10,462 to 20,083, outweighing all other causes of violent deaths. In 2015, firearms accounted for 54 percent of homicides; by 2017 this percentage had risen to 69 percent. The numbers of homicides committed with knives and with other weapon types have also risen from 2015 to 2017, although to a much smaller degree. The escalation in gun violence has been severe enough that every other category declined in percentage terms.

The only category to have declined in both raw numbers and percentage terms was homicides committed with an unspecified weapon type, falling by about a third. This decline likely reflects recent improvements in transparency and data quality, as an increasing number of case files include full details about the crime.

The disparity between the number of males killed with guns and the number of females suggests that much of the rising prevalence of gun violence in Mexico does stem from an increase in organized crime activity.

FIGURE 1.8
Homicides by weapon type, 2015-2017


Gun violence makes up an increasingly large share of homicides in Mexico, rising from 54 to 69 percent of the total in the last two years.



Source: SESNSP

FIGURE 1.9
Homicides by weapon & sex, 2017

Over 70 percent of homicides against men are carried out with a firearm, whereas women are more likely than men to be killed with other types of weapons.




Source: SESNSP

FIGURE 1.10

Family violence, January 2015 to December 2017

Monthly rates of family violence rose 32 percent from January 2015 to December 2017. The chart shows a three-month moving average to smooth the visualization of the trend.



Source: SESNSP

“
These forms of violence are less likely to be related to organized crime... indicating higher levels of interpersonal violence throughout society.”

RIISING FAMILY VIOLENCE

9.3 per 100,000

The December 2017 rate reached 9.3.

32% ↑

increase over the January 2015 rate.

The effect of the rise in violence on Mexican men represents a future risk factor for Mexico. Numerous studies show that as the number of households with missing men increases, so do violence, poverty, and other forms of social breakdown.²⁶ Youth in Mexico also face risks, as 69 percent of young people aged 12 to 29 who were witness to, victim of or involved in an act of gun violence reported that neither their community members or local police did anything in response to the incident.²⁷

FAMILY VIOLENCE

Violence in the family has a statistically significant correlation with sexual assault, violent assault, and robbery. These forms of violence are less likely to be related to organized crime, and have all been rising in the last three years, indicating higher levels of interpersonal violence throughout society.

Rates of family violence have risen over the same time period, as have the rates of other forms of violence in Mexico. Figure 1.10 shows the monthly trend in family violence for the last three years (the full available time series). The December 2017 rate reached 9.3, a 32 percent increase over the January 2015 rate.

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR CONTAINING VIOLENCE

IEP’s research increasingly demonstrates that improving the capacities and capabilities of government and society to contain violence are critical. Long-term violence prevention depends upon the *attitudes, institutions and structures* of Positive Peace, part of which covers government functionality and the justice system. In the short term, finding the optimal level of law enforcement and incarceration while strengthening the justice system is the key for improving the rule of law.

When compared to OECD country spending on the justice system,

policing and prisons as a percentage of GDP, Mexico only spent 60 percent of the average, suggesting the country significantly underinvests for its level of both violence and development.

Mexico’s institutional capacity would be improved by continuing to train and professionalize the police force. Nationwide, 62 percent of state-level public security employees have received full

training, according to the latest government data. Figure 1.11 highlights the percentage of state and municipal public security employees who have received training by state. Capacity building varies significantly between states.²⁸ Nonetheless, despite high rates of training in some states, 65 percent of officers failed to demonstrate the required skills in a 2014 evaluation by the National Public Security System.²⁹ Publishing more recent figures would help to better understand if there have been improvements in skill levels.

Over the last decade, Mexico has relied on its military to fill the gap in its law enforcement capacity, deploying an additional 30,000 troops in 2007.³⁰ The military was deployed by President Calderón in 2006 to address the infiltration of the police by cartel members and while deployments were meant to be temporary, soldiers still remain on the streets of Mexico. The military are trained for armed conflict, not policing, and therefore replacing them with properly trained police is becoming more necessary. Although the military might be better equipped to combat heavily armed criminals, soldiers lack basic law enforcement skills such as gathering evidence, conducting investigations and interviewing witnesses and suspects.


The state of Tamaulipas, which ranks 23rd in the MPI, has relied on the military for security since the disbanding of its local police force, which was found to have ties to cartels.³¹

According to a study released in 2011, during the last wave of

FIGURE 1.11

Percent trained employees out of total employees

By and large, the states with the smallest forces have a greater percentage of employees trained, suggesting that states may face resource challenges in training a large number of people.



Source: INEGI CNG

TABLE 1.2

Ten states that reduced prison overcrowding, 2015-2017

State	2015			2017		
	Spaces	People	Population Rate	Spaces	People	Population Rate
Aguascalientes	1,480	1,539	104%	1,885	1,254	67%
Baja California	14,823	16,449	111%	14,827	12,839	87%
Baja California Sur	1,564	1,987	127%	1,682	1,548	92%
Chiapas	4,848	5,686	117%	4,848	4,526	93%
Chihuahua	7,296	7,575	104%	7,696	7,656	99%
Colima	3,537	3,784	107%	3,620	2,439	67%
Michoacán	5,959	6,420	108%	5,959	5,000	84%
Oaxaca	4,204	4,393	104%	4,302	3,176	74%
Sinaloa	6,485	9,011	139%	6,499	5,435	84%
Veracruz	8,046	8,263	103%	7,016	7,024	100%

Source: IEP

deteriorating peacefulness, violence increased disproportionately in states where the federal police ceded power to the military. The study uses propensity score matching to isolate the impact of military intervention on homicide rates, reaching the conclusion that military deployments were associated with an increased rate of murder.³²

The continuing rise in levels of violence also indicates that the extensive use of the military has had limited beneficial impact. If it is to be effective, the tactical use of the military needs to be integrated into a much broader strategic plan that address both the causes and the symptoms of violence, as discussed throughout this report.


Mexico has struggled to develop the justice system's capacity to address the high levels of crime in the country. Mexico has 4.2

judges per 100,000 people, significantly below the global average of 16.2.³³ This deficit in judges means that fewer cases go before the bench and helps to contribute to the low conviction rates and the large number of prisoners held without a sentence. In 10 states, the total number of convictions as a percentage of the total number of homicide cases is under 20 percent, with the worst state being Tamaulipas at less than one percent.

On the other hand, improvements have been made in reducing prison overcrowding. In 2015, 23 states had various degrees of prison overcrowding; by 2017, ten states had addressed their overcrowding problem. Out of the remaining 13 states, only Guanajuato, Tabasco, and Zacatecas experienced a higher rate of overcrowding in 2017 than in 2015, with all other states making improvements.

KEY FINDINGS

FIREARM HOMICIDES



From 2015 to 2017, the number of homicides committed with a firearm doubled from 10,462 to 20,083, outweighing all other causes of violent deaths. In 2015, firearms accounted for 54% of homicides; by 2017 this percentage had risen to 69%.

STATE IMPROVEMENTS VS DETERIORATIONS



Only seven of the 32 states improved in peacefulness in 2017, while 25 states deteriorated

YUCATÁN




Yucatán was once again the most peaceful state, followed by Tlaxcala, Campeche, Coahuila and Chiapas. Four of these states improved in peacefulness: Yucatán, Tlaxcala, Campeche, and Chiapas.

FIGURE 1.12

Number of private security companies & national GDP, 2010-2016

Between 2010 and 2016, nearly 1,000 new private security firms entered the market.



“ With the growth in the industry, the federal government is now attempting to regulate it.

PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS

32% ↑

increase between 2010 and 2016 accounted for 1,000 new security firms entering the market.

2015	3,104
2017	4,102

Source: INEGI

Seven states addressed the problem by adding prison capacity. Aguascalientes created 405 new spaces in its prisons, an increase of 27 percent. Chiapas, Michoacán and Veracruz reduced the number of inmates, with Veracruz recording a 13 percent fall in capacity over the last two years.

PRIVATE SECURITY IN MEXICO

Because of the rising rates of violence, many Mexicans have turned to private security providers. From 2010 to 2016, the number of private security companies in Mexico increased from 3,104 to 4,102, an increase of 32 percent over six years. The number has been steadily increasing since 2012, even as economic

growth slowed in 2016, highlighting the above average growth rate of the industry.

Between 2015 and 2016, the number of private security companies increased by 112, despite a slight drop in GDP. With the growth in the industry, the federal government is now attempting to regulate it. Security companies are required to register with the Secretary of the Interior, however many have encountered barriers due to complicated regulations, the high cost of registration and long bureaucratic process.³⁴ The Mexican Association of Private Security Firms has been advocating for a uniform federal law that will make registration and regulation easier for business and government.³⁵



SECTION 2:

ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

KEY FINDINGS

- The economic impact of violence in Mexico was 4.72 trillion pesos (US\$249 billion) in 2017. This is equivalent to 21 percent of the country's GDP.
- The economic impact of violence was eight times higher than the public investments made in health and seven times higher than those made in education in 2017.
- A one percent decline in the economic impact of violence is equivalent to federal government's investment in activities related to science, technology and innovation in 2017.
- On a per person basis, the economic impact of violence was 33,118 pesos, more than four times the average monthly salary of a Mexican worker.
- The largest contributor to the economic impact of violence in 2017 was homicide, accounting for 46 percent of the total impact. This is equivalent to 2.18 trillion pesos or ten percent of Mexico's GDP.
- The economic impact of violence increased by 15 percent in 2017 or 634 billion pesos.
- The largest contributor to the increase in the economic impact in 2017 was homicide which increased by 27 percent or 458 billion pesos.
- The per capita economic impact varies significantly from state to state, ranging from 9,779 pesos in Yucatán to 95,486 pesos in Colima.
- Federal government expenditure on violence containment activities decreased by seven percent in 2017, after rising 86 percent in the prior decade.
- Mexico spends one percent of its GDP on domestic security and the justice system. This is only 60 percent of the average for OECD countries.
- Given the high opportunity cost of violence, higher investments in public security could generate significant economic gains.



THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN 2017

The economic impact of violence in Mexico was estimated to be 4.72 trillion pesos (US\$249 billion) in 2017, equivalent to 21 percent of Mexico's GDP. This represents a 15 percent increase from 2016, and reflects the country's deterioration in peacefulness.

To put this into perspective the economic impact of violence was eight times higher than public expenditure on health and seven times higher than those made in education. This highlights that small reductions in violence can have a meaningful positive impact on the economy.

Violence and the fear of violence create significant economic disruptions. While violent incidents incur costs in the form of property damage, physical injury or psychological trauma, fear of violence alters economic behaviour, primarily by changing investment and consumption patterns but also in diverting public and private resources away from productive activities and towards protective measures.

Combined, they generate significant welfare losses in the form of productivity shortfalls, foregone earnings and distorted expenditure – all of which affect the price of goods and services. Measuring the scale and cost of violence has, therefore, important implications for assessing the effects it has on economic activity.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the share of the total economic impact of violence by category in 2017. The data shows that the

consequential costs from violence in Mexico are significantly larger than government expenditure on violence containment. Government spending on domestic security and the judicial system in Mexico as a percentage of GDP is only 60 percent of the OECD average. Considering the higher levels of violence, considerable gains can be made by increasing funding to match the OECD average.



Fear of violence alters economic behaviour, primarily by changing investment and consumption patterns.

Homicide is the largest category in the model, at 46 percent of the total in 2017, up from 42 percent in 2016. The rising homicide rate in 2017 drove both the deterioration in peacefulness and the rising economic impact of violence, leading to an increase of 27 percent or 458 billion pesos from the year prior. The total economic impact of homicide to the Mexican economy amounted to 2.18 trillion in 2017, equivalent to ten percent of Mexico's GDP. This highlights the large economic gains associated with reductions in the homicide rate in Mexico. A ten percent decline in the economic impact of homicide is equivalent to 218

billion pesos. This is equivalent to nine times what the government spent on science, technology and innovation in 2017.

Violent crime, which is comprised of robbery, assault and rape,

KEY FINDINGS

ECONOMIC IMPACT

2.18tn

pesos in 2017. The total economic impact of homicide to the Mexican economy




27%

increase to the economic cost of violence mainly due to the rising homicide rate and deterioration in peacefulness

FIGURE 2.1

Category breakdown of the total economic impact of violence, 2017

Homicide and violent crime represent 86 percent of the economic impact of violence. This highlights that the impact from consequences of violence is far larger than containment spending in Mexico.



Source: IEP

TABLE 2.1

The economic impact of violence in 2017, billion constant 2017 pesos

Total economic losses including lost opportunity resulting from violence amounted to 4.72 trillion pesos in 2017.

INDICATOR	DIRECT	INDIRECT	MULTIPLIER EFFECT	TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE
Homicide	189.5	1,803.80	189.50	2,182.80
Violent Crime	173.1	1,558.80	173.10	1,905.00
Organized Crime	1.9	14.9	1.90	18.70
Fear		79.1	-	79.10
Incarceration		2.2	-	2.20
Firearms	8.3	-	8.30	16.60
Private security	12.5	-	12.50	25.00
Military spending	99.1	-	99.10	198.20
Domestic security spending	44.5	-	44.50	89.00
Justice system spending	102.9	-	102.90	205.80
	631.8	3,458.80	631.80	4,722.40

Source: IEP

was the second most expensive form of violence, representing 40 percent of the economic impact of violence, at 1.9 trillion pesos. Together, violent crime and homicide add up to 86 percent of the total economic impact of violence. However, violent crime did not increase at the same rate as homicides. The increase in violent crime was 202 billion pesos or 12 percent from its 2016 level.

Government spending on activities aimed at reducing violence – military, internal security and justice system expenditure were 493 billion pesos, accounting for 10 percent of the total economic impact.

The remaining three percent of economic losses are related to fear of violence, organized crime activity, household firearm purchases, and the costs of private security.

Table 2.1 presents a full breakdown of the costs included in the 2017 estimate. Direct costs can be expenditures incurred by the victim, the perpetrator and the government. Indirect costs accrue after the fact and include the present value of long-term costs arising from incidents of crime, such as lost future income, and physical and psychological trauma.

The multiplier effect represents the lost economic benefits that would have been generated if all relevant expenditure had been directed into more productive alternatives. The total economic impact of violence is the direct cost of violence, the indirect cost and the multiplier effect added together which reflects the opportunity cost of violence.

The economic impact of organized criminal activity is calculated for two types of crimes, kidnapping and extortion, and amounted to 18.7 billion pesos in 2017; however, this is a highly conservative estimate as the model does not include all of the losses imposed by organized criminal groups, in particular, human trafficking, commodity theft, or drug-trade related economic activity such as production, transport, and trade. Data on these types of crimes is extremely difficult to capture.



PER CAPITA

33,118

On a per person basis, the economic impact of violence was 33,118 pesos, more than four times the average monthly salary of a Mexican worker.

“

Even small reductions in violence can have a meaningful positive impact on the economy.

PER CAPITA

The nationwide economic impact of violence amounted to 33,118 pesos per person in 2017. These per capita losses surpass four months of income for an average Mexican worker or two months income for the average Mexican family.¹

Table 2.2 contains the MPI score and the per capita economic impact of violence by state. As expected, where peacefulness is low, the economic impact of violence is higher. However, given the high cost of homicide, some states suffer more from the economic impact of violence than their MPI rank would seem to predict.

Colima, which ranks 29st out of 32 states in the MPI, has the highest per capita impact at 95,486 pesos. Colima had the highest homicide rate in Mexico in 2017 but has a relatively small population.

Yucatan had the lowest impact of violence of any state in Mexico at 9,779 pesos. If the level of peace in every state improved to Yucatan's level, the economic impact of violence would be reduced to 1.65 trillion pesos or nine percent of Mexican GDP. This will result in a peace dividend of three trillion pesos equivalent to 16 percent of Mexico's GDP.

“

If the level of peace in every state improved to Yucatan's level, the economic impact of violence would be reduced to 1.65 trillion pesos or nine percent of Mexican GDP.




TABLE 2.2

The per capita economic impact of violence, 2017

The per capita impact of violence varies significantly from state to state in Mexico, from Yucatán at 9,779 pesos per person to Colima at 95,486 pesos per person.

STATE	STATE MPI SCORE	PER CAPITA IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (PESOS)	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (BILLIONS)
YUCATÁN	1.167	9,779	29.0
CHIAPAS	1.572	14,467	95.3
CAMPECHE	1.482	14,774	19.3
TLAXCALA	1.381	15,198	25.8
COAHUILA	1.505	18,568	69.0
PUEBLA	1.882	21,610	159.3
NAYARIT	1.974	22,319	35.0
VERACRUZ	1.998	22,513	211.2
HIDALGO	1.757	23,166	81.1
NUEVO LEÓN	2.578	25,364	154.7
DURANGO	2.043	26,106	57.6
JALISCO	2.341	26,369	245.8
SONORA	2.230	28,101	102.6
OAXACA	2.095	28,624	134.5
AGUASCALIENTES	2.223	29,088	45.8
QUERÉTARO	2.010	29,719	72.7
QUINTANA ROO	2.452	30,955	62.6
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	2.472	31,237	103.1
MICHOACÁN	2.420	32,215	167.9
MEXICO CITY	2.693	32,406	331.5
TABASCO	2.973	33,075	93.7
TAMAULIPAS	2.740	36,429	153.3
MEXICO	2.550	37,009	721.7
GUANAJUATO	2.544	38,821	258.8
ZACATECAS	3.306	44,351	82.3
SINALOA	3.051	44,988	157.1
MORELOS	2.888	46,632	105.0
CHIHUAHUA	2.979	53,286	227.6
GUERRERO	4.153	63,700	259.0
BAJA CALIFORNIA	3.951	70,683	288.8
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	4.550	94,244	88.9
COLIMA	3.640	95,486	82.8
National		33,118	4,722.6

Source: IEP



TRENDS IN ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

IEP's 2018 Economic impact of violence model reflects the updated crime data from SESNSP. The new data only dates back to 2015, allowing three years of trend analysis. SESNSP changed the way it records crime data allowing for only three years of direct comparison. In future years as more data is released a longer trend analysis will be able to be developed.

The economic impact of violence increased by 15 percent in 2017, resulting in 634 billion in additional losses. This followed a ten percent increase in economic impact of violence in 2016.

TABLE 2.3

Trend in the economic impact of violence 2015-2017, billions constant 2017 pesos

Total economic losses including lost opportunity resulting from violence amounted to 4.72 trillion pesos in 2017.


INDICATOR	2015	2016	2017	CHANGE (2016 TO 2017)
Homicide	1,394.6	1,724.6	2,182.7	27%
Violent Crime	1,650.0	1,702.9	1,905.1	12%
Organized Crime	17.6	18.5	18.7	2%
Fear	75.5	76.3	79.1	4%
Incarceration	2.5	2.5	2.2	-13%
Firearms	12.2	10.7	16.6	54%
Private security	24.5	24.7	25.1	1%
Military spending	217.0	206.2	198.3	-4%
Domestic security spending	108.8	99.1	89.0	-10%
Justice system spending	199.8	223.2	205.7	-8%
	3,702.5	4,088.9	4,722.6	15%

Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.2

Trend in the economic impact of violence 2015-2017

The economic impact of violence increased 25 percent from 2015 to 2017. It increased from 3.7 trillion pesos in 2015 to 4.72 trillion pesos in 2017, increasing by 386 billion pesos in 2016 and 634 billion pesos in 2017.



Source: IEP

TRENDS ↗

HEALTH & EDUCATION

8x

The economic impact of violence was eight times higher than the public investments made in health and seven times higher than those made in education in 2017.

“

The economic impact of violence increased by 15 percent in 2017



FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

Direct government expenditure on containing and dealing with the consequences of violence accounted for ten percent of the total economic impact of violence in 2017 and amounted to 493 billion pesos. This is comprised of spending on incarceration, domestic security, military and the justice system.

From 2007 to 2017, federal violence containment expenditure increased by 70 percent, representing an additional cost to Mexico's budget but this is still well below the OECD country average. Given the fact that the direct losses from homicide and violent crime are so significant in Mexico and the rates of violence have been so high, an increase in these investments are well justified and essential.

It was only after 2011 that the increase in spending slowed and in 2017 there was a year-on-year decline of seven percent. Figure 2.3 shows the trend in government expenditure on violence containment.

Figure 2.3 shows spending on public order and safety for OECD countries and covers domestic security and justice system spending. Spending in these areas in Mexico are well below the OECD average. IEP research indicates that more investment is


needed so as to improve the functioning of the justice and police systems. This would help to free up the current heavy reliance on the military. When investing in the security system, other broader initiatives need to be undertaken. In Mexico's case, special emphasis needs to be placed on corruption, transparency and training.

It is important to understand the efficiency and effectiveness of government spending on the justice and security sectors. Spending beyond an optimal level has the potential to constrain a nation's economic development. However, under investment will create the conditions for excessive levels of

“

More investment is needed so as to improve the functioning of the justice and police

KEY FINDINGS



GOVERNMENT SPENDING


10%

Government spending on activities aimed at reducing violence – military, internal security and justice system expenditure were 493 billion pesos, accounting for 10 percent of the total economic impact.

FIGURE 2.3

Government expenditure on violence containment, 2007-2017

The rise in government expenditure on violence containment has slowed since 2014 and then declining by seven percent in 2017.



Source: Mexican Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP)

TABLE 2.4

Government spending on violence containment, 2007-2017, constant 2017 pesos, billions


INDICATOR	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Military Expenditure	59.3	64.9	72.9	81.4	94.7	87.7	90.2	102.0	108.5	103.1	99.1
Domestic Security	27.3	31.3	41.8	44.1	53.0	53.2	47.0	53.7	54.4	49.6	44.5
Justice	55.9	60.7	64.9	68.9	77.8	88.6	85.0	97.3	99.9	111.6	102.9
Total	142.4	157.0	179.6	194.3	225.5	229.5	222.1	252.9	262.8	264.3	246.5

Source: Mexican Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP)

crime which in turn will negatively impact the economy. These trade-offs are not easy to understand and present an important policy challenge. The scarcity of public resources means that an increase in spending on containing violence has to be funded by increased taxes or reallocating from other sectors. In Mexico, the lack of capabilities in the judicial and security sectors leads to a security gap where the consequential costs of violence far exceed containment costs. Therefore, achieving the optimal levels of spending on public security expenditure is important for making the most productive use of capital.

FIGURE 2.4

Domestic security and justice system spending in OECD countries as percentage of GDP



Source: OECD, Mexican Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP)

VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

7%

decrease in 2017 Federal government expenditure on violence containment activities, after rising 86 percent in the prior decade.

“

The lack of capabilities in the judicial and security sectors leads to a security gap

METHODOLOGY

The global economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic activity related to “containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence.” The estimates include the direct and indirect cost of violence as well as an economic multiplier. The multiplier effect calculates the additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided.

This study includes two types of costs, plus a multiplier: direct and indirect costs. Examples of direct costs include medical costs for victims of violent crime, capital destruction from violence and costs associated with the security and judicial systems. Indirect costs include lost wages or productivity from crime due to physical and emotional trauma. There is also a measure of the impact of fear on the economy, as people who fear that they may become a victim of violent crime alter their behaviour.

The multiplier refers to the additional economic activity that would have occurred if the crimes had not been committed or where government expenditure for policing, the legal and judicial system had been directed to more productive uses.

IEP estimates the economic impact of violence in Mexico using a similar methodology to its global study, the Economic Value of Peace. The Mexican study uses a variety of measures including a comprehensive aggregation of costs related to violence, armed conflict and spending on military, judicial and policing and internal security services.

IEP’s estimate of the economic impact of violence includes three components:

1. **Direct costs** are the costs of crime or violence to the victim, the perpetrator, and the government. These include direct expenditures such as the cost of policing, medical expenses, funerals or incarceration.
2. **Indirect costs** are costs that accrue after the fact. These include physical and psychological trauma and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as lost future income.
3. **The multiplier effect** is a commonly used economic concept which describes the extent to which additional expenditure has flow-on impacts in the wider economy. Every time there is an injection of new income into the economy this will lead to more spending, which will in turn create employment, further income and encourage additional spending, thereby increasing GDP. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is the reason behind the ‘multiplier effect’ and why a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity. Refer to Box 2.1 for more detail on the peace multiplier.

Violence containment expenditure refers to the direct and indirect costs associated with preventing or dealing with the consequences of violence.

The **economic impact of violence** refers to the total cost of violence containment plus the peace multiplier, explained in Box 2.1.

This study uses a cost accounting methodology to measure the economic impact of violence. Expenditures on containing violence are totalled and unit costs are applied to the MPI estimates for the number of crimes committed. These crimes only include homicide, assault, rape, robbery, extortion, and kidnapping. A unit cost is also applied to the estimated level of fear of insecurity. The unit costs estimate the direct (tangible) and indirect (intangible) costs of each crime. Direct unit costs include losses to the victim and perpetrator, and exclude costs incurred by law enforcement and health care systems, as these are captured elsewhere in the model. Indirect unit costs include the physical and psychological trauma, and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as lost life-time wages for homicide victims.

The cost estimates provided in this report are in constant 2017 pesos, which facilitates the comparison of the estimates over time. The estimation only includes elements of violence where reliable data could be obtained. As such, the estimate can be considered conservative. The items listed below are included in the cost of violence methodology:

1. Homicide
2. Violent crime, which includes assault, rape and robbery
3. Organized crime, which includes extortion and kidnapping
4. Indirect costs of incarceration
5. Firearms
6. Fear of insecurity
7. Private security expenditures
8. Federal spending on violence containment, which includes the military, domestic security and the justice system.
9. Medical and funeral costs

Some of the items not counted in the economic impact of violence include:

- State-level public spending on security
- The cost of domestic violence
- The cost of violence to businesses
- Insurance premiums related to violence
- Household out-of-pocket spending on safety and security
- The cost of drug-trade related crimes such as the production, possession, transport and supply of drugs.

Although data is available for some of these categories, it is either not fully available for all states, or for all years of analysis.

For more details on the methodology for estimating the economic impact of violence, please refer to the full methodology section on page 72.

BOX 2.1

The multiplier effect

The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic concept, which describes the extent to which additional expenditure improves the wider economy. Every time there is an injection of new income into the economy this will lead to more spending which will, in turn, create employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is known as the 'multiplier effect' and is the reason that a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of expenditure related to containing violence. For instance, if a community were to become more peaceful, individuals would spend less time and resources protecting themselves against violence. Because of this decrease in violence there are likely to be substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, as money is diverted towards more productive areas such as health, business investment, education and infrastructure.

When a homicide is avoided, the direct costs, such as the money spent on medical treatment and a funeral, could be

spent elsewhere. The economy also benefits from the lifetime income of the victim. The economic benefits from greater peace can therefore be significant. This was also noted by Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009) who argued that violence or the fear of violence may result in some economic activities not occurring at all. More generally, there is strong evidence to suggest that violence and the fear of violence can fundamentally alter the incentives for business. For instance, analysis of 730 business ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001 found that with higher levels of violence, new ventures were less likely to survive and profit. Consequently, with greater levels of violence it is likely that we might expect lower levels of employment and economic productivity over the long-term, as the incentives faced discourage new employment creation and longer-term investment.

“

A dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity

This study assumes that the multiplier is one, signifying that for every dollar saved on violence containment, there will be an additional dollar of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with similar studies.²



SECTION 3:


POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO

KEY FINDINGS

- Mexico ranked 59th out of 163 countries in the 2017 Positive Peace Index (PPI), with an overall score better than both the global and the Central America and Caribbean regional averages.
- In contrast, Mexico ranked 142nd out of 164 in the 2017 Global Peace Index (GPI).
- When a country ranks higher in the PPI than in the GPI, it is said to have a Positive Peace surplus. This indicates that Mexico has the potential to improve its levels of peacefulness.
- However, Mexico performed poorly on three critical Positive Peace Pillars - well-functioning government, low levels of corruption and free flow of information. These are the only three of the eight Pillars to exhibit deteriorating trends.
- Mexico's underperforming Pillars are characteristic of the kind of institutional weakness that allows organized crime to thrive.
- Results from the Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) highlight that the most peaceful states tend to be the ones with higher levels of Positive Peace.
- The top five states in the MPPI ranking are: Yucatán, Nuevo León, Aguascalientes, Querétaro and Campeche. Yucatán, Campeche and Querétaro are also ranked in the top ten for the MPI.
- The bottom five states in the MPPI ranking are: Guerrero, Chiapas, Tabasco, Oaxaca and Morelos. Guerrero, Tabasco, and Morelos are also ranked in the bottom ten for the MPI.

ABOUT POSITIVE PEACE

WHAT IS POSITIVE PEACE?



+

Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. These same factors also lead to many other positive outcomes that society feels are important. Therefore, Positive Peace is described as creating the optimum environment for human potential to flourish.

+

Positive Peace has been empirically derived by IEP via the statistical analysis of thousands of cross-country measures of economic and social progress to determine what factors are statistically significantly associated with the Global Peace Index.

+

Positive Peace is measured by the Positive Peace Index (PPI), which consists of eight domains, each containing three indicators, totalling 24. This provides a baseline measure of the effectiveness of a country to build and maintain peace. It also provides a measure for policymakers, researchers, and corporations to use.

+

Positive Peace factors can be used as the basis for empirically measuring a country's resilience, or its ability to absorb and recover from shocks. It can also be used to measure fragility and to help predict the likelihood of conflict, violence and instability

The distinguishing feature of IEP's work on Positive Peace is that it is empirically derived through quantitative analysis. There are few known empirical and quantitative frameworks available to analyze Positive Peace. Historically, it has largely been understood qualitatively and based on idealistic concepts of a peaceful society.

Instead, IEP's Positive Peace framework is based on the quantitatively identifiable common characteristics of the world's most peaceful countries. In order to address the gap in this kind of quantitative research, IEP utilizes the time-series data contained in the GPI, in combination with existing peace and development literature to statistically analyze which characteristics peaceful countries have in common. An important

aspect of this approach is to avoid value judgments and allow statistical analysis to explain the key drivers of peace.

Human beings encounter disagreement and dispute regularly – whether at home, at work, among friends, or on a more systemic level between ethnic, religious or political groups. But the majority of these conflicts do not result in violence. Conflict provides the opportunity to negotiate or renegotiate to improve mutual outcomes, and as such can be constructive, provided it is nonviolent.¹ There are certain aspects within societies that enable this, such as attitudes that discourage violence or formal and informal structures designed to reconcile grievances. The Positive Peace framework draws out the positive aspects of societies that support adaptability and resilience so that violence is avoided.

THE PILLARS OF POSITIVE PEACE

IEP has identified eight key factors, or Pillars, that comprise Positive Peace:



CHARACTERISTICS OF POSITIVE PEACE

Positive Peace has the following characteristics:

- Systemic and complex: progress occurs in non-linear ways and can be better understood through relationships and communication flows rather than through a linear sequence of events.
- Virtuous or vicious: it works as a process where negative feedback loops or vicious cycles can be created and perpetuated, or alternatively, positive feedback loops are where virtuous cycles are created and perpetuated.
- Preventative: though overall Positive Peace levels tend to change slowly over time, building strength in relevant Pillars can prevent violence and violent conflict.
- Underpins resilience and nonviolence: Positive Peace builds the capacity for resilience and incentives for nonviolent alternatives to conflict resolution. It provides an empirical framework to measure an otherwise amorphous concept, resilience.
- Informal and formal: it includes both formal and informal societal factors. This implies that societal and attitudinal factors are as important as state institutions.
- Supports development goals: Positive Peace provides an environment in which development goals are more likely to be achieved.



POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO

MEXICO IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

Understanding peace in Mexico, a middle-income OECD member state experiencing a high rate of violence, is not straightforward. Mexico ranked 59th out of 163 countries in the 2017 Positive Peace Index (PPI), with an overall score that outperformed both the global and the Central American and Caribbean regional averages. In contrast, it ranked 142nd in the 2017 Global Peace Index (GPI), underperforming the global and regional average, with an overall score similar to countries like Egypt, Mali, Burundi, and Venezuela.

When a country performs better in the PPI relative to the GPI, it is said to have a Positive Peace surplus. This surplus is an indication of a country's institutional, economic and societal capacity to improve its level of peacefulness. But given that Positive Peace represents a system of relationships, this capacity can be impaired when there is an imbalance between the Positive Peace Pillars, which is the case for Mexico. An imbalance is where some Pillars are much weaker than the others.

PILLAR IMBALANCES

IEP's global research has found a negative and statistically significant correlation between imbalanced Pillar performance and levels of peacefulness.² This suggests that in order to improve peace, the multiple dimensions of Positive Peace need to work in unison.


While Mexico outperformed the global and regional average in the Pillars for *sound business environment, high levels of human capital, good relations with neighbors, equitable distribution of resources and acceptance of the rights of others*, it underperformed in the Pillars for *well-functioning government, low levels of corruption and free flow of information*.



... balanced performance across the Pillars of Positive Peace is a defining characteristic of highly peaceful countries.

FIGURE 3.1

Mexico vs global top quintile countries, PPI pillar scores, 2017



Source: IEP

TABLE 3.1

Effects of increasing one pillar while keeping another constant

Improvements in certain Pillars without improvements in others – specifically *sound business environment* and *low levels of corruption* – correlates negatively with peacefulness.

REGION	IMPROVING THIS PILLAR	WITHOUT IMPROVING THIS PILLAR	CORRELATION WITH PEACEFULNESS
Central American & Caribbean	 Sound Business Environment	 Low Levels of Corruption	-0.42
Central American & Caribbean	 Sound Business Environment	 Well-Functioning Government	-0.52
South America	 Sound Business Environment	 Acceptance of the Rights of Others	-0.44
South America	 High Levels of Human Capital	 Low Levels of Corruption	-0.46
South America	 Sound Business Environment	 Low Levels of Corruption	-0.48
South America	 High Levels of Human Capital	 Well-Functioning Government	-0.48
South America	 Sound Business Environment	 Well-Functioning Government	-0.49

Improvements in certain Pillars without improvements in others – specifically *sound business environment* and *low levels of corruption* – correlates negatively with peacefulness.

This imbalance underpins Mexico's difficulties in addressing its high rates of criminal violence.

IEP's global research has shown that balanced performance across the Pillars of Positive Peace is a defining characteristic of highly peaceful countries. In other words, countries with the highest levels of Positive Peace tend to register the lowest variance in Pillar scores.

Figure 3.1 compares Mexico's Pillar scores with the averaged Pillar scores of the countries that ranked in the top quintile of the 2017 PPI. It shows that Mexico's three underperforming Pillars are the ones for which the distance from the scores of the top quintile countries is the largest. This highlights that Mexico's ability to improve its levels of peacefulness largely depends on its ability to improve its underperforming Pillars.

These imbalances create risks for peace and security interventions. Efforts to improve some Pillars without improving others can have counterproductive consequences. In the South America and Central America and the Caribbean regions, if the *sound business environment* Pillar improves and *low levels of corruption* and *well-functioning government* remain the same then peace is more likely to deteriorate, as shown in Table 3.1.

If Mexico is to become more peaceful, it needs to focus on strengthening its weakest Pillars: *well-functioning government*, *low levels of corruption* and *free flow of information*. Although building a *sound business environment* and improving levels of human capital are important, focusing on them to the exclusion of other Pillars will not promote societal advancement.

In high Positive Peace systems, *low levels of corruption* and a *well-functioning government* act as barriers to the growth of organized criminal activity. But in Mexico, a country with a sizeable illicit economy, the scores for *well-functioning government* and *low levels of corruption* remain low, reflecting the



Efforts to improve some Pillars without improving others can have counterproductive consequences.

country's lagging institutional capacity to tackle organized crime and the violent activities associated with it.

The high levels of criminality and violence in Mexico and many of its Central and South American neighbors are primarily driven by economic rather than political gain: access to illicit commodities, trafficking territory or drug cultivation. The infrastructure normally associated with high-performing legal businesses can

also be used for illicit activities, such as leveraging telecommunications networks, and using road networks for access to ports and borders, and laundering money through legitimate banks and businesses. While corruption can facilitate the operation of criminal activities, weaknesses in the law enforcement and justice system can reduce the capacity to prosecute crimes. Consequently, high levels of impunity translate into lower opportunity costs for engaging in illicit activities or in committing violent crimes.

Meanwhile, the tens of billions of dollars of illicit profits flowing through Central America and into the U.S. generate wealth for criminal syndicates. Global Financial Integrity (GFI), an independent think tank, conservatively estimated that inward and outward illicit financial flows in Mexico totaled USD 77.6 billion between 2005 and 2013.³

The complementary relationship between Mexico's *sound business environment* and criminal activity demonstrates the importance of 'systems thinking' for Positive Peace. When aspects of the system are out of balance, Positive Peace will not be robust enough to foster lower levels of violence.

2018

MEXICO POSITIVE PEACE INDEX

The MPPI is based on the global PPI methodology and uses state-level economic, governance, social and attitudinal data sourced primarily from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), but also from intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, and international non-governmental organizations like Freedom House and Reporters without Borders.



STATE RESULTS

Results from the MPPI find that the most peaceful states, as measured by the MPI, tend to be the ones with higher levels of Positive Peace. The top five states in the MPPI ranking are: Yucatán, Nuevo León, Aguascalientes, Querétaro and Campeche. Three of these states are also ranked in top ten of the MPI: Yucatán, Campeche and Querétaro. Aguascalientes ranks in the top half of




the MPI, at 13. The bottom five states in the MPPI ranking are: Guerrero, Chiapas, Tabasco, Oaxaca and Morelos. Guerrero, Tabasco, and Morelos and are ranked in the bottom ten for the MPI.

When looking at the geographic distribution of Positive Peace by state, the states with low or very low levels of Positive Peace form a cluster around Mexico City in the southern region of the country. The full results of the MPPI are shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2

Positive Peace scores across states and by pillar, 2016

Only five states perform strongly on seven of the eight Positive Peace pillars. At a global level, peaceful societies tend to have strengths in all pillars. Many states have room for improvement.

RANK	STATE	OVERALL SCORE								
1	YUCATÁN	2.339	2.107	2.682	1.591	3.189	2.284	1.809	2.848	2.774
2	NUEVO LEÓN	2.341	2.763	2.303	1.827	1.783	2.596	1.891	2.279	3.485
3	AGUASCALIENTES	2.439	3.014	2.246	1.732	2.036	2.626	2.106	2.780	3.253
4	QUERÉTARO	2.544	2.896	2.632	1.940	2.683	2.777	1.933	3.113	2.659
5	CAMPECHE	2.583	1.817	2.090	2.357	3.184	2.987	2.388	3.144	3.107
6	JALISCO	2.591	3.019	2.650	2.311	2.817	2.830	1.589	2.925	2.630
7	DURANGO	2.593	2.355	2.940	2.351	3.198	2.962	2.166	2.707	2.307
8	COAHUILA	2.633	2.481	2.875	3.374	2.388	2.240	2.131	1.767	3.368
9	SONORA	2.651	2.492	2.970	2.935	2.678	2.693	1.515	2.445	3.347
10	BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	2.660	2.902	3.555	3.291	2.128	2.076	1.959	2.275	2.590
11	COLIMA	2.699	3.439	2.499	2.634	2.767	3.098	1.454	2.201	3.294
12	TAMAULIPAS	2.709	3.377	3.171	2.649	2.696	3.016	2.266	2.090	2.225
13	SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	2.812	2.665	2.357	2.731	3.413	3.286	2.127	2.908	3.112
14	SINALOA	2.857	3.060	2.607	2.633	3.444	2.907	2.064	2.770	3.452
15	MEXICO CITY	2.879	2.802	3.159	4.200	1.000	4.544	2.235	2.020	2.216
16	BAJA CALIFORNIA	2.900	3.737	3.178	2.770	2.503	2.474	1.723	2.503	4.120
17	NAYARIT	2.916	3.172	3.570	2.692	3.772	2.347	1.830	2.673	3.338
18	GUANAJUATO	2.943	3.745	2.692	1.983	2.497	3.592	2.303	3.582	3.525
19	CHIHUAHUA	3.003	2.987	3.311	2.606	3.681	2.580	2.610	2.385	4.131
20	QUINTANA ROO	3.016	3.478	2.989	3.895	2.528	2.721	1.373	2.405	4.002
21	ZACATECAS	3.075	3.811	3.356	1.751	3.563	3.380	2.847	2.988	3.543
22	PUEBLA	3.210	3.678	2.546	2.599	3.722	3.548	3.193	3.304	3.338
23	MICHOACÁN	3.256	4.051	3.174	2.759	3.914	2.992	2.782	3.157	3.286
24	TLAXCALA	3.323	4.274	3.771	2.661	3.374	3.152	2.813	3.530	3.131
25	HIDALGO	3.352	4.238	3.183	3.198	3.672	3.583	2.457	3.103	3.192
26	VERACRUZ	3.379	4.142	2.873	2.435	4.085	3.973	4.131	2.930	2.839
27	MÉXICO	3.402	3.641	3.069	3.750	3.267	4.070	2.890	3.105	3.115
28	MORELOS	3.421	4.052	3.220	4.294	2.847	4.164	1.950	2.713	3.337
29	OAXACA	3.456	3.471	3.593	2.216	4.993	3.278	4.404	3.378	3.138
30	TABASCO	3.484	4.001	3.500	3.437	3.314	3.805	2.945	3.607	3.124
31	CHIAPAS	3.634	4.306	3.211	2.596	4.976	2.784	3.592	4.183	3.895
32	GUERRERO	3.822	4.208	3.505	3.852	4.934	4.105	3.276	3.600	2.947
	NATIONAL AVERAGE	2.966	3.318	2.984	2.752	3.158	3.108	2.399	2.857	3.182

TOP FIVE

STATES IN POSITIVE PEACE



Yucatán

RANK

1

SCORE:

2.339

Yucatán ranked first in both the MPPI and MPI. Notably, the state received Mexico's second strongest score in *low levels of corruption* and ranked sixth in *free flow of information*. Its weakest score was in *high levels of human capital*, in which it ranked 16th out of 32.

Low levels of corruption has a particularly strong impact on levels of peace, and is reflected in Yucatán's low levels of violence. However, it should be noted that this does not mean corruption is absent from the state, but rather that Yucatán outperforms the rest of country. Yucatán had the second lowest rate of perceived acts of corruption, with only 28 percent of the population reporting that they frequently perceived acts of corruption, compared to a national average of 44 percent. While corruption is still a concern in Yucatán, the state has

taken steps to address the issue, such as the creation of the Anti-Corruption General Prosecutor's Office.⁴ Yucatán also had the ninth highest percentage of households with internet access and ranked seventh in the measure of accessibility of public information, accounting for its strong score in *free flow of information*.

Although Yucatán was ranked sixth in the Human Development Index (HDI) health measure, it was 22nd in the HDI education measure and 24th for the number of scientific and technological companies and institutions, earning the state a weak score in *high levels of human capital*. Improving educational outcomes is important for maintaining ongoing high levels of peace in Yucatán.

Nuevo León

RANK

2

SCORE:

2.341

Nuevo León ranked second in the MPPI

for 2018, a stark difference from its 21st ranking in the MPI. Rises in the levels of violent crime over the past three years have placed the state in the lower end of the MPI ranking. It is the only high ranking state on Positive Peace that is not well ranked on the MPI. This can partly be explained by Nuevo León's location near the U.S. border. It is a prime location for drug cartel activity and as such it needs more robust institutions to withstand the pressures associated with this.

Notwithstanding, Nuevo León's Positive Peace surplus is an indication of its potential to reduce levels of violence. In 2017, it had the second strongest score in *high levels of human capital*, and also performed strongly in *low levels of corruption* and *free flow of information*. Nuevo León's weakest score was in the *acceptance of the rights of others*, for which the state ranked 26th out of 32.

The state had the second highest score in the HDI education measure and the fourth highest number of scientific and technological companies and institutions, giving it a high ranking in

high levels of human capital. In particular, Nuevo León is known to be the hub of IT service companies in Mexico.⁵ It is also home to several prominent universities, including the Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey and Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León.⁶ In addition, Nuevo León had the lowest percentage of citizens perceiving the state police to be corrupt and the third lowest for the municipal police, the public ministry and the State Attorney's office.

Despite its strong scores in these two domains, Nuevo León underperformed in *acceptance of the rights of others*. It ranked 26th in social mobility out of all the states: on average, the current generation had just four more years of education than their parents. Additionally, the state ranked ninth in the indigenous development gap, measured by the difference in HDI score between indigenous and non-indigenous groups. Nuevo León has been severely affected by the drug war, and has struggled to recover from a wave of cartel violence in 2011 and 2012. Given its strong economy and proximity to the US border, the state will need to look at Positive Peace to uphold what is already strong and improve the Pillars that are weak.

Aguascalientes

RANK **3** SCORE: **2.439**

Aguascalientes received the third best score in the MPPI, even though it ranked 13th in the MPI. Its best score was in *low levels of corruption*, in which it ranked second overall. The state also ranks second in *sound business environment*, even if its score in this Pillar is not as strong as that of *low levels of corruption*. Aguascalientes performed comparatively weakly in *well-functioning government* and *acceptance of the rights of others*. Improvements in *well-functioning government* would most likely lead to strong improvements in peace as *well-functioning government* includes the role of the judicial system. Only one

third of the state's citizens reported being aware of government action to improve public security in 2017 and the state recorded a homicide impunity rate of 34 percent in the same year.

Aguascalientes ranked in the top three for the indicator that measures the frequency with which citizens witness acts of corruption, with 29 percent of the population reporting witnessing acts of corruption frequently – a low level by national standards. This finding however contrasts with the results on perceptions of corruption regarding public security institutions. In Aguascalientes, the percentage of citizens perceiving the public ministry, the municipal police, and the state police to be corrupt were higher than the national average. Notwithstanding, at a business forum in May 2017, the president of the Mexican Employers' Federation pointed to Aguascalientes as one of the few Mexican states to have made progress in fighting corruption.⁷

Querétaro

RANK **4** SCORE: **2.544**

Querétaro ranked fourth in Positive Peace, and scored strongly on *low levels of corruption* and *free flow of information*. It ranked 10th in the MPI. Its weakest score was in *equitable distribution of resources*, for which it ranked 23rd out of all Mexican states. Querétaro had the lowest levels of perceived acts of corruption out of any state, with only 26 percent of respondents perceiving frequent acts of corruption, well below the national average of 44 percent. In January of 2017, the mayor of Querétaro City announced the launch of the city's Municipal Anti-Corruption System, making the state's capital one of the first cities to implement such a program.⁸

It also ranked twelfth in households with internet access, eighth in the perception of accessibility of public information, and had no recorded instances of journalists being killed, driving its strong

score in the domain of *free flow of information*.

Its weak score in *equitable distribution of resources* was mainly due to Querétaro having the sixth highest percentage of the population considered vulnerable to slipping through the social safety net. This constitutes 33 percent of the state's population, or around 681,000 people.

Campeche

RANK **5** SCORE: **2.583**

Campeche ranked fifth in Positive Peace and is the third most peaceful state in Mexico. It ranked first in *well-functioning government* and *sound business environment*, but had weak scores in *high levels of human capital*, *acceptance of the rights of others*, and *equitable distribution of resources*.

The state ranked third in the population's awareness of steps being taken to improve public spaces. It ranked sixth in citizen evaluation of the work of the municipal police. However, even with this high ranking, only 51 percent of the population considered them to be effective.

The state has a strong ranking in *sound business environment*, which is mainly driven by the high GDP per capita. At 62,800 pesos, the state's per capita GDP is nearly two and a half times that of Mexico City, the next richest state. However, Campeche performs more moderately in ease of doing business and unemployment, ranking 15th and 16th respectively.

Campeche ranked in the top third of states in *low levels of corruption*. High performance in this Pillar is supported by high performance in *well-functioning government*. This balance between Pillars supports the overall peacefulness in the state. In particular, Campeche demonstrated low levels of violent crime and weapons crimes, and fairly low levels of organized crime in 2017.

BOTTOM FIVE

STATES IN POSITIVE PEACE



Morelos

RANK

28

SCORE:

3.421

Morelos had the fifth weakest score in the MPPI. It ranked last in *low levels of corruption*, and additionally received weak scores in *good relations with neighbors* and *well-functioning government*. Its strongest score was in *free flow of information*, in which Morelos was in the top third.

When asked about government corruption, 82 percent of the population of Morelos said they perceived the municipal police to be corrupt, while 79 percent said the same about the public ministry and 82 percent for the state police. The state also ranks 8th in perceived acts of corruption, with 51 percent of respondents saying that corruption is “frequent” in the state. Morelos does not have an anti-corruption training program for public administration personnel, one of only nine states to lack this kind of program.

Morelos was ranked tenth for *free flow of information*. The state ranks 8th in accessibility of public information and 14th in households with internet access.

Much like Mexico as a whole, Morelos had a stronger score in *sound business environment* than in *low levels of corruption* and *well-functioning government*. This imbalance appears to be a consistent barrier to building peace.

Oaxaca

RANK

29

SCORE:

3.456

As the state with the fourth weakest score in the 2018 MPPI, Oaxaca ranked last in *high levels of human capital*. It also ranked worse than the national average in *free flow of information* and *equitable distribution of resources*. Its strongest score was in *low levels of corruption*, in which it ranked seventh overall. It ranked 12th on the MPI.

Oaxaca ranked 30th in both education and health, and 31st in number of scientific and technological companies/institutions, giving it the weakest score in *high levels of human capital* nationwide. Teachers in the state have staged public protests over low wages, the loss of union control, and the jailing of teachers, and have demanded the government release funds to repair schools damaged in earthquakes.⁹ Political conflict and poverty also negatively affect education in Oaxaca, while healthcare professionals have endured unpaid salaries and layoffs.¹⁰

“

Much like Mexico as a whole, Morelos had a stronger score in *sound business environment* than in *low levels of corruption* and *well-functioning government*. This imbalance appears to be a consistent barrier to building peace.

“

Guerrero ranked 27th in perception of safety in public locations, with only 22 percent of the population reporting to feel safe in their municipality. Only twenty-three percent of the population said they trusted their neighbors, while the data on net migration suggests significant numbers of citizens are emigrating due to the persistently high levels of violence in the state.

Only 21 percent of households have internet access, the second lowest percentage in the country, while 70 percent of its population lives in poverty.

Oaxaca's strong score in *low levels of corruption* partially offset its weak scores in other Pillars. Oaxaca scored 12th overall in the MPI and had fairly low levels of organized crime.

Tabasco

RANK
30 SCORE:
3.484

Tabasco ranked third from last in the 2018 MPPI. The state scored worse than the national average in seven of the eight Pillars of Positive Peace, performing better than the national average only in *acceptance of the rights of others*. Its weakest score was in *good relations with neighbors*, while its strongest was in *free flow of information*. It ranked 25th on the MPI.

While 41 percent of Tabasco's population reported having a high degree of trust in their neighbors, this still put the state in the bottom third on this indicator. Moreover, 87 percent of the population indicated feeling unsafe in public locations within their municipality, giving Tabasco the worst score for this indicator. These two findings give the state its weak score in *good relations with neighbors*. The increasing competition between criminal gangs has led to a rise in homicide and violent crime rates,

explaining why residents feel unsafe in public spaces.¹¹

Tabasco also ranked 25th in *well-functioning government*. Nationwide, weak scores in this Pillar tend to result in higher levels of violence, and this is certainly reflected in Tabasco, which had the third highest level of violent crime in the country.

Chiapas

RANK
31 SCORE:
3.634

Although it ranked fifth in the MPI, Chiapas had the second worst score in the MPPI. This discrepancy is what's known as a Positive Peace deficit, indicating that the state is at risk of a deterioration in peacefulness because it does not have the adequate levels of Positive Peace to sustain the current relatively low levels of violence.

The state received the weakest score in *equitable distribution of resources* and the second weakest score in *high levels of human capital*. Its strongest score was in *low levels of corruption*, in which it ranked 12th.

Chiapas had the highest level of people living in poverty and the highest average number of people per house of any state. Its rate of economic growth from 2003-2013 was lower than in any other Mexican state, at 0.2 percent, contributing to an income gap of 60 percent between Chiapas and the national average.¹²

In addition to these weak indicators for *equitable distribution of resources*, the state ranked last in education, 29th in the HDI health measure, and 28th in the number of scientific and technological companies and/or institutions.

Guerrero

RANK
32 SCORE:
3.822

Guerrero recorded the weakest Positive Peace score and ranked second to last (31st) in the MPI. It was particularly weak in *high levels of human capital* and *good relations with neighbors*, for which it ranked 23rd and 27th, respectively. Guerrero's strongest score was in *acceptance of the rights of others*, where it ranked ninth.

The state performed poorly in all three indicators for *high levels of human capital*: ranking 30th in the HDI measure for health, 29th in the HDI measure for education, and 29th in its number of scientific and technological companies and/or institutions. The chance of a child dying before their first birthday is 1.7 times higher in Guerrero than the national average.¹³ Additionally, educational advances have been further jeopardized by the closure of 650 schools last year due to both the 2017 earthquakes and prevailing insecurity.¹⁴


Guerrero ranked 27th in perception of safety in public locations, with only 22 percent of the population reporting to feel safe in their municipality. Only twenty-three percent of the population said they trusted their neighbors, while the data on net migration suggests significant numbers of citizens are emigrating due to the persistently high levels of violence in the state, placing the state last in the ranking for net migration.¹⁵

Despite these negative factors, Guerrero recorded the highest rate of upward social mobility in the country, driving its relatively strong score in *acceptance of the rights of others*.



TRACKING PROGRESS IN POSITIVE PEACE

KEY FINDINGS




TRUST IN PUBLIC SECURITY

18%

Percentage of Mexicans in 2017 reporting to have a high level of trust in public security institutions fell to 18 percent, its lowest level since 2012

POSITIVE PEACE PILLARS



Five out of eight Positive Peace Pillars in Mexico have been improving: sound business environment, high levels of human capital, good relations with neighbors, equitable distribution of resources and acceptance of the rights of others.

WOMEN IN CONGRESS

42%

The share of female legislators in Mexico was 42 percent in 2016. This is the highest share in Mexico's history and places Mexico as the OECD country with the third highest percentage of female law makers.

POLICY CHALLENGES FOR IMPROVING POSITIVE PEACE

Well-functioning government, low levels of corruption and free flow of information are the three worst performing Positive Peace Pillars in Mexico. But, more worrisome, they are the ones showing signs of deterioration. This highlights the need to place a greater focus on improving these areas, particularly as the record levels of homicide in 2017 could be a symptom of the deteriorating trends in these Pillars.

Government services at the federal, state and municipal levels are directly affected by the weakness of these three Pillars. The efficient allocation of public resources is undermined by corruption, whereas the degree of press freedom and the extent to which citizens can access trustworthy public information helps to uncover and prevent corruption. So long as these Pillars remain weak, attaining higher levels of peace will be very difficult.

Given the statistically significant correlation between levels of violent crime and perceptions of impunity and trust in judges, the high levels of violence are further undermining the degree of citizen trust that is necessary for a strong democratic political culture, a key indicator of *well-functioning government*.¹⁶ In 2017, only 18 percent of Mexicans reported to have a high level of trust in public security institutions, and only seven percent in the case of the municipal police. Additionally, only 13 percent were aware of any action taken by government

“

Well-functioning government, low levels of corruption and free flow of information are the three worst performing Positive Peace Pillars in Mexico. But, more worrisome, they are the only ones showing signs of deterioration.

authorities to tackle corruption, with the figure being 14 percent for those aware of action taken to tackle narco trafficking.

Meanwhile, the number of Mexicans reporting impunity as their ‘most worrisome’ issue tripled in the last five years, going from 7 percent in 2012 to 20 percent in 2017. According to the 2017 Global Impunity Index, Mexico has the highest impunity rate in the Americas.¹⁷ Given the fact that the Mexican states that performed better in *well-functioning government, low levels of corruption and free flow of information* are also the states that are more peaceful, this highlights the importance of focusing on these Pillars.

“


High levels of violence are further undermining the degree of citizen trust that is necessary for a strong democratic political culture, a key global indicator of *well-functioning government*.

DETERIORATING TRENDS

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

FIGURE 3.2

Perceptions of information released by public authorities, 2017



Source: INEGI (ENAIID)

Mexico faces a number of challenges to *free flow of information*, one of its weakest Positive Peace Pillars. The country has one of the world's highest execution rates for journalists and highlights the high security risks faced by media professionals reporting on organized crime or corrupt activities.

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Mexico ranked alongside Syria and Iraq as one of the deadliest countries for journalists in 2017.¹⁸ Reporters Without Borders counted 69 media professionals killed in Mexico in 2017.¹⁹ Unsurprisingly, Mexico's freedom of the press score has deteriorated consistently since 2007, with 2016 and 2017 marking the worst scores on record.²⁰

According to Freedom House, most

murders and other violent attacks against journalists in Mexico go unpunished, further reinforcing the deteriorating perceptions of impunity. Consequently, journalists continue to face extreme pressure, including credible threats of violence, from both criminal organizations and corrupt government officials.²¹ This impinges on Mexico's ability to accurately report on organized crime.

Mexicans are also becoming less trustful of public information released by government authorities, with 82 percent of Mexicans believing it to be manipulated in 2017.²² The figure was 69 percent for those deeming it to be incomplete, with 59 percent perceiving it to be false, as shown in Figure 3.2. During the same year, only 21 percent of Mexicans reported that it was 'easy' or 'very easy' to obtain government information.²³

“


According to Freedom House, most murders and other violent attacks against journalists in Mexico go unpunished, further reinforcing the deteriorating perceptions of impunity. Consequently, journalists continue to face extreme pressure, including credible threats of violence, from both criminal organizations and corrupt government officials.

KEY FINDINGS

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

69

Media professionals were killed in 2017, up from two in 2007. Mexico is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a journalist.



IMPUNITY

20% ↑

The percentage of citizens reporting impunity to be their 'most worrisome' issue nearly tripled in the last five years, going from seven percent in 2012 to 20 percent in 2017.

CORRUPTION

63%


In 2017, 63 percent of Mexicans reported perceiving public security institutions as corrupt, with 70 percent saying so for judges.

WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT


FIGURE 3.3

Perceptions of public security institutions, 2012-2017

Citizens' trust towards public security institutions and perceptions about their effectiveness have fallen to levels similar to 2012.



Source: ENVIPE

 Perceptions of public security and law enforcement performance is a key gauge of government performance. IEP research on Positive Peace finds that service delivery, including delivering on the rule of law, is an important aspect of a *well-functioning government*, and thus high levels of peacefulness.²⁴

After improving for a number of years, the trend in the level of trust in public security institutions has been in decline since 2015, as shown in Figure 3.3. In

2017, the percentage of Mexicans reporting to have a high level of trust in public security institutions fell to 18 percent, its lowest level since 2012. A similar trend can be seen in the percentage of Mexicans who deem the work of public security institutions to be highly effective, which has dropped by 17 percent and is now similar to its 2012 score, as shown in Figure 3.3.

These trends have also coincided with a fall in the percentage of Mexicans

reporting to be aware of government action to tackle narco trafficking and corruption, both of which are well below their 2012 levels, at under 15 percent in 2017, as also shown in Figure 3.3. This could be a symptom of the rising concern with regards to issues like insecurity and impunity, the two issues for which the percentage of Mexicans reporting them as 'most worrisome' increased by the largest margin between 2012 and 2017 – by four percentage points for insecurity and 14 percentage points for impunity.²⁵

BOX 3.1

Government initiatives to improve public security

Reforming policing institutions has become a government priority. This is mainly due to the fact that police forces are seen as the weakest link in the criminal justice system.²⁶

The government's flagship proposal has been to encourage states to adopt a Unified Police Command (Mando Unico) that would bring the country's 1,800 municipal police forces under the purview of state authorities. This plan is designed to make municipal police less susceptible to local corruption and to allow for better coordination in operations against state-wide threats to security.


Revamping police institutions will not be easy in places like Veracruz or Michoacán, two states with a significant track record of police forces colluding with organized crime.²⁷ These two states performed poorly in the 2018 MPPI, ranking 26th and 23rd, respectively.

Since the congressional approval of the new criminal justice system (NCJS) in 2008, the federal government has been coordinating nationwide efforts to run standardized aptitude tests for its police forces.

These evaluations are coordinated by the National Centre for Evaluation and Accreditation (CNCA) and are meant to ensure that recruits meet required professional standards.

FIGURE 3.4

Citizens reporting a disposition to help the police, 2012-2017



Source: ENVIPE

They are also intended to weed out corrupt officers or those with past criminal charges, and to identify those with a history of substance abuse or psychological problems that may require assistance. Such efforts have been complemented by attempts to improve the levels of reporting to the National Registry of Public Security Personnel (RNPS) as a means to identify officers with records of past misconduct.

LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION

With 63 percent of Mexicans perceiving public security institutions to be corrupt in 2017, high levels of corruption continue to be a nationwide problem. Additionally, the percentage of citizens reporting impunity to be their ‘most worrisome’ issue tripled between 2012 and 2017, no doubt a result of the high and pervasive levels of corruption in Mexico. Meanwhile, the percentage of Mexicans reporting to have a high trust in judges has been on a downward trend since 2014, dropping to 14 percent in 2017, as shown in Figure 3.5.

Overall, the percentage of Mexicans perceiving public security institutions as

corrupt has been consistently rising since 2014, reaching 62 percent in 2017, as shown in Figure 3.6. The trend for the percentage of Mexicans reporting to perceive judges as corrupt has also deteriorated. In 2017, the percentage of Mexicans reporting to perceive judges as corrupt was 72 percent.


Between 2011 and 2014, a fall in the level of crime was accompanied by improvements in the perceptions of corruption toward public security institutions. This trend has since reversed. As crime increases, people become skeptical of the government and perceive that it is in collusion with organized crime. Given the rise in the percentage of people perceiving impunity as their ‘most

worrisome’ issue, this is likely to erode their trust in their elected officials ahead and beyond the 2018 presidential elections.

This is particularly important when considering the correlation between violent crime and the percentage of people reporting impunity as their ‘most worrisome’ issue. The same relation holds for violent crime and high trust in judges. Figure 3.7 shows that states with the lowest percentage of citizens reporting impunity as their ‘most worrisome’ issue are those that tend to have the lowest levels of violent crime. The states with the highest percentage of citizens reporting a high degree of trust in judges also tend to be those with lower levels of violence.

FIGURE 3.5
High trust in judges & impunity as ‘most worrisome’ issue, 2012-2017


High levels of trust in judges has been falling while worries over impunity have been on the rise.



Source: ENVIPE

FIGURE 3.6
Public security institutions perceived corrupt, 2011-2017


Perceptions of public security institutions as corrupt has been on an upward trend since 2014.



Source: ENVIPE

FIGURE 3.7
Violent crime vs impunity & high trust in judges as ‘most worrisome’ issue, 2017

States with the lowest levels of violent crime are those with the lowest percentage of citizens reporting impunity as their ‘most worrisome’ issue and where higher percentages of citizens report a high degree of trust in judges.



Source: ENVIPE


IMPROVING TRENDS

ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS

FIGURE 3.8

Percentage of women in congress, 2010–2016

More than 40 percent of Mexican legislators were female in 2016, three times the share in 1997.



Source: OECD

Across many Mexican states, issues relating to income disparity, high levels of violence, and discrimination have marginalized certain groups. The 2013-2018 National Development Plan incorporated gender equality and empowerment as a new policy dimension, in order to address marginalization of women. This was mainly the result of the introduction of a National Gender Equality plan, for which resources were earmarked in the budget to implement gender equality goals.²⁸

The share of women in congress has increased substantially from 14 percent in 1997 to 42 percent in 2016, making Mexico the OECD country with the third highest percentage of female parliamentarians after Iceland and Sweden.²⁹

HIGH LEVELS OF HUMAN CAPITAL

One of the most important indicators in measuring improvements in *high levels of human capital* is the percentage of citizens that have obtained a university degree or have received specialized training.


Given that young people constitute close to one third of the Mexican population, this 'youth bulge' can be a risk if young people are unable to find employment or a satisfactory income. A large and frustrated cohort of young people can become a potential source of social and political instability.³⁰

IEP research across 163 countries has found that there is a statistically significant correlation between high levels of peacefulness and smaller youth populations.³¹ However, when

FIGURE 3.9

Youth education & employment, 2005-2016

More young people are obtaining university degrees at a time when youth unemployment has been falling.



Source: OECD

productively engaged, a large youth population can be an asset for the economy.

Educational attainment for young Mexicans has been improving. The percentage of Mexicans aged 25 to 34 with a tertiary education increased by eight percentage points between 2005 and 2017, rising from 14 percent to 22 percent. Also during the same period, the percentage of Mexicans aged 15 to 29 that were not in employment, education or training (NEET) dropped by two percentage points.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

At the national level, the percentage of Mexicans with access to basic services has been rising, from 83 percent in 2008 to 88 percent in 2016. In addition, the percentage of Mexicans with access to public health has increased from 61 percent in 2008 to 84 percent in 2016. Meanwhile, the percentage of Mexicans living in poverty has been falling, albeit at a slower pace, from 46 percent in 2010 to 43 percent in 2016.

Progress in these indicators demonstrates the Mexican government's ability to improve access to public goods and services. It is an indication of improving social safety nets for the portion of the population that continues to face economic constraints, particularly when considering the high levels of income inequality in Mexico. This is particularly relevant when considering that Mexico has the second worst Gini coefficient of all OECD countries at 0.46, significantly higher than the OECD average of 0.32. A higher coefficient indicates a more unequal distribution of wealth.

“


Progress in these indicators demonstrates the Mexican government's ability to improve access to public goods and services. It is an indication of improving social safety nets for the portion of the population that continues to face economic constraints, particularly when considering the high levels of income inequality in Mexico.

SOUND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

FIGURE 3.10

Cost & time to start a business, 2004-2017

Between 2004 and 2017, the cost and time it takes to start a business in Mexico dropped by 39 and 73 percent, respectively.




Source: World Bank

Between 2004 and 2017, the cost and time it takes to start a business in Mexico improved by 39 percent and 73 percent, respectively, as shown in Figure 3.10. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate fell by 35 percent between 2012 and 2017. Taken together, this is indicative of the fact that the regulatory environment for Mexican businesses has improved, which in turn has contributed to the falling unemployment rate.

YOUTH EDUCATION

22%

The percentage of Mexican youth with a tertiary education increased from 14 percent to 22 percent between 2005 and 2017. During the same period, the percentage of young Mexicans that were not in employment, education or training (NEET) dropped by two percentage points.



COMMUNITY COOPERATION

34%

Between 2013 and 2017, the percentage of Mexicans reporting to cooperate in solving communal problems has improved, going from 28 percent to 34 percent. This has been accompanied by a rising trend in the percentage of people reporting to have a high level of trust in their community.

ACCESS TO PUBLIC HEALTH

84%


The percentage of Mexicans with access to public health has increased from 61 percent in 2008 to 84 percent in 2016.

GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS

FIGURE 3.11

Cooperation to solve communal problems & high level of trust in community, 2013-17

Since 2013, the percentage of Mexicans reporting to cooperate to solve communal problems and those reporting a high level of trust in their community has been increasing.



Source: ENVIPE


Between 2013 and 2017, the percentage of Mexicans reporting to cooperate in solving communal problems increased from 28 percent to 34 percent. This rising trend is underscored by improvements in the percentage of citizens reporting to have a high level of trust in their community, which has increased by three percentage points since 2013, as shown in Figure 3.11.

Figure 3.12 shows that the most peaceful states also tend to be those where a higher percentage of citizens reported to cooperate in tackling robbery. The relationship highlights the importance of community involvement in solving crime. Since 2013, all states except Baja California - the third least peaceful country in Mexico - have seen an increase in the percentage of people reporting to cooperate in tackling robbery.

FIGURE 3.12

2018 MPI score vs community cooperation to tackle robbery

More peaceful states tend to have a higher percentage of citizens reporting to cooperate to tackle robbery.



Source: ENVIPE



SECTION 4:

EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

MÉXICO Y LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE PAZ: LA DIMENSIÓN DEL MIEDO

Mauricio Meschoulam, Centro de Investigación para la Paz
México, AC. (CIPMEX)

La dimensión del miedo está frecuentemente obscurecida en nuestros relatos de la violencia, pero siempre les subyace. Cuando hablamos de las víctimas, a veces olvidamos a esas otras personas, aquellas quienes, afortunadamente, no murieron; ni siquiera sangraron. Tampoco perdieron a alguien. Solo vieron lo sucedido. Lo atestiguaron de manera presencial, o bien, tuvieron contacto con la narrativa de los hechos. Esas personas también son víctimas. Muchas de ellas, silenciosamente, quedan afectadas, algunas de manera muy importante. Esas circunstancias, tristemente, rebasan lo individual.

El Instituto para la Economía y la Paz, el centro de pensamiento responsable de esta edición considera que lo que define la paz desde su ángulo negativo es tanto la ausencia de violencia como la *ausencia del miedo a la violencia*, y consecuentemente, utiliza mediciones que buscan detectar su presencia para incorporarlas a sus índices. Ekanola (2012) lo plantea de este otro modo: Existen diferentes condiciones, objetivas y subjetivas, para que una sociedad pueda ser considerada pacífica.

Las condiciones objetivas incluyen seguridad física, prosperidad material y armonía entre los miembros de dicha sociedad. Las condiciones subjetivas incluyen el bienestar emocional de los miembros de esa sociedad. En efecto, el miedo a la violencia puede ser tan dañino para una colectividad como la violencia misma.

Es natural. Cuando tenemos miedo no nos sentimos en paz, incluso si el conflicto armado o la violencia material se llegan a reducir. Si en nuestro alrededor hay balaceras o explosiones, si hay rumores de operativos, vehículos militares o de la policía, normalmente nuestra mente no se detiene a pensar si lo que sentimos es producto de una mayor o menor tasa de homicidios o delitos.

A veces, basta que seamos testigos de un cuerpo desmembrado colgado de un puente, aquél que en el frío estadístico podría representar la cifra de un solo homicidio, uno solo, para que el miedo nos cale hasta los huesos y concluyamos que la paz está más lejos que nunca.

En otras ocasiones ni siquiera tiene que ocurrir un evento en nuestra proximidad. Un solo párrafo, una fotografía, un video compartido, pueden hacer que caigamos en pánico y que, a raíz de ese pánico, haya afectaciones en nuestras conductas, en nuestras actitudes y opiniones. Por consiguiente, medir la violencia no equivale a medir el miedo a la violencia. Más aún, medir las “percepciones” sobre la violencia o la inseguridad, a veces omite una importante parte del cuadro.

Este ensayo busca compartir algunos resultados de la investigación del Centro de Investigación para la Paz México AC. (CIPMEX), y a partir de ellos, contar la historia de cómo hemos intentado abordar estos temas desde hace algunos años, apuntar por qué estos temas importan desde la democracia, así como explorar algunas primeras ideas para empezar a mitigar su impacto.

MIEDO, DEMOCRACIA Y DESARROLLO INCLUYENTE

El factor miedo no es solo un tema relativo al bienestar psicológico o emocional de las personas, o al sentimiento de paz en una sociedad. El miedo y el estrés asociado a esta emoción se vinculan también con otras cuestiones como las posibilidades del desarrollo democrático o incluyente en un entorno.

Hay investigación que muestra que una parte de las víctimas de la violencia sí puede entrar en un proceso de crecimiento post-traumático (Tedeschi y Calhoun, 2004) y como resultado, incrementar su participación política (Bateson, 2009). Sin embargo, como dijimos, la violencia y sus efectos psicosociales generan otra clase de víctimas: las víctimas psicológicas. Por tanto, es necesario valorar cómo es que esta otra clase de victimización puede afectar la participación democrática. Así, por ejemplo, hay estudios que han encontrado que el sentimiento de inseguridad puede impactar negativamente la percepción de la eficacia de la democracia, e incluso puede afectar la participación política o electoral y la confianza en las instituciones (Carreras, 2009).

Más aún, la investigación ha mostrado que las personas que están bajo estrés o tienen miedo, tienden a ser menos tolerantes, más reactivas, y más excluyentes de otras personas (Siegel, 2007; Wilson, 2004). Se ha encontrado que la exposición al terror produce un sentimiento de amenaza que genera actitudes excluyentes, y un menor apoyo a los esfuerzos de paz (Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, y Hobfoll, 2009).

Hirsch-Hoefler y sus colegas (2016) lo ponen en estas palabras: “El conflicto endurecerá tu corazón”. Estos sentimientos pueden tener efectos sobre circunstancias que van desde las preferencias electorales o incentivar el apoyo político a medidas tales como el cierre de fronteras, hasta el castigo colectivo a determinados grupos religiosos o sociales, incluyendo en algunos casos, el deseo de represalias violentas dirigidas hacia los “enemigos” percibidos (Hanes y Machin, 2014).

ESTRÉS POST-TRAUMÁTICO (EPT) EN MÉXICO: MÁS ALLÁ DE LAS PERCEPCIONES

Por factores que no busco discutir en este espacio, la violencia en México no tiene las características del terrorismo clásico, aunque efectivamente, hay ciertos actos que sí parecen incluir algunos elementos que podrían asemejarse. En mis discusiones en prensa, he preferido denominar a ciertos ataques como “cuasi-terroristas”. Phillips (2017), por ejemplo, ha elegido emplear la expresión “tácticas terroristas utilizadas por grupos criminales”. En lo que había consenso hacia el 2011, al margen de cómo decidamos denominar a esa u otras clases de violencia cometida en México, es que los efectos psicosociales ocasionados por la misma podrían haber escalado considerablemente. Por consiguiente, en 2012, llevamos a cabo un estudio en el país buscando detectar síntomas sugerentes de estrés post traumático a causa de la violencia asociada al crimen organizado, entre participantes de 25 estados diferentes. El estudio fue liderado por el Dr. José Calderón, médico psiquiatra de la Universidad del Estado de Luisiana, especialista en trauma y adicciones. En la investigación participamos la psicóloga Liora Schneider y este autor. Los resultados fueron compartidos en prensa (Meschoulam, 2012). A reserva de las limitaciones metodológicas que compartimos en su momento, y considerando que nuestros hallazgos eran apenas exploratorios, esos primeros signos aportaban evidencia inicial de una sociedad psicológicamente muy afectada.

El 51% de nuestros participantes reportó que la violencia afectaba su vida laboral, el 72% indicaba que la violencia afectaba su vida social y 58% percibía que la violencia afectaba su vida familiar. El 60.1% percibía que la violencia afectaba su salud mental. Del 25% que había acudido al médico en el último mes, 98% percibía que la razón de su enfermedad se encontraba relacionada con el estrés. Entre los síntomas más comunes asociados al estrés por exposición a violencia, 31% reportaba angustia frecuente o gran esfuerzo para cumplir con tareas cotidianas y 36.1% reportaba irritabilidad. Uno de cada cuatro reportaba insomnio frecuente y 28% desesperanza. El estrés parecía producir ausentismo laboral en al menos 31% de participantes, lo que podría traducirse en un impacto económico cuantificable. El estudio también detectaba signos que podían indicar la presencia de contagio vertical de estrés (padres a hijos).

De manera muy relevante, uno de cada dos encuestados percibía que los medios de comunicación eran el principal canal de transmisión del estrés. El estudio detectó una correlación estadísticamente muy significativa entre exposición a medios y síntomas de estrés y trauma como angustia, irritabilidad, pesadillas e insomnio; 90% de nuestros encuestados reportaban tener contacto con noticias y 75% indicaba que después de este contacto se sentía peor. Otros factores de transmisión eran rumores sobre actos violentos (45%), asalto a personas allegadas (44.5%), o el ver al ejército o la policía en retenes u operativos (43.7%).

El 10% había cambiado de residencia por efectos de la violencia; el 80% había dejado de frecuentar lugares debido al miedo, y el 54% había modificado su rutina diaria. Uno de cada dos participantes dijo que, si pudiera huir de México, lo haría. Claramente, el tema rebasaba la cuestión de las “percepciones”. Así que, con el fin de explorar más a fondo el proceso mediante el cual este tipo de circunstancias eran socialmente construidas, decidimos iniciar una serie de investigaciones cualitativas mediante entrevistas de profundidad.

EL MIEDO ANTE LA EXPERIENCIA, LA CONVERSACIÓN Y LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN

“ Yo misma me vi en la necesidad de prácticamente encerrarme en mi casa por el miedo a ser objeto de asalto, secuestro o el famosísimo car-jacking que se dio por miles aquí (Ama de casa, CDMX).²

Este tipo de respuestas se tornaron patrones altamente repetidos en cientos de entrevistas de profundidad que llevamos a cabo en la CDMX y 25 estados del país entre 2013 y 2017. Los detalles metodológicos de esas investigaciones se pueden encontrar en las publicaciones académicas acá referidas (Meschoulam et al., 2015; Meschoulam et al., 2017).

A través de un análisis muy detallado de cada una de esas entrevistas, párrafo por párrafo, frase por frase y palabra por palabra, pudimos detectar que, entre nuestros entrevistados, la construcción social de ese tipo de percepciones, y concretamente del miedo que expresaban, se fincaba primeramente en la experiencia y observación personales, en las conversaciones cotidianas, y en las experiencias de personas allegadas. Por ejemplo:

“ Yo sí tuve experiencias de que iba manejando; de hecho, una vez me llegó a levantar una balacera que fue como a cuatro manzanas de mi casa y pues ahora sí que era un ruido impresionante. Al principio piensas pues equis, ha de ser un transformador, pero ya después de que se escuchan las ráfagas dices ¿qué onda?, ¡Están aquí!, yo estoy aquí, y te da un miedo impresionante. (Estudiante, Veracruz)

“ Desde vivir ese tipo de cosas o cinco retenes para ir a Saltillo donde estaba muy presente el gobierno, el ejército, la policía, y luego llegué aquí a Sinaloa donde no hay retenes, ya no se oyen balazos, pero sabemos que aquí está parte del meollo del asunto y sí me ha tocado escuchar historias de terror como la del ejido donde sacaron a los hombres y los mataron en la plaza y...sé que ahí hay actividad porque me cuentan y entonces hay lugares donde mejor prefiero no ir. (Servidor Público, Sinaloa)

Además de ello, esas entrevistas de profundidad revelaron que nuestros participantes, muy notoriamente, se alejaban de los medios de comunicación, en parte por la desconfianza que estos les provocaban, pero en buena medida también debido a que, en su visión, estos exhiben demasiada violencia de manera innecesaria. Nueve de cada diez entrevistados consideró a los medios tradicionales como amarillistas y provocadores de estrés, lo que resultó altamente consistente con el estudio de estrés post-traumático referido arriba.

Estos son ejemplos de respuestas típicas de nuestros participantes:

“ A veces es como muy fuerte porque te involucras tanto que... bueno, a mí me pasa ¿no? de las noticias...sí me entra el miedo y luego “¡Ay, que no pase!”. O no sé, también por cómo te lo venden es como también quererte tener ahí como de “¡Ten miedo!, ¡Está pasando esto!” y así. Sí, a veces sí es como ay... a veces ya ni las quieres ver por lo mismo porque es como de “¡Muerte, muerte, asaltos, pelea, guerra!” y es como, a veces sí pues te alejas un poco para no sentirte así porque como que te contagian. (Cajera, CDMX)

“ Y es lo que me caga del gobierno y medios, que sólo ven la violencia como números ...Entonces para mí los medios son inútiles en cuanto a que sólo me dicen lo malo que está pasando sin lograr ningún cambio positivo...debería ser eso todos los días (contar también las noticias positivas) en lugar de escuchar pura basura ...porque, aunque sé que el morbo vende más...O sea, por eso hay tantos periódicos aquí basura como el Metro o esas madres, que en las portadas siempre sale un pinche cadáver y cosas así. A la gente le produce morbo y lo compra, pero también se me hace bastante nefasto porque como que ocasionan que la sociedad siga siendo igual. (Gerente de restaurante, CDMX)

Pero en el esquema de construcción social de emociones como el miedo, no solo las experiencias, las conversaciones y los medios tradicionales impactan. También las redes sociales y los espacios digitales fueron muy mencionados por nuestros participantes.

Específicamente, los mensajes colocados por las organizaciones criminales, ya sea en determinados sitios físicos o bien, en espacios virtuales para llamar la atención, fueron temas que recibieron gran cantidad de menciones.

“ Por ejemplo, en Michoacán donde ya hay un canal, La Tuta TV, que es un canal que dirige el crimen organizado...o sea tienen ya hasta sus propios medios de comunicación para hacer llegar los mensajes a la sociedad y el mensaje es: “Aquí estamos, somos violentos y te podemos fregar”, y pues la gente está asustada. (Servidor Público, Michoacán)

“ Es que ellos nos hacen saber para que les tengamos miedo. Lo hacen saber, lo hacen público, cuando decapitan a alguien dejan mantas o cartulinas de lo que va a pasar a los que sigan haciendo. Por eso la gente se da cuenta, todos están enterados por ellos porque del crimen organizado se trata de amenazar, intimidar. Es lo que veo en la calle. (Comerciante, Michoacán).

En suma, nuestra investigación detectó que el proceso de construcción social de las percepciones y emociones como el miedo, en nuestros cientos de entrevistados, está compuesto de una combinación de elementos que consiste al menos de los siguientes factores:

1. Las experiencias y observaciones propias o las de allegados, que les hacen sentirse temerosos y estresados
2. Las conversaciones que sostienen y los rumores que escuchan de manera cotidiana
3. La forma como la violencia es cubierta en una parte sustancial de los medios de comunicación tradicionales
4. Las imágenes, videos y textos compartidos en redes sociales
5. La publicitación premeditada de la violencia por parte de organizaciones criminales con el objeto de provocar terror e intimidar

El resultado de lo anterior es un amplio sector de la sociedad profundamente atemorizado y que padece los efectos del estrés asociado a la violencia criminal, factores que, como consecuencia, impactan en mayor o menor grado sus opiniones, sus actitudes y sus conductas. Por consiguiente, para revertir ese proceso, no basta con reducir los índices de violencia material; se necesitaría también, trabajar en cada uno de los puntos mencionados.

¿QUÉ SE PUEDE HACER?

Atenuar el impacto del miedo no es simple. Quizás, la recomendación inicial tiene que ver con comprender su importancia y sus efectos en cuanto a la falta de paz en una sociedad.

Lo segundo es que, dada la relevancia del tema, su estudio debe profundizarse y expandirse. Adicionalmente, algunas ideas que en CIPMEX hemos recomendado desde 2011, incluyen las siguientes (son solo ejemplos; hay mucho más que se puede/debe hacer):

- a. Fomentar acciones para fortalecer las redes de apoyo familiares y comunitarias, los lazos de colaboración y cohesión social, así como la asistencia en el nivel local (James y Gilliland, 2012). Por ejemplo, promover acciones como eventos artísticos y deportivos, puede resultar en una disminución de estrés en las comunidades (Nanayakkara, Culpan, & McChesney, 2010);

- b. Paralelamente, la formación y capacitación del personal de salud, trabajadores comunitarios de salud y para-profesionales de salud en el uso de métodos simples de detección de depresión, estrés, ansiedad, adicciones y trauma, junto con técnicas sencillas de primeros auxilios psicológicos. El uso de trabajadores comunitarios de salud podría contribuir a la difusión de técnicas de reducción de estrés, detección y manejo sencillo de depresión o ansiedad;
- c. Propusimos también actuar—específicamente para contener los efectos psicosociales—antes, durante y después de eventos de carácter crítico-traumático (tales como una balacera en un estadio de fútbol, el incendio de un casino, o una explosión de granada en las instalaciones de un medio, en una plaza pública, o en un acuario en plena luz del día, eventos que han ocurrido en México varias veces), mediante acciones de prevención, intervención y postvención de crisis psicológicas (la postvención es la fase que sucede a la intervención y consiste en evaluar lo llevado a cabo y proponer medidas para fortalecer lo que funciona y corregir lo que no), así como la implementación de primeros auxilios psicológicos en la población que lo necesitara (James & Gilliland, 2012);
- d. Por último, el tema de la cobertura mediática de la violencia fue desarrollado en nuestra última publicación (Meschoulam et al., 2017). En síntesis, la propuesta consiste en no dejar de informar veraz y oportunamente acerca de la violencia, pero dar igual espacio a los factores subyacentes, las causas estructurales de esa violencia, y abrir puertas al debate sobre las potenciales soluciones y a la discusión sobre la necesidad de construir paz de raíz. Intentar equilibrar la vocación de informar que los medios tienen, con las afectaciones de sus audiencias y sus continuos llamados a pensar en coberturas diferentes, tiene sentido si se busca que estas audiencias dejen de huir de notas que, en su visión, les provocan estrés, desesperanza e impotencia.

EN SUMA

El miedo a la violencia es uno de los componentes mayores de ese estado que conocemos como *falta de paz*. El miedo impacta no solamente en nuestra percepción de inseguridad, sino en los niveles de estrés que padecemos, lo que tiene consecuencias que van desde la salud hasta un considerable impacto en nuestras actitudes, opiniones, y comportamientos sociales, económicos y políticos. Esto puede, entre otras cosas, provocar graves complicaciones para el desarrollo democrático de las sociedades, lo que a su vez, podría alimentar los círculos de violencia de manera imparable. Por consecuencia, si se busca pensar seriamente en la construcción de condiciones de paz, la dimensión del miedo no puede ser minimizada, ocluida o peor aún, evadida.

REFERENCIAS

- Bateson, R. (2009). The Political Consequences of Crime Victimization in Latin America. *Comparative Politics Workshop*, 46.
- Canetti-Nisim, D., Halperin, E., Sharvit, K., y Hobfoll, S. E. (2009). A new stress-based model of political extremism: Personal exposure to terrorism, psychological distress, and exclusionist political attitudes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(3), 363-389.
- Carreras, M. (2009). The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America. Presentación en el 21 Congreso Mundial IPSA, Santiago, Chile. Recuperado de: http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_3560.pdf
- Ekanola, A. B. (2012). The Moral Demand of Peace on the Global Capitalist Order. *A Journal of Social Justice*, 18, 281-288.
- Hanes, E. y Machin, S. (2014). Hate Crime in the Wake of Terror Attacks. Evidence From 7/7 and 9/11. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*. 30 (3), 247-267.
- Hirsch-Hoefler, S., Canetti, D., Rapaport, C., y Hobfoll, S. E. (2016). Conflict will harden your heart: Exposure to violence, psychological distress, and peace barriers in Israel and Palestine. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(4), 845-859.
- James, R.K., y Gilliland, B. L. (2012). *Crisis intervention strategies*. Belmont, CA., USA: Brooks/Cole Cengage Learning (7th ed.).
- Meschoulam, M. (2012). Violencia y efectos psicosociales: el estudio. *El Universal*. Recuperado de: <http://www.eluniversalmas.com.mx/editoriales/2012/03/57482.php>
- Meschoulam, M., Hacker A. J., Carbajal F., De Benito, C., Blumenkron, C., y Raich, T. (2015). Values, Perceptions, and Peacebuilding: An Expanded Qualitative Study in Mexico. *International Journal of Peace Studies* 20 (1).
- Meschoulam, M., De Benito, C., Blumenkron, C., Muhech, A., Naanous, T., Ramírez, A. y Quintanilla, S. (2017). Mass Media, Violence, and Peacebuilding: A Qualitative Study in Mexico. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 22 (1).
- Nanayakkara, S., Culpan, I & McChesney, J. (2010). Peace building and peacekeeping through sport in Asia: mission impossible? *The 4th Oceanic Conference on International Studies* (OCIS IV). Auckland, N.Z: OCIS
- Phillips, B. (2017). Terrorist Tactics by Criminal Organizations: The Mexican Case in Context. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 12 (1).
- Siegel, D. (2007) *The Mindful brain, reflection and attunement in the cultivation of wellbeing*. New York, NY: WW Norton Eds.
- Tedeschi, G. R., y Calhoun G. L. (2004). Posttraumatic Growth: Conceptual Foundations and Empirical Evidence. *Psychological Inquiry* 15 (1), 1-18.
- Wilson, J. P. (2004). *The posttraumatic self: Restoring meaning and wholeness to personality*. New York, NY.: Brunner-Routledge Eds.

EL PAPEL DEL SECTOR PRIVADO EN LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE PAZ

Gustavo Pérez Berlanga, Director de Responsabilidad Social de Grupo Toks



“No hay empresa exitosa en una sociedad fracasada, así como ninguna sociedad será exitosa con empresas fracasadas”.

La frase anterior se le atribuye al empresario y filántropo suizo Stephan Schmidheiny y resalta la necesidad que las empresas contribuyan a atender aspectos sociales y ambientales que representan retos y oportunidades para las sociedades actuales en todo el mundo, incluyendo cuestiones de ética empresarial, integridad y construcción de paz.

Una empresa tiene mayores oportunidades de desarrollo en sociedades pacíficas, justas e incluyentes. Hace algunos meses participé en el evento anual “Business for Peace” (Negocios para la Paz) organizado por la red de Pacto Mundial Colombia, la oficina de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para Construcción de Paz y la Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá.

El evento reunió a más de 200 líderes empresariales, inversionistas, autoridades locales y de la sociedad civil con un fin común: explorar oportunidades innovadoras de colaboración para lograr sociedades más pacíficas, tomando como marco de referencia el Objetivo 16 de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas: Paz, Justicia e Instituciones Sólidas. También tuvo como objetivo mostrar casos exitosos de cómo algunas empresas han establecido iniciativas que han contribuido a la paz dentro de sus operaciones de negocio.

Me llamó la atención que había más de 100 empresarios colombianos presentes en el evento aprendiendo y compartiendo experiencias acerca de su involucramiento en acciones que deriven en una sociedad más pacífica. En el caso de México, solamente hubo una empresa mexicana participante.

En abril de 2016, la oficina de Pacto Mundial en México lanzó la iniciativa Negocios para la Paz (*Business for Peace*) de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para que las empresas interesadas se adhieran a la misma, generando una red de aprendizaje y colaboración. Marco Pérez, el entonces Coordinador de la red mexicana de Pacto Mundial decía: «no solamente son los gobiernos y la sociedad civil quienes hacen un llamado a la paz, y pueden construirla, sino también las empresas. Muchas veces a las empresas les cuesta identificar el término paz,

entendiendo que es un proceso de construcción. No es una meta solamente del soberano».

Casi dos años después del lanzamiento de la iniciativa, solamente cinco empresas mexicanas se han adherido a ella, y no se ha generado aún ningún evento relacionado con *Business for Peace* en el país. Lo anterior muestra la enorme oportunidad que tenemos por delante.

Al involucrarse en la construcción de paz, una empresa puede beneficiarse de diversas formas, destacando las siguientes:

- Contar con una estrategia de manejo de riesgos en las operaciones de negocio.
- Disminuir costos asociados a la inseguridad, en aspectos tales como robos hormiga, acoso laboral o *mobbing*, inclusión laboral, prevención del delito, etc.
- Involucrarse con actores públicos y privados que, conjuntamente, diseñen e implementen propuestas contribuyendo al bien común.
- Aprender de casos exitosos a nivel mundial y alinear la estrategia de negocio a las mejores prácticas mundiales.

Aprovecho este espacio para compartirles algunas iniciativas que hemos desarrollado en la cadena de restaurantes Toks enfocadas a una sociedad más armónica e incluyente:

1. PROYECTOS PRODUCTIVOS, desde 2003 se estableció una estrategia de compra de insumos a pequeños productores rurales en el país, integrándolos a la cadena de valor del negocio. Por ejemplo, la miel que se consume en los restaurantes Toks de todo el país es recolectada por apicultores amuzgos del estado de Guerrero, el chocolate es producido por mujeres mixtecas de Oaxaca, la granola y el mole por mujeres mazahuas del Estado de México, la mermelada de fresa por mujeres de la sierra de Guanajuato y el café por pequeños productores de la Reserva de la Biósfera del volcán Tacaná, en el Soconusco en Chiapas. Esta iniciativa ha beneficiado a más de 12 mil personas en el país y ha logrado que las familias tengan condiciones

de vida digna sin necesidad de migrar a ciudades grandes o a Estados Unidos, que cambien de cultivo por otros al margen de la ley o que incluso, ingresen a las filas del crimen organizado.



2. CAMPAÑA “NO SOLO LOS NIÑOS DEBEN PORTARSE BIEN”,

en alianza con la organización México Unido Contra la Delincuencia (MUCD), en los Toks de todo el país se obsequiaron separadores de libros que contenían un decálogo de cómo construir ciudadanía a través de ciertos comportamientos; por ejemplo, cuando vas al cine (no brincarte la fila), entras a un restaurante (no meter comida), cuando conduces (no obstruir los pasos peatonales), en redes sociales (no insultar), etc. Se distribuyeron miles de separadores y tuvo tal aceptación entre los comensales, que incluso varios de ellos solicitaron a MUCD replicar la iniciativa en sus negocios, escuelas, etc.



3. TALLERES DE SERIGRAFÍA Y PANADERÍA,

en alianza con Fundación Reintegra, en la Ciudad de México, se establecieron dos talleres productivos que tienen como finalidad que los jóvenes que se encuentran en una situación de vulnerabilidad o los adolescentes en conflicto con la ley, tengan una forma de vida digna a través de una actividad lícita y que les brinda muchas satisfacciones. Se estima que por cada joven rehabilitado por Reintegra, se pueden prevenir hasta mil asaltos al año considerando tres asaltos diarios. Desde que inició este proyecto en 2012, se han beneficiado a más de 320 jóvenes y varios de ellos ya tiene sus propios negocios, trabajan en la industria serigráfica o están empleados de manera formal.



4. PROGRAMA ANTI-VIOLENCIA EN LA EMPRESA,

hace un par de años, Toks decidió establecer un programa de erradicación del acoso laboral o *mobbing* entre sus empleados. Lo primero que hizo fue una prueba piloto en donde lanzó una campaña de concientización para que los empleados conocieran los niveles de violencia que se dan dentro de las relaciones humanas, para ello utilizó la herramienta denominada “Violentómetro” desarrollada por el Instituto Politécnico Nacional, que les hizo ser conscientes de los comportamientos violentos tanto en expresiones verbales como en actitudes dentro de sus acciones cotidianas en el hogar, escuela, calle, trabajo, etc. Después se realizaron acciones determinadas por los mismos empleados para

erradicar la violencia en todas sus formas en su lugar de trabajo, buscando un entorno laboral más armónico y pacífico. Como resultados cuantitativos se logró reducir un 40% la rotación, incrementar el nivel de satisfacción del cliente (medido a través de clientes ocultos o *mystery shoppers*) en un 21% y, en la parte cualitativa, los empleados manifiestan estar más contentos. La siguiente etapa es replicar la prueba piloto en sus más de 200 unidades de negocio.



5. FOOD TRUCK CHIAPAS Y TIJUANA,

en alianza con autoridades locales, estatales y federales, así como con diversas organizaciones nacionales e internacionales, en Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas, se lanzó una iniciativa que consiste en que jóvenes egresados de centros de rehabilitación por consumo de drogas, sustancias o alcohol, tengan mayores oportunidades de una reinserción social exitosa a través de operar un negocio de comida móvil (*food truck*) que les brindará ingresos dignos además de aprender el funcionamiento de un negocio, fomentar el trabajo en equipo, y lograr un sentido de pertenencia. Se espera que esta iniciativa logre incrementar significativamente los casos de éxito en reinserción social en los jóvenes, tanto hombres como mujeres.



Más allá de la seguridad pública que es una responsabilidad de las autoridades en los tres niveles de gobierno (local, estatal y federal), la seguridad ciudadana es una responsabilidad que nos concierne a todos los actores de la sociedad: gobierno, sociedad civil, y, por supuesto, las empresas.

Los ejemplos mencionados en este artículo muestran como una empresa del sector privado puede contribuir a la generación de paz positiva dentro de sus operaciones y la sociedad.

Eleanor Roosevelt decía: “No basta con hablar de paz. Uno debe creer en ella y trabajar para conseguirla”.

¿TENDRÁ FIN EL CICLO INFERNAL DE VIOLENCIA CRIMINAL EN MÉXICO?

Notas para repensar el problema e imaginar soluciones alternativas

Guillermo Trejo, Profesor de ciencia política en la Universidad de Notre Dame y fellow del Kellogg Institute for International Studies.

Los datos oficiales y ahora el oportuno análisis del Instituto para la Economía y la Paz muestran de forma lapidaria que 2017 fue el año más violento en la historia reciente de México. Medido en términos de la tasa de homicidio, y desagregando la información para identificar los homicidios dolosos, el reporte ofrece un panorama sombrío de una nueva espiral de violencia en el país. Tras el fatídico aumento de la tasa de homicidio entre 2007 y 2011, parecía que el agudo ciclo de violencia originado por la guerra contra el narcotráfico iniciada por el presidente Felipe Calderón – en el cual se multiplicó por dos la tasa de homicidio y se sextuplicó el número de homicidios asociados al crimen organizado – empezaba a ceder. A mediados del sexenio del presidente Enrique Peña Nieto, muchas voces optimistas hablaban incluso de la necesidad de explicar cómo el país había logrado doblegar la violencia criminal.

¿Por qué falló de manera tan fehaciente nuestra capacidad predictiva? ¿Por qué la violencia criminal hoy es mayor que nunca antes?

Partiendo del informe del Instituto para la Economía y la Paz, en este ensayo quisiera aportar algunos elementos teóricos y conceptuales y abonar los resultados de diferentes estudios empíricos que en su conjunto sugieren que a pesar de que el crimen organizado ha mutado de una forma vertiginosa, las formas de violencia se han multiplicado y los tipos de víctimas se han esparcido rápidamente, nuestro entendimiento y medición de estas nuevas realidades criminales no ha avanzado a la misma velocidad. El resultado es que hoy tenemos un retrato parcial del problema y las recomendaciones de política pública en el mejor de los casos tocan tan sólo la punta del iceberg de la violencia criminal.

Las sugerencias que aquí comparto van en la misma dirección del llamado que hace el Instituto para la Economía y la Paz para desagregar los datos de violencia criminal y atender a diferentes formas de violencia. Intento, sin embargo, ir un paso más allá al señalar la necesidad de empezar a reconocer, nombrar y medir realidades de violencia criminal hasta hoy ignoradas. Las recomendaciones de política pública también van en el mismo sentido del llamado del Instituto a mirar el problema de la impunidad y la corrupción, pero sugiero abrir el lente con el que miramos la impunidad para atender tres tipos de violaciones interrelacionadas que tienen hoy postrado al país: la corrupción, la violencia criminal y las graves violaciones de derechos humanos.

Esta compleja red de actores y violaciones nos obliga a considerar el uso de mecanismos extraordinarios, como un mecanismo híbrido de apoyo internacional a investigaciones y procesos judiciales domésticos. A México le ha llegado la hora de aceptar que las soluciones puramente endógenas ya no funcionan.

REPENSAR EL PROBLEMA

En México llevamos más de una década discutiendo los datos de homicidios y de homicidios presuntamente perpetrados por el crimen organizado. Sin duda, estos datos representan métricas vitales para entender el fenómeno criminal. Pero tratar de entender la evolución del crimen organizado y de las diferentes formas de violencia solamente a través de este lente puede ser muy limitante. Tras casi tres décadas de conflictos bélicos entre cárteles y tras una década de una guerra fallida del Estado mexicano contra el crimen organizado, hoy sabemos que en estos conflictos prolongados los actores criminales mutan de piel y sus objetivos, métodos y formas de violencia también se transforman de manera importante.

Como lo han demostrado diferentes estudios, la guerra contra el narco y la política de descabezamiento de las organizaciones criminales iniciada por el presidente Calderón y refrendada por el presidente Peña Nieto, resultaron en una acelerada fragmentación de los cinco cárteles que inicialmente dominaban el trasiego la droga en más de 200 organizaciones criminales de distintos tamaños y giros criminales (Guerrero 2016). La fragmentación dio pie a una competencia letal por el trasiego de la droga, la cual explica, en parte, el crecimiento exponencial de los homicidios atribuibles al crimen organizado de la última década (Calderón, et. al. 2015; Phillips 2015).

La fragmentación y la violencia que surge de la competencia son fenómenos que hemos logrado parcialmente medir. Como apunta el reporte del Instituto, aunque no contamos con información sobre víctimas y victimarios ni sus características, la combinación de las cifras gubernamentales y las estimaciones a partir de recolecciones hemerográficas realizadas por los mismos periódicos, empresas privadas y académicos, nos permiten entender los parámetros básicos de la violencia criminal.

Pero poco sabemos sobre cómo la feroz competencia por el trasiego de la droga llevó a los cárteles y a sus socios a la diversificación hacia nuevas industrias criminales. En estas transformaciones quizá el fenómeno más relevante fue que las organizaciones criminales expandieron su radio de acción hacia actividades extractivas de *riqueza humana* como la extorsión, el secuestro, el tráfico de migrantes y la trata de mujeres y menores. En estas industrias criminales, el negocio consiste en la victimización ciudadana. Además de la extracción de la riqueza humana, los cárteles también expandieron su radio de acción hacia la extracción de *recursos naturales* como los bosques, el petróleo y minerales diversos. La operación de estas industrias es sólo posible mediante la sumisión de organizaciones sociales y de gobiernos locales.

En su rápida expansión hacia actividades extractivas, los cárteles y diversas organizaciones criminales fueron poco a poco apoderándose de municipios enteros – de sus recursos públicos, de importantes puestos en los gobiernos municipales como las direcciones del catastro, la asignación de obras públicas, la regulación de actividades comerciales y las policías municipales. El control de los gobiernos municipales les ha permitido desarrollar regímenes locales de gobernanza criminal mediante los cuales controlan no solamente las industrias criminales de extracción de riqueza humana y natural sino también del trasiego de la droga.

Junto con mi colega Sandra Ley, en diferentes estudios hemos dado cuenta de cómo los cárteles y las organizaciones criminales han asesinado cientos de autoridades locales y candidatos a puestos municipales de elección popular para establecer la gobernanza criminal (Trejo y Ley 2015 y 2018). Nuestros estudios demuestran que los ataques letales en contra de autoridades y candidatos aumentan durante ciclos electorales locales y que entre 2006 y 2012 los ataques fueron más frecuentes en municipios de estados gobernados por la izquierda, en donde el feroz conflicto entre el presidente Calderón y la izquierda partidista dejó a cientos de alcaldes desprotegidos y vulnerables a ataques criminales. Ya para 2015, un tercio de la población nacional habitaba en municipios que habían experimentado al menos un ataque en contra de autoridades y candidatos locales.

Habiendo penetrado los gobiernos locales, los cárteles y otras organizaciones criminales han ejercido el control de colonias, pueblos y ciudades enteras mediante la sujeción de la ciudadanía. Teniendo bajo su control a los gobiernos municipales y con la protección informal de las fuerzas estatales – en su mayoría agentes corruptos de las policías ministeriales, de las secretarías de seguridad pública y de las procuradurías estatales – las organizaciones criminales han ejercido una violencia letal en contra de cualquier actor de la sociedad civil que exponga, denuncie, dispute o ponga a prueba la hegemonía criminal. Así se explican las olas de

asesinatos de cientos de periodistas, activistas sociales, defensores de derechos humanos y sacerdotes y religiosas; así se explican muchas de las desapariciones forzadas y los cientos de fosas clandestinas que han venido apareciendo año con año desde que inició la guerra contra el narco; y así se explican las múltiples masacres que han cimbrado al país, incluidas atrocidades colectivas como la tristemente emblemática desaparición forzada de los 43 estudiantes de Ayotzinapa en Iguala, Guerrero.

Al tiempo que la tasa de homicidio iba en descenso entre 2011 y 2015, estas otras formas de violencia iban en aumento. Los asesinatos contra autoridades y candidatos, periodistas y activistas sociales siguieron y se multiplicaron durante el sexenio del presidente Peña Nieto. No deja de ser paradójico que la desaparición de los 43 estudiantes de Ayotzinapa sucedió cuando la tasa de homicidio iba a la baja y cuando el gobierno federal y algunos de nuestros más agudos analistas políticos pregonaban el fin del ciclo infernal de violencia criminal.

Atender a las diferentes formas de violencia más allá de la tasa de homicidio nos remite a nuevos fenómenos que conllevan retos mayúsculos de política pública.

Señalo tres:

1. Las nuevas realidades de gobernanza criminal nos hablan de la captura de estructuras de gobiernos locales pero también de diferentes formas de corrupción y colusión a distintos niveles de gobierno – particularmente el estatal – que hacen posible el desarrollo y persistencia de la nueva gobernabilidad criminal.
2. La expansión del crimen organizado a industrias extractivas de riqueza humana y natural se han traducido en una nueva era de victimización ciudadana y de graves violaciones de derechos humanos, en la que tanto actores criminales como gubernamentales están involucrados en la perpetración de lo que algunos estudios califican ya de crímenes de lesa humanidad (Open Society Justice Initiative 2016).
3. Las violaciones que surgen del empalme de la corrupción, la criminalidad y las graves violaciones de derechos humanos se mantienen impunes en la mayoría de los casos.

IMAGINAR SOLUCIONES ALTERNATIVAS

En México empieza a surgir un consenso en torno a la idea de que la impunidad es uno de los motores de la inseguridad y de la violencia criminal. Una tasa de impunidad criminal del 99%, como lo sugiere el Instituto a partir de datos de la Encuesta Nacional de Victimización (ENVIPE), hace posible el crecimiento, la diversificación y la persistencia de industrias criminales y de diferentes formas de violencia.

A partir del paradigma de la economía del crimen, iniciado por el eminente economista Gary Becker (1968), en México diversos actores han concluido que el crimen es posible porque las penas son bajas o porque la probabilidad de que se capture al criminal y se castigue el crimen es mínima.

Esto se ha traducido en tres propuestas:

1. Aumentar las penas y adoptar políticas de mano dura mediante la militarización de la seguridad;
2. Aumentar la probabilidad de la captura mediante una mayor presencia de las policías y los ministerios públicos; y
3. Aumentar la probabilidad de captura y castigo mediante sendas reformas de las policías y reformas de fondo del sistema judicial que van desde cambios profundos en las prácticas de los ministerios públicos hasta la creación de una fiscalía autónoma.

Existe suficiente evidencia empírica para desechar el argumento militarista de políticas de mano dura como solución de la violencia criminal. Dos de los estudios comparativos más serios en las ciencias sociales (Neumayer 2003; Rivera 2016), aportan resultados estadísticos robustos que demuestran que políticas represivas de mano dura estimulan, más que disminuir, la violencia criminal (medida por la tasa de homicidio).

Existe, también, evidencia que cuestiona el argumento sobre la mayor presencia del Estado como solución a la violencia criminal. En diferentes estudios sobre los determinantes políticos de la violencia criminal en México, mi colega Sandra Ley y yo hemos constatado de manera reiterada que los homicidios asociados al crimen organizado son mayores en municipios con una mayor presencia de los ministerios públicos (Trejo y Ley 2015 y 2018).

El que la presencia del Estado esté asociada con mayores niveles de violencia criminal puede ser un perturbador indicio de que al estar los agentes estatales coludidos con el crimen organizado, su presencia estimula, en lugar de reducir, la violencia criminal. Y no es que la presencia del Estado se explique porque hay más crimen. En los municipios indígenas de México, donde el Estado ha estado históricamente ausente, los niveles de violencia criminal tienden en promedio – salvo graves excepciones como la Sierra Tarahumara – a ser menores. Ahí los grupos criminales no encuentran a sus comparsas estatales que les son vitales para desarrollar la industria criminal. El tercer argumento cuenta con mucho mayor sustento,

pero la evidencia comparativa muestra que cuando la violencia criminal la generan redes donde convergen actores estatales y criminales, las resistencias a cualquier reforma de fondo, o a cualquier intento por parte de agentes limpios de llevar ante la justicia a los miembros de estas redes criminales, son formidables. Como lo demuestra la experiencia de Guatemala previa a la creación de la Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG), jueces que han intentado hacer justicia en contextos de colusión entre Estado y crimen organizado con frecuencia son amenazados para desistir o son simplemente asesinados. Hay también enormes resistencias de parte de fuerzas de seguridad que no se coluden con el crimen organizado pero que combaten al crimen mediante políticas de mano dura. Unas veces estos agentes estatales ejecutan extrajudicialmente a miembros del crimen organizado y otras veces a “falsos positivos” – es decir, a civiles que no tienen ningún vínculo con el mundo criminal.



El que la presencia del Estado esté asociada con mayores niveles de violencia criminal puede ser un perturbador indicio de que al estar los agentes estatales coludidos con el crimen organizado, su presencia estimula, en lugar de reducir, la violencia criminal.

Cuando parte del aparato estatal está cooptado por el crimen organizado y la otra tiene esqueletos en el clóset por graves violaciones de derechos humanos cometidas en la lucha contra el crimen, las soluciones endógenas pierden su viabilidad y cobra importancia modelos híbridos de cooperación internacional con fiscales autónomos. El ejemplo emblemático de este tipo de cooperación híbrida es la CICIG. Con el objetivo de acabar con la impunidad que hace posible la corrupción, la criminalidad y las graves violaciones de derechos humanos, la CICIG es un caso exitoso de

cooperación de Naciones Unidas con la fiscalía guatemalteca para dismantelar redes militares y criminales que se habían apoderado no solamente del submundo criminal sino de enormes bolsones del Estado y que mediante un uso brutal de la violencia tenían postrada a la sociedad guatemalteca.

Los reportes que año tras año dan fe de un interminable ciclo infernal de violencia criminal en México, en el cual la violencia aumenta y se multiplica y en el que el crimen organizado ha pasado de cooptar a agentes estatales a apoderarse de pedazos del Estado mismo, sugieren que el tiempo de las soluciones meramente endógenas ha llegado a su fin. Es muy probable que en México llegó el momento de voltear la mirada a esquemas más audaces de justicia extraordinaria, en los que la cooperación internacional es de vital importancia para hacernos de instrumentos institucionales para ponerle fin a este largo ciclo de violencia criminal que está acabando con generaciones enteras.

REFERENCIAS

- Becker, G. 1968. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. En G. Becker & W. Landes (eds.) *Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment*, NBER, 1-54.
- Calderón, G., Robles, G., Díaz-Cayeros, A., & Magaloni, B. 2015. The beheading of criminal organizations and the dynamics of violence in Mexico. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(8), 1455-1485.
- Guerrero, E. 2016. La inseguridad (2013-2015), *Nexos*, enero 2016.
- Neumayer, E. 2003. Good policy can lower violent crime: Evidence from a cross-national panel of homicide rates, 1980-97. *Journal of Peace Research* 40(6): 619-640.
- Open Society Justice Initiative. 2016. *Undeniable Atrocities: Confronting Crimes against Humanity in Mexico*, Open Society.
- Phillips, B. J. 2015. How does leadership decapitation affect violence? The case of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. *Journal of Politics*, 77(2), 324-336.
- Rivera, M. 2016. The sources of social violence in Latin America: An empirical analysis of homicide rates, 1980-2010. *Journal of Peace Research* 53(1): 84-99.
- Trejo, G. & S. Ley. 2018. (por publicarse). "Multi-Level Partisan Conflict and Drug Violence in Mexico: When Do Criminal Organizations Attack Subnational Elected Officials?" En A. Giraudy, E. Moncada & R. Snyder (eds.) *Inside Countries: Subnational Research in Comparative Politics*, Cambridge University Press.
2017. "Why Did Drug Cartels Go to War in Mexico? Subnational Party Alternation, the Breakdown of Criminal Protection, and the Onset of Large-Scale Violence." *Comparative Political Studies*. DOI: 10.1177/0010414017720703. Agosto.
2016. "Federalism, Drugs, and Violence: Why Intergovernmental Partisan Conflict Stimulated Inter-cartel Violence in Mexico." *Política y Gobierno* 23(1): 9-52.
2015. "Municipios bajo fuego (1995-2014)." *Nexos*, febrero 2015.

HACIA UN MODELO EFICAZ DE INVESTIGACIÓN POLICIAL¹

Leonel Fernández Novelo, Observatorio Ciudadano de Seguridad, Justicia y Legalidad, AC

Los dos principales problemas que impiden que en México se puedan desarrollar acciones que fomenten y protejan la paz son la corrupción y la impunidad. Y si bien la primera es un componente fundamental de la segunda, la impunidad también se puede mitigar a través de un diseño institucional eficaz. En particular, el modelo actual de investigación criminal, o para ser precisos la falta de uno, impide resolver los problemas de seguridad y dar acceso a la justicia a los mexicanos, lo que se traduce en impunidad. Un camino posible y urgente para comenzar a resolver este problema es la definición de la policía y del Ministerio Público (MP) que queremos a partir de sus atribuciones y capacidades.

A pesar de que en los últimos ocho años se han aprobado e implementado cambios mayúsculos al modelo de justicia, y el gasto en seguridad ha aumentado más del 60%², la percepción de inseguridad y la incidencia delictiva siguen en aumento.³

Sin embargo, uno de los eslabones más importantes para lograr más seguridad y justicia ha quedado fuera del aumento del presupuesto, de las capacitaciones, y en general, de toda discusión y atención pública: las áreas de procuración de justicia –integradas por Ministerios Públicos, Policía de Investigación y peritos.⁴

Este no es un tema menor. En la práctica, las acciones policiales se reducen sólo a reaccionar ante el delito y a tratar de realizar detenciones en flagrancia para poner a disposición del Ministerio Público al mayor número de individuos. Por su parte, el aparato de procuración de justicia se enfoca sólo en resolver jurídicamente caso por caso, o en su defecto, en lograr la prisión del imputado, aunque sea preventivamente. ¿Qué nos dice esto? Que las autoridades creen que encarcelar al mayor número posible de detenidos es la única vía para resolver el problema de la inseguridad en México.

Esta forma de hacer política pública deja fuera elementos importantes para lograr que las acciones de seguridad sean efectivas, como el entendimiento de que el crimen no está aislado del contexto en el que se desenvuelve, que se puede identificar el comportamiento criminal por tipo de delito, y que sus características geográficas son observables. Sin el análisis científico de estos factores, es difícil pensar en acciones de prevención y contención que permitan disminuir los delitos sin necesidad de utilizar la cárcel como única herramienta.

A través de los Ministerios Públicos, las Procuradurías y Fiscalías Generales juegan un papel central en el proceso

y cuentan con atribuciones que van, desde la investigación de los delitos (caso por caso, incluso en los robos menores), peritajes y el litigio para ejercer acción penal y puestas a disposición, hasta realizar estudios sobre el comportamiento delictivo. En concreto, el MP controla todas las fases, desde las puestas a disposición hasta el ejercicio de la acción penal. Prácticamente, no hay una sola fase del proceso donde el Ministerio Público no tenga alguna atribución directa.

Sin embargo, parece que el eslabón más importante dentro al sistema actual: las áreas de procuración de justicia, es el menos fortalecido y el que asume más carga en el proceso. Un ejemplo: en promedio, existen sólo 7.5 agentes del Ministerio Público por cada 100 mil habitantes⁵, mientras que la tasa total de delitos en 2017 fue de 1,464.5 por cada 100 mil habitantes.⁶ Esto significa que cada agente tendría que investigar y resolver 195 casos en un año, y dado que la investigación criminal en México se hace caso por caso –sin tener en cuenta la relación que pueden tener estos entre sí– es poco probable que cada MP pueda realizar todo el proceso de investigación y resolución de un caso en tan sólo un día y medio. Menos aún, que se puedan generar estrategias a partir de inteligencia e investigación del comportamiento y de la geografía del crimen.

Por otra parte, la Policía de Investigación, antes conocida como Policía Judicial, que se encuentra bajo el mando del MP, tiene poco o nulo intercambio de inteligencia con la policía dependiente de la Secretaría de Seguridad Pública. Sus atribuciones se reducen a realizar diligencias solicitadas por el MP dentro de cada caso. No pueden investigar comportamientos o evidencia de acciones que puedan llevar a descubrir nuevos delitos, si esto no se encuentra de una carpeta de investigación de un caso específico. Asimismo, los aumentos de equipamiento para las policías, y la discusión sobre mando, controles de confianza y capacitación, no han tomado en cuenta a este grupo policial sobre el cual, junto con el Ministerio Público, recae la responsabilidad real de la disminución de los delitos.

Por otro lado, las policías municipales y estatales, que han dispuesto de una gran cantidad de recursos y han recibido subsidios tales como FASP y FORTASEG, y de las cuales se presumen las grandes inversiones en equipamiento y vehículos, tienen muy poco campo de acción al investigar los delitos, reduciendo su función, en la práctica, a simplemente captar delincuentes en flagrancia y responder llamadas de alerta. Lo anterior, aún

cuando cuentan con información precisa e inteligencia suficiente para, por ejemplo, detener a una banda de asaltantes de casas, o desarrollar acciones de prevención situacional ante un delito específico, en una zona y momento del día particulares. Sus posibilidades de llevar a cabo estas tareas por sí mismas son mínimas. ¿Por qué? Según sus atribuciones actuales, si quieren investigar una serie de delitos relacionados, la investigación debe ser coordinada por el MP a partir de un caso en particular, ya sea por su propia iniciativa o a solicitud de las policías. Además, en ocasiones, la inteligencia que genera la Policía de Investigación no se considera oficial debido a que no se encuentra dentro de ninguna carpeta de investigación.

La lógica podría llevarnos a concluir que la respuesta es aumentar el presupuesto para las procuradurías y fiscalías. Sin embargo, si los recursos no se invierten inteligentemente, un simple aumento del dinero público destinado a desarrollar políticas y acciones de prevención y reducción del delito, y a la procuración de justicia, resulta insuficiente. Por ejemplo: Es necesario tener claro qué tipo de delito afecta a cuáles colonias en particular, y diseñar acciones específicas.

Tampoco será útil más inversión mientras las diferentes áreas involucradas (policías, investigadores, peritos, Ministerios Públicos, jueces y cárceles) no trabajen en coordinación con el objetivo de generar más seguridad y más justicia. Sin estas condiciones, el sistema será un barril sin fondo en donde el gasto público tendrá nula efectividad.⁷

De hecho, una de las razones por las que el aumento de los presupuestos para seguridad no ha funcionado para disminuir los delitos en México, es la poca eficacia del modelo de procuración de justicia de la que ya hemos hablado. Mientras no se disminuya la carga de atribuciones del Ministerio Público y se desarrolle un modelo de investigación basado en inteligencia policial es poco probable que las cosas cambien.

Antes de que se sigan ejerciendo millones de pesos del erario sin evidencia de efectos positivos visibles, es indispensable que se revise el modelo de investigación criminal existente y se diseñe uno nuevo. Junto con el nuevo sistema de justicia penal, este modelo debe tener como objetivo generar más justicia, más seguridad y más paz; no sólo un mayor número de detenciones.

Para ello, los ejes centrales para la discusión de este nuevo sistema deberían ser:

1. Redefinir las obligaciones que tiene el Ministerio Público de tal manera que sus funciones se centren exclusivamente en el litigio de los casos penales. Las puestas a disposición se deben hacer ante jueces, y las denuncias y reportes ante la policía. Para que haya justicia, el Ministerio Público debe ser capaz de dar seguimiento a la evidencia de tal forma que pueda armar el caso adecuadamente ante el Poder Judicial.

2. Dotar a las secretarías de seguridad pública de capacidades independientes de investigación. Para ello, las policías de investigación –actualmente dependientes del MP–, deben formar parte de las secretarías de seguridad pública municipales, estatales y federal. La carrera policial debe incluir la posibilidad de que cada agente pueda convertirse en policía de investigación al crecer en la institución. Las policías deben tener la facultad legal y operativa para investigar concentraciones de delitos de tal forma que les permita identificar posibles culpables y presentar evidencia válida, independientemente de que exista una denuncia o no.

Estas actividades deben ir acompañadas también del fortalecimiento de las instituciones: salarios dignos y suficientes, capacitación adecuada y constante, tanto para policías como ministerios públicos, desarrollo de servicio civil de carrera, entre otras estrategias. Además, es importante seguir capacitando en el nuevo Sistema de Justicia Penal Acusatorio a los miembros de las procuradurías, fiscales y policías; y no sólo a los jueces.

Aun hay un largo camino por delante para resolver los problemas de eficacia institucional en el sistema. Es fundamental iniciar esta discusión para pasar de un sistema reactivo, –que se enfoca a resolver casos individuales, no entiende la dinámica delincencial, ni considera la geografía del crimen para actuar en consecuencia– a uno cuyo objetivo sea desarrollar justicia y paz a partir de inteligencia, un sistema que permita la prevención y la reducción del crimen.

REFERENCIAS

1. Agradezco los comentarios y aportaciones de Lilian Chapa Koloffon.
2. Ethos, 2017
3. Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública 2017, INEGI, 2017.
4. Ethos, 2017
5. Idem
6. Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, Estadísticas Delictivas, marzo de 2018.
7. Pocos estudios se han realizado sobre la efectividad del gasto, sin embargo, vale la pena revisar *Descifrando el gasto público en seguridad*, Ethos, 2017.



SECTION 5:

2018 MEXICO PEACE INDEX METHODOLOGY

The Mexico Peace Index (MPI) is based on the work of the Global Peace Index (GPI), the leading global measure of peacefulness, produced by IEP annually since 2007. The MPI follows a similar methodology to the United Kingdom Peace Index (UKPI) and the United States Peace Index (USPI), also produced by IEP, and measures negative peace, defined as ‘the absence of violence or fear of violence’.

This is the fifth iteration of the MPI and the 2018 edition uses the improved, more transparent data on crime and violence released this year by the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security (Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SESNSP).

The MPI measures peacefulness at the state level in Mexico. A key reason for choosing this unit of analysis is that, similar to the United States, Mexico's state governments have wide-ranging autonomous powers, allowing them to have a significant impact on the level of violence. The response to violence may therefore differ significantly from state to state.

The MPI is composed of five indicators. The *homicide* and *violent crime* indicators are the same as those used in the United States Peace Index (USPI) and United Kingdom Peace Index (UKPI), based on the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's standard definition of violent crime. The *detention without a sentence* indicator in the MPI captures the excessive use of incarceration in some states. The *weapons crime* indicator represents gun use and

availability, using the best available data. This is similar to the approach used in the USPI as well. Lastly, the *organized crime* indicator is specific to Mexico, because of the problems the country faces with organized criminal activity. The indicator proxies organized crime activity using rates of extortion, kidnapping and drug crimes.

All of the data used to calculate the MPI comes from government bodies in Mexico. IEP then uses survey data collected by the national statistical office to adjust the figures for underreporting. Where possible, the data source used for this study is from the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security (Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SESNSP).

2018 MPI INDICATORS

DATA SOURCES AND IMPUTATION METHODS

The MPI is composed of five indicators, scored between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the most peaceful score and 5 the least peaceful. Population data is used for estimating rates per 100,000 people. The data runs from 2015 to 2017.

Homicide

The number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

Violent Crime

The number of robbery and sexual assault cases, as well as the number of violent assault victims, per 100,000 people, adjusted for underreporting.

- Categories of robbery: 14 (cases – not necessarily an individual victim)
- Categories of sexual assault: 7 (cases – proxy for the number of victims)
- Categories of violent assault: 2 (victims)

Source: SESNSP

Organized Crime

Number of kidnapping and extortion victims, as well as narcotics cases, per 100k people, with kidnapping and extortion adjusted for underreporting.

Narcotics:

- Federal narcotics crimes (production, transport, trafficking, commerce, supply, possession, other)
- Retail drug sales (Narcomenudeo): possession of drugs past a certain quantity, depending on substance.

Source: SESNSP

Weapons Crime

The number of victims of homicide and assault committed with a firearm per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

Detention without a Sentence

The ratio of persons in prison without a sentence to the number of homicides and violent crimes.

Source: National Security Commission / Comisión Nacional de Seguridad (CNG)

Population data

The estimated population of each state in each year.

Population data is used to calculate the rate per 100,000 people for homicide, violent crime, organized crime and weapons crime.

Source: CONA PO

UNDERREPORTING

Crime underreporting exists whenever there is a discrepancy between the number of crimes reported by respondents in a victimization survey and those that victims report to the authorities. In its 2017 iteration of the National Survey of Victimization and Perceptions of Public Security (Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública, ENVIPE), Mexico's National Office of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía, INEGI) found that in 2016, only 6 percent of crimes were reported to the authorities, a figure that has been consistently low since ENVIPE's first iteration in 2011.

Two of the MPI indicators – *violent crime* and *organized crime* – are adjusted for underreporting. IEP uses ENVIPE data to

calculate underreporting rates for each state and adjusts the official statistics for sexual assault, robbery, assault, extortion and kidnapping to better reflect actual rates of violence. This approach helps to counterbalance the high rates of underreporting, known as the 'dark figure' (cifra negra).

IEP calculates the underreporting rate for a number of crimes based on the information from ENVIPE. The survey asks each respondent if they were a victim of a particular type of crime and whether or not they had reported it to the authorities. IEP then divides the total numbers of crimes reported by survey respondents by the number of crimes that survey respondents said they reported to the authorities. This produces a multiplier for adjusting the official statistics. The adjustments are made for the crimes of rape, robbery, assault, extortion and kidnapping.

Two adjustments were made to produce a full dataset. Because of the small sample sizes, there are some cases where none of the survey respondents reported the crime to the authorities. In cases where none of the instances of a crime were reported, the maximum underreporting multiplier for that crime and year was assigned to these states. Second, there were some states where there were no respondents that reported experiencing a particular crime – either kidnapping or rape. If no crimes were recorded on the survey, the average reporting multiplier is used for that crime in that year.

Finally, the underreporting rates for each state and crime were averaged over time and these averaged underreporting rates were applied to the official statistics for every year of the MPI. This average over time is used for three reasons:

- The underreporting rates for each year do include some imputations, based on assumptions, given the above.
- The victimization data is only available for a subset of the years included in the MPI, and as such some proxy rate must be applied over time in any scenario.
- Crime reporting is problematic in Mexico. While ENVIPE is based on a sample of the state populations, an average over time smooths out any large fluctuations in underreporting rates that may be the result of complex and imperfect surveying and reporting methodologies, rather than a true change in reporting.

Underreporting rate

Definition: Number of crimes reported by victims on the victimization survey divided by the number of those crimes that victims stated they reported to the authorities.

Underreporting multipliers are applied to the number of rapes, robberies, assaults, kidnappings and extortions recorded by SESNSP.

Source: SESNSP

Imputation: If the number of reported crimes is equal to zero, it is not possible to apply the underreporting multiplier, therefore the highest under-reporting rate for that crime from other states is used. In some cases no crimes were reported either during the survey or to the authorities, however the assumption is that some crimes did occur but were not captured in the survey data as the sample is limited. In this case the average underreporting multiplier across states is assigned.

INDICATOR SCORE & OVERALL CALCULATIONS

The MPI indicators are scored between 1 and 5, with 5 being the least peaceful score and 1 being the most peaceful score. Banded indicator scores are calculated by normalizing the range of raw values based on each state's average value over the period 2015 to 2017. First, the average value for each state over the three years of the study is calculated. Then the outliers are removed from the range of average state values in order to identify the min and max of normally distributed average values. Outliers in this case are defined as data points that are more than three standard deviations greater than the mean. Next, the values for each year are normalized using the min and max of the normal range and are banded between 1 and 5. The calculation for banded scores is:

$$\text{Banded score}_x = \left(\frac{\text{raw value}_x - \text{min}_{\text{sample}}}{\text{max}_{\text{sample}} - \text{min}_{\text{sample}}} \times 4 \right) + 1$$

Finally, if any of the banded values are above 5, the state is assigned a score of 5 and if any values are below 1, the state is assigned a score of 1.

After the score for each indicator has been calculated, weights are applied to each of the indicators in order to calculate the overall MPI score. The overall score is calculated by multiplying each indicator score by its index weight and then summing the weighted indicator scores.

There are many methods for choosing the weights to be applied to a composite index. In order to maintain consistency across IEP's various peace indices, the weights in the MPI mirror those used in

the GPI, USPI and UKPI as closely as possible. The 2018 weights are the same as the 2017 Mexico Peace Index.

The weights for the GPI indicators were agreed upon by an international panel of independent peace and conflict experts based on a consensus view of their relative importance. To complement this approach and reflect the local context of Mexico, a second expert panel was formed consisting of leading Mexican academics and researchers to determine the final weights for the five indicators in the MPI. These final weights are shown in table 5.1.

With direction from the expert panel, a number of different methods such as equal weighting, principal component analysis and analytical hierarchical processing were used to test the robustness of the results.

TABLE 5.1
Indicator Weights in the MPI

INDICATOR	WEIGHT	% OF INDEX
Homicide	4	30%
Violent Crime	3	21%
Weapons Crime	3	20%
Detention without a Sentence	1	8%
Organized Crime	3	21%

2018 MPI EXPERT PANEL

- **Óscar Jaimés Bello,**
Director de Desarrollo de Información Gubernamental. INEGI
- **Leslie Solís Saravia,**
Program Associate, World Justice Project
- **Leonel Fernández Novelo,**
Coordinador de Observatorios Locales. Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano
- **Alberto Díaz-Cayeros,**
Senior Fellow, Center for Democracy Development and Rule of Law. Freeman Spogli Institute of International Affairs, Stanford University.
- **Marcela Figueroa Franco,**
Researcher, Causa en Común.
- **Guillermo Zeped Lecuona,**
Director Jurimetría: Iniciativas para el Estado de Derecho, A.C.



2018 MEXICO POSITIVE PEACE INDEX METHODOLOGY

The Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) is a composite index that measures Positive Peace at the subnational (state) level and covers all 32 states. To do this, data sources were compiled from the (inter)nationally sourced statistics, census and survey questions most closely aligned to the eight Pillars of the Global Positive Peace Index. The MPI is calculated using:

- **8 national survey questions**
- **14 national census data indicators**
- **5 data sources from academic or intergovernmental organizations.**

There are a number of considerations that need to be made when applying Positive Peace to sub-national measurements. Such considerations can be either conceptual or technical.

The global PPI is empirically derived by selecting indicators that correlated with peace at the global level. However, applying Positive Peace at the sub-national level may require a different set of relevant factors because socio-economic factors that correlate at the global level may not correlate when measured at the Mexican state level, or the relevant data may not be available at the state level.

While subnational statistics relating to health, education and poverty are available for the states, some other measures of the global PPI model are not collected at the subnational level. For example, in measuring the *Well-Functioning Government* Pillar for the global PPI, organizations such as the World Bank and the Economist Intelligence Unit provide composite measures for the rule of law, functioning of democracy and government effectiveness at the country level. The same measures at the state level are not available, therefore other similar (and nationally-sourced) measures are used.

The MPPI uses a combination of objective and subjective measures of Positive Peace, all scored across the 32 states. Where

possible, preference has been given to objective measures. Where this has not been possible, preference has been given to survey data, especially if it is enquiring about the local situation. For example, between the two questions “do you feel safe in your state” or “do you feel safe in your neighborhood?” the latter would be selected as it has more of a personal or communal impact to the respondent and therefore any answer given is more likely to be a more accurate portrayal.

Secondly, timeliness and currency of data can be an issue for some data sets. Finding data at the state level can be difficult and, as such, it is often necessary to use data that is, in some cases, two to three years old. However, it is observed that Positive Peace at the global level is very slow-moving. That is, while violence and conflict can erupt and spread quickly, building and strengthening the *attitudes, institutions and structures* that create and sustain peaceful societies takes a long time, sometimes decades. Therefore, although using current data is preferable, using slightly older data for Positive Peace is still viable.

MPPI INDICATORS

In calculating the MPPI, the first step is to normalize each of the 27 indicators. To do this, each indicator is first categorized into either being a positive or a negative indicator. Positive indicators are such that it is desirable for a state to have more of the measure. For negative indicators, it is more desirable for a state to have less. Table 5.2 lists all indicators in the MPPI.

Each indicator is normalized based on whether it is a positive or negative measure. For positive indicators, scores are assigned a value between one and five. States that perform the best in any one indicator are assigned a score of one. States that perform the worst in any one indicator are assigned a score five. A state's score in each Pillar is the average of all its banded indicator scores. The overall MPPI is the average of a state's eight Pillars. In this sense, every indicator is equally weighted in each Pillar and each Pillar is equally weighted in the overall MPI score.

Table 5.2

Mexico Positive Peace Index Indicators

PILLAR	INDICATOR	DESCRIPTION	YEAR	SOURCE
WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT	Are you aware of any action taken by local authorities to improve public lighting?	Percentage of respondents that answered Yes	2017	ENVIPE
	Are you aware of any action taken by local authorities to construct or improve parks and sports facilities?	Percentage of respondents that answered Yes	2017	ENVIPE
	How would you rate the performance of the work carried out by the municipal police?	Percentage of respondents that answered 'effective'	2017	ENVIPE
SOUND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT	Impunity rate for homicides	Ratio of incoming prisoners for homicide to homicide cases	2015	INEGI/CNG
	Doing Business	Ease of Doing Business rank	2012	World Bank
	Unemployment rate	Percentage of unemployed people per state	2014	INEGI
	GDP per capita	GDP per capita	2015	INEGI
LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION	How often do you perceive acts of corruption?	Percentage of state population answering 'very frequent'	2015	ENCIG
	Do you perceive the Public Ministry and State Attorneys as corrupt?	Percentage of respondents answering 'No'	2017	ENVIPE
	Do you perceive the municipal police to be corrupt?	Percentage of respondents answering 'No'	2017	ENVIPE
	Do you perceive the state police to be corrupt?	Percentage of respondents answering 'No'	2017	ENVIPE
	Is there an anticorruption training program for public administration personnel?	1 for yes, 0 for no or unknown	2015	INEGI CNG
HIGH LEVELS OF HUMAN CAPITAL	HDI health	Sub-component of the Human Development Index	2012	UNDP
	HDI education	Sub-component of the Human Development Index	2012	UNDP
	Scientific and technological companies/institutes	Number of those registered in the Registro Nacional de Instituciones y Empresas Científicas y Tecnológicas (RENIECyT)	2014	DENUE
GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS	Trust in neighbours	Percentage of respondents that answered with 'high degree of trust'	2017	ENVIPE
	Safety in public locations of municipality	Percentage of respondents that answered that they felt 'safe'	2017	ENVIPE
	Net migration	Levels of immigration minus emigration, as a percentage of the population	2014	INEGI
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION	Households with internet access	Percentage of households with bandwidth subscription	2015	INEGI
	Accessibility to public information	Percentage of respondents that report being able to access public information 'very frequently'	2016	INEGI
	Attacks on journalists	Total number of attacks per state	2015	Article 19
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES	Socially vulnerable population	Percentage of population with income below the wellbeing level and with at least one social vulnerability	2014	CONEVAL
	People living in poverty	Percentage of population living in poverty	2014	CONEVAL
	Average number of people per house	Average number of occupants per household	2010	INEGI
ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS	Upward social mobility	Additional years of school for this generation compared to the last	2011	EMOVI/CEEY
	Women in the municipal administration	Percentage of women employed in the municipal administration	2014	CNGMD
	Indigenous development gap	Absolute value of the difference in HDI score for the indigenous and non-indigenous populations	2010	UNDP



METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

The global economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic activity related to “containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence.” The estimates include the direct and indirect cost of violence as well as an economic multiplier. The multiplier effect calculates the additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided.

This study includes two types of costs, direct and indirect, plus a multiplier. Examples of direct costs include medical costs for victims of violent crime, capital destruction from violence and costs associated with the security and judicial systems. Indirect costs include lost wages or productivity from crime due to physical and emotional trauma. There is also a measure of the impact of fear on the economy, as people who fear that they may become a victim of violent crime alter their behavior.

The multiplier refers to the additional economic activity that would have occurred if the crimes had not been committed or where government expenditure for policing, the legal and judicial system had been directed to more productive uses.

IEP estimates the economic impact of violence in Mexico using a similar methodology to its global study, the Economic Value of Peace. The Mexican study uses a variety of measures including a comprehensive aggregation of costs related to violence, armed conflict and spending on military, judicial and policing and internal security services.

IEP’s estimate of the economic impact of violence includes three components:

- 1. Direct costs** are the costs of crime or violence to the victim, the perpetrator, and the government. These include direct expenditures such as the cost of policing, medical expenses, funerals or incarceration.
- 2. Indirect costs** are costs that accrue after the fact. These include physical and psychological trauma and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as lost future income.
- 3. The multiplier effect** is a commonly used economic concept which describes the extent to which additional expenditure has flow-on impacts in the wider economy. Every time there is an injection of new income into the economy rather than an output due to the consequences of violence, this will lead to more spending. This will in turn create employment, further income and encourage additional spending, thereby increasing GDP. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is the reason behind the ‘multiplier effect’ and why a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity. Refer to Box 5.1 for more detail on the **peace multiplier**.

Violence containment expenditure refers to the direct and indirect costs associated with preventing or dealing with the consequences of violence.

The *economic impact of violence* refers to the total cost of violence containment plus the peace multiplier, explained in Box 5.1.

This study uses a cost accounting methodology to measure the economic impact of violence. Expenditures on containing violence are totaled and unit costs are applied to the MPI estimates for the number of crimes committed. These crimes only include homicide, assault, rape, robbery, extortion, and kidnapping. A unit cost is also applied to the estimated level of fear of insecurity. The unit costs estimate the direct (tangible) and indirect (intangible) costs of each crime. Direct unit costs include losses to the victim and perpetrator, and exclude costs incurred by law enforcement and health care systems, as these are captured elsewhere in the model. Indirect unit costs include the physical and psychological trauma, and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as lost life-time wages for homicide victims.

The cost estimates provided in this report have been adjusted to constant 2017 pesos, using official data on average annual consumer price index (CPI) from the Central Bank of Mexico, which facilitates the comparison of the estimates over time. The estimation only includes elements of violence where reliable data could be obtained. As such, the estimate can be considered conservative. The items listed below are included in the cost of violence methodology, from a time period of 2003 to 2007:

- 1. Homicide**
- 2. Violent crime, which includes assault, rape and robbery**
- 3. Organized crime, which includes extortion and kidnapping**
- 4. Indirect costs of incarceration**
- 5. Firearms**
- 6. Fear of insecurity**
- 7. Private security expenditures**
- 8. Federal spending on violence containment, which includes the military, domestic security and the justice system.**
- 9. Medical and funeral costs**

The analysis incorporates federal-level public spending on the military because Mexico’s military has been extensively involved in fighting the organized criminal groups domestically. Therefore, IEP considers spending on the Mexican military to be included in the cost of internal security.

Some of the items not counted in the economic impact of violence include:

- State-level public spending on security

- The cost of domestic violence
- The cost of violence to businesses
- Insurance premiums related to violence
- Household out-of-pocket spending on safety and security
- The cost of drug-trade related crimes such as the production, possession, transport and supply of drugs.

These items were not included for two reasons. First, some items

have been captured elsewhere in the model. For example, the costs associated with drug-trade related crimes are included in the cost of domestic security, including law enforcement, incarceration and the justice system. Secondly, reliable data could not be sourced at a state level for the entire study.

Although data is available for some of these categories, it is either not fully available for all states, or for all years of analysis.

BOX 5.1

The multiplier effect

The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic concept, which describes the extent to which additional expenditure improves the wider economy. Every time there is an injection of new income into the economy this will lead to more spending which will, in turn, create employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is known as the 'multiplier effect' and is the reason that a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of expenditure related to containing violence. For instance, if a community were to become more peaceful, individuals would spend less time and

resources protecting themselves against violence. Because of this decrease in violence there are likely to be substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, as money is diverted towards more productive areas such as health, business investment, education and infrastructure.

When a homicide is avoided, the direct costs, such as the money spent on medical treatment and a funeral, could be spent elsewhere. The economy also benefits from the lifetime income of the victim. The economic benefits from greater peace can therefore be significant. This was also noted by Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009) who argued that violence or the fear of violence may result in some economic activities not occurring at all. More generally, there is strong evidence to suggest that

violence and the fear of violence can fundamentally alter the incentives for business. For instance, analysis of 730 business ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001 found that with higher levels of violence, new ventures were less likely to survive and profit. Consequently, with greater levels of violence it is likely that we might expect lower levels of employment and economic productivity over the long-term, as the incentives faced discourage new employment creation and longer-term investment.

This study assumes that the multiplier is one, signifying that for every dollar saved on violence containment, there will be an additional dollar of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with similar studies.¹

ESTIMATION METHODS

A combination of approaches is used to estimate the economic cost of violence to Mexico's economy. The analysis involved three components:

1. Financial information detailing the level of expenditure on items associated with violence was used wherever possible.
2. Unit costs were used to estimate the cost of violent activities. Specifically, an estimate of the economic cost of a violent act was sourced from the literature and applied to the total number of times such an event occurred to provide an estimate of the total cost of categories of violence.
3. Where data on the incidences of a particular type of violence was missing, the figure was either estimated based on an appropriate proxy or excluded from the study.

IEP uses federal government expenditure data for military, domestic security, and justice system as federal government violence containment costs. Data is sourced from Secretariat of Public Finance and Credit (SHCP). State and municipal level spending are excluded from the study due to data unavailability.

The federal government expenditure data does not provide details of the spending at the state level. Therefore, a combination of state population size and MPI scores is used to estimate the likely distribution between states.

A unit cost approach is used to estimate the economic cost of homicide, violent crime, organized crime, fear of insecurity and firearms. Unit costs for the homicide, violent crimes and organized crimes are based on a study by McCollister (2010) that estimated the tangible and intangible cost of violent crimes in the United States.

1. Direct costs or tangible costs of crime include medical expenses, cash losses, property theft or damage, and productivity losses.
2. Indirect costs include physical and psychological trauma as well as long term costs due to a violent incident.

In addition to the breakdown by tangible and intangible costs, McCollister (2010) offers further details of the costs by victim, perpetrator and justice system. Such itemization enables IEP to exclude the justice system costs to avoid double counting with expenditure data used for the justice system and domestic security.

IEP also uses Dolan & Peasgood's (2006) estimate of the unit cost of fear of crime to calculate the cost of perceptions of insecurity in Mexico. The unit cost of firearms in the Mexican black market is used to calculate the total cost of firearms. Goodman & Marizco (2010) suggest that the price of a weapon in Mexico is two to three times higher than the price of the same weapon in the US market.

To ensure that cost estimates appropriately represent relative income levels in Mexico, they were scaled according to Mexico's GDP per capita relative to the US before being converted to 2017 Mexican pesos. This was based on the aforementioned US study suggesting that the indirect cost of a homicide approximates US\$8.4 million. The equivalent cost in Mexico was then calculated based on purchasing-power adjusted GDP per capita of US\$17,107 for Mexico as compared to US\$54,629 for the US in 2014. This is called the adjusted unit cost.

All the costs are adjusted to constant 2017 pesos using consumer price index (CPI) data from the central Bank of Mexico. The base year of 2017 was chosen because it is the most recent year for which CPI data was available. Estimating the economic impact in constant prices facilitates comparisons over time.

Any GDP-related analysis uses the most recent available GDP data from INEGI.

CALCULATING THE COST OF HOMICIDE, VIOLENT CRIME AND ORGANIZED CRIME

To calculate the cost for the categories of crime used in this study, IEP uses the data from the MPI.

Data on the incidence of homicide is sourced from the SESNSP. Homicides are multiplied by adjusted unit costs to calculate the total cost of homicide in Mexico.

Violent crime, which includes incidents of rape, robbery and assault, is also sourced from SESNSP and adjusted for underreporting. The economic costs of each category of violent crime are calculated using the respective adjusted unit costs.

The cost of organized crime is based on the number of incidents of extortion and kidnapping. To estimate the total cost of extortions and kidnapping in Mexico, IEP assumes that extortions and robbery - as well as kidnapping and assault - are equivalent in terms of their economic impact on the victim. Therefore unit costs are sourced from McCollister (2010) and applied to extortion and kidnapping.

COST OF FEAR OF INSECURITY

ENVIPE data is used to estimate the perception of insecurity at the state level in Mexico. IEP uses the proportion of respondents who felt insecure, multiplied by the state's population to arrive at the number of people who reported a fear of insecurity. Victimization survey estimates are available for 2015 and 2016 to 2017. Therefore, IEP estimates the fear of insecurity for the years for which data is not available. The unit cost of fear is taken from Dolan and Peasgood (2006), from which the adjusted unit cost is derived.

COST OF FIREARMS

The 2017 Economic Impact of Violence analysis includes an updated estimate for the cost of firearms in Mexico.

There is no official data available on the number of firearms in Mexico. A number of studies have attempted to calculate the annual increase in the number of firearms or annual imports from the US. Goodman and Marizco (2010) use firearms seizures on the US-Mexico border to estimate the number of firearms. However, such studies largely underestimate the annual increase in the number of firearms.

ENVIPE asks respondents whether or not anyone in the household purchased a firearm in the last year. Mexico Evalua, a think tank, collated population estimates of household firearms purchases for the available survey years, 2015 to 2017, and provided this data to IEP.

The Small Arms Data Observatory provided IEP with estimates of the price of a firearm on the black market in Mexico from the dataset Illicit Small Arms Prices - Countries Dataset.

Based on this estimated unit cost and the quantity of firearms purchased in each state, IEP generated values for the total costs of firearms.

CALCULATING THE INDIRECT COST OF INCARCERATION

The direct cost of incarceration is included in the government expenditure on domestic security and the justice system. Therefore, IEP only includes the indirect cost of incarceration, which is the lost income due to imprisonment. This is calculated using the Mexican minimum wage and the number of inmates that would have been in full time employment. Data on the minimum wage for Mexico is sourced from department of labor and social welfare (STPS). Literature suggests that 60 percent of people who were sentenced to prison had full-time employment prior to being in prison and 20 percent of them have some employment inside prison. Therefore, IEP considers that 40 percent of the inmates would have been in full time employment. Minimum wage lost is calculated for 40 percent of the prison population in Mexico.

CALCULATING THE COST OF PRIVATE SECURITY

No reliable data is available for the number of private security personnel in Mexico for the period of 2015 to 2017. The number of security officers for 2004 was sourced from the Small Arms Survey. Also, the ratio of private security officers to public security officers is sourced from the Small Arms Survey and assumed to be constant over time. IEP estimates the economic cost of private security using the ratio of private to public security officers and the minimum wage.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

To measure the total economic impact of violence, IEP uses a peace multiplier to estimate the additional economic activity that would have resulted if the violence was avoided. The conceptual underpinning of the multiplier is the opportunity cost of the resources lost by the victim, perpetrator, and the law enforcement agencies due to the crime. Therefore, the peace multiplier represents the flow-on effects of redirected expenditure from violence containment to more economically enabling activities such as business investment or education.



APPENDIX A:

MEXICO'S OFFICIAL CRIME DATA

In December of 2017, SESNSP introduced a more comprehensive and transparent federal crime dataset. The principal change is the addition of data on the number of victims of several types of crimes, rather than just the number of cases. Publishing data on both the number of victims and cases offers a more accurate assessment of the magnitude and severity of violent crime, as multiple victims can be affected by one case. This more detailed data has allowed IEP to create a more accurate and valuable analysis of peace in Mexico.

Whereas Mexico previously only published a single database of the incidence of crime, there are now two databases:

1. Number of cases for 53 crimes (up from 22), including human trafficking, sexual assault, family violence, and retail drug sales.

2. Number of victims of 13 crimes (up from 3), by sex and age group (adult or minor).

The new victims dataset covers 13 crimes, including four out of the five crimes in the MPI for which it is possible to identify a direct victim. This appendix details the improvements in Mexico's official crime data as well as the outstanding gaps.

COMPARING OLD AND NEW DATASETS

The MPI indicators for violent crime and organized crime have both been updated to reflect newly available data for different subcategories of crime.


VIOLENT CRIME

The violent crime indicator includes robbery, assault and sexual assault. Figure A.1 shows the composition of each of the components for violent crime in the new and old datasets. In the old crime incidence dataset, all three crimes are measured by the number of investigations. In the new data, robbery is measured using the number of cases, assault is measured using the number of victims, and sexual assault is measured using the number of cases as a proxy for the number of victims.

When looking at the composition of each category as a percentage of the total, the percentage share for robbery and assault remained relatively the same between the two datasets. Robbery continues to be the largest component, although the number of cases increased slightly, the percentage of the total fell from 77 to 74 percent due to larger increases in the other crimes.

The share of cases of sexual assault rose to 3.7 percent, up from 1.5 percent in the old dataset, as a result of including new data on

FIGURE A.1
Composition of the MPI violent crime indicator, old vs new SESNSP dataset, 2017




Source: SESNSP

sexual crimes. The previous dataset included the number of investigations of rape, while the new dataset counts investigations of sexual abuse, 'crimes equivalent to rape,' incest, and sexual coercion as well. These violent offenses are criminalized in all 32 states, but were only added to the dataset under the new methodology in 2017. The methodology documents for the new dataset do not state why SESNSP did not publish data on the number of victims of sexual assault.

ORGANIZED CRIME

Organized crime has also been revised to include victim data. Before, only cases of kidnapping, extortion, and narcotics were included. Now, victims of kidnapping and extortion are included as well as cases of federal drug crimes and retail drug sales.

FIGURE A.2
Composition of the MPI organized crime indicator, old vs new SESNSP dataset, 2017



Source: SESNSP

Figure A.2 shows the composition of this indicator by each type of crime for the old and new datasets. In the old dataset, the percentages for cases of extortion and narcotics crime was similar, at 43 percent and 49 percent, respectively, with kidnapping at nine percent. New data on retail drug sales brings the share for narcotics crimes to 88 percent, increasing from 6,428 cases to 50,385, an eight-fold increase.

Meanwhile, the number of victims of extortion and kidnapping increased by two and 21 percent, respectively. Despite this increase, extortion as a percentage dropped to 10 percent and kidnapping dropped to 2.4 percent due to the eight-fold increase in narcotics crimes.

REMAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

The new datasets represent an advancement in transparency, based on a three-year reform process of the federal public security information system, and allow for a much more comprehensive analysis, contributing to the *free flow of information*. Over time, the new methodology for crime data will yield a rich time series of evidence. Yet there are still a number of opportunities to improve,

which would make evidence-based policy analysis more informative.

STATE-LEVEL DATA GAPS

Federal crime data is compiled from the municipal level up. The Public Ministry offices in each municipality submit data to the state attorney general, which then submits the state level numbers to the federal attorney general. 29 out of 32 states reported the data used for the MPI in full in the new datasets. Only a small number of data gaps remain. Table 5.3 shows the three states that had missing crime data for the variables used in MPI indicators.

TABLE 5.3

Data gaps for MPI variables, by state

STATE	VARIABLE	YEAR
TLAXCALA	Extortion	2016
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	Kidnapping	2015, 2016
YUCATÁN	Kidnapping	2015, 2016

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF HOMICIDES

The homicide data in Mexico does not correlate with any other type of crime. This highlights the need to develop disaggregated data for different phenomena.

Organized crime related homicide data should show one of two dynamics:

1. A strong direct correlation between homicide and extortion, kidnapping and narcotics crimes would indicate a high presence of organized crime all around.
2. Alternatively, a strong inverse correlation may indicate a trade-off between crimes, suggesting that criminal organizations use lethal violence where law enforcement effectively prevents them from generating revenue via extortion, kidnapping or drug sales.

Neither of these correlations appear in the data because there is currently no way to disaggregate organized crime related homicides from other types of homicides. The homicide data in Mexico captures several different forms of lethal violence, which can be broadly categorized as interpersonal violence and violent conflict. Interpersonal violence includes violence between two or a few people that is related to a specific dynamic between the parties involved. Examples include a bar fight gone bad or a dispute between intimate partners.

At the same time, there are active violent conflicts taking place, in which individual acts of violence are related to broader issues. These violent conflicts occur between different criminal organizations, criminal organizations and government forces (both police and military) and community self-defense groups and criminal organizations, in addition to a small number of incidents of terrorism. The latest available armed conflict data documents a total 34 groups which have been involved in violent conflict in Mexico between 2011 and 2016.

APPENDIX B:

RESULTS TABLE

Table B.1

Mexico Peace Index Scores 2015 - 2017

A lower score indicates a better level of peacefulness.

STATE	2015	2016	2017
AGUASCALIENTES	1.72	1.77	2.22
BAJA CALIFORNIA	3.02	3.13	3.95
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	2.66	3.63	4.55
CAMPECHE	1.56	1.51	1.48
CHIAPAS	1.69	1.58	1.57
CHIHUAHUA	2.30	2.56	2.98
COAHUILA	1.69	1.50	1.50
COLIMA	2.25	3.90	3.64
MEXICO CITY	2.47	2.54	2.69
DURANGO	2.09	1.97	2.04
GUANAJUATO	2.15	2.23	2.54
GUERRERO	3.81	4.11	4.15
HIDALGO	1.42	1.51	1.76
JALISCO	2.26	2.22	2.34
MÉXICO	2.16	2.28	2.55
MICHOACÁN	1.99	2.30	2.42
MORELOS	3.08	3.01	2.89
NAYARIT	1.52	1.36	1.97
NUEVO LEÓN	2.24	2.55	2.58
OAXACA	2.00	1.98	2.09
PUEBLA	1.85	1.67	1.88
QUERÉTARO	1.78	1.74	2.01
QUINTANA ROO	2.37	1.84	2.45
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	1.92	2.28	2.47
SINALOA	2.89	2.80	3.05
SONORA	2.17	2.39	2.23
TABASCO	2.34	2.46	2.97
TAMAULIPAS	2.67	2.39	2.74
TLAXCALA	1.31	2.04	1.38
VERACRUZ	1.38	1.68	2.00
YUCATÁN	1.36	1.25	1.17
ZACATECAS	2.16	2.61	3.31
NATIONAL SCORE	2.13	2.23	2.46

ENDNOTES

SECTION 1

- 1 The 2017 MPI identified widespread gaps and discrepancies in homicide, weapons crime and organized crime data in Tlaxcala in 2016. These issues appear to have been corrected in the 2017 official data release. However, even the updated data reports no incidences of extortion in 2016. Given the severity of violence in Mexico and the historical gaps in data, the MPI methodology considers crime counts of zero to represent a failure to report data rather than the absence of crime. These observations are filled using the national average. As such, Tlaxcala's 2016 extortion score – even in the new methodology – is based on an estimated rate that is much higher than what is typically reported in the state when data is not missing.
- 2 Based on data from the Censo Nacional de Gobiernos, 2017
- 3 The Nuevo Sistema de Justicia Penal is a nationwide justice reform implemented in all states at the municipal level, and includes reforms to the use of pre-trial detention. Similarly, all 11 of Campeche's municipalities have been incorporated in the new uniform police code, Mando Unico Policial.
- 4 J. Gibling, 'Violence in Sinaloa surges after El Chapo is extradited', Aljazeera, March 2017. Available from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/violence-sinaloa-surges-el-chapo-extradited-170315085021060.html> (Accessed March 12, 2018)
- 5 InSight Crime, 'Tijuana Cartel', February 2018. Available from: <https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/tijuana-cartel-profile/> (Accessed March 12, 2018)
- 6 S. Stewart, 'Tracking Mexico's Cartels in 2018', February 2018. Available from: <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tracking-mexicos-cartels-2018> (Accessed March 12, 2018)
- 7 "T. Clavel, 'Organized Crime Behind Spiking Homicides in Mexico's Most Violent Municipalities', Insight Crime, March 2017. Available from: <https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/organized-crime-behind-spiking-homicides-mexico-violent-municipalities/> (Accessed March 12, 2018)
- 8 M. Yagoub, 'Why a 900% Spike in Murders in West Mexico State?', InSight Crime, May 2016. Available from: <https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/what-is-behind-900-spike-in-murders-in-west-mexico-state/> (Accessed March 12, 2018)
- 9 P. Corcoran, 'Mexico's Recent Rise in Violence at Center of New Report', Insight Crime, April 2017. Available from: <https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexico-recent-rise-violence-center-new-report/> (Accessed March 10, 2018)
- 10 Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) 2016, INEGI, Available from: <http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/enchogares/regulares/envipe/2016/> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 11 A. Noble, 'Violence worsens in Mexico after removal of drug cartel leaders', The Washington Times, December 2017. Available from: <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/dec/25/mexico-violence-surges-despite-drug-kingpin-decap/> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 12 J. Beittel, 'Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations,' Congressional Research Service, April 2017.
- 13 M. Allansson, E. Melander & L. Themnér (2017) Organized violence, 1989-2016. Journal of Peace Research 54(4).
- 14 Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Sistema Penitenciario Estatales 2017, INEGI, Available from: <http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/censosgobierno/estatal/cngspspe/2017/> (Accessed 28 Feb 2018).
- 15 Defined as a statistical outlier compared to 2015 state homicide rates.
- 16 Monthly rates of family violence have risen 32 percent from January 2015 to December 2017.
- 17 Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad De México, n.d., 'Violencia y terror: Hallazgos sobre fosas clandestinas en México,' Available from: http://www.ibero.mx/files/informe_fosas_clandestinas_2017.pdf.
- 18 Defined as three standard deviations from the 2015 mean state homicide rates. State rates are compared to the range in 2015 because homicides rates were lowest in that year of the dataset.
- 19 5,000 victims are of unknown age, sex or both.
- 20 UNICEF, 'Hidden in Plain Sight - A Statistical Analysis of Violence Against Children', p. 34, September 2014. Available from: https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/VR-full-report_Final-LR-3_2_15_189.pdf (Accessed March 15, 2018)

- 21 S. Macias, 'Crece la compra de armas de fuego en hogares locales', Mexico Evalua, December 2017. Available from: <http://mexicoevalua.org/2017/12/07/crece-la-compra-de-armas-de-fuego-en-hogares-locales/> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 22 FBI:UCR, '2016 Crime in the United States'. Available from: <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-2.xls> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 23 Attackers kill 11 people at a party in central Mexico', Al Jazeera, July 2017. Available from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/gunmen-kill-11-people-party-central-mexico-170713232908118.html> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 24 M. Palin, 'Ideal killers: 'Young, beautiful, reckless' female death squad', News.com.au, July 2017. Available from: <http://www.news.com.au/world/north-america/ideal-killers-young-beautiful-reckless-female-death-squad/news-story/13ed8a9475c03d2e8010085a16091cd9> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 25 Justice in Mexico Project, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2016, pg 13
- 26 Muggah and Vilalta, "What Explains Criminal Violence in Mexico City A Test of Two Theories of Crime", May 2017. Studies such as this one show that the variable typically referred to as 'female heads of household' is associated with higher homicide rates. Given the social norms and the severe effects of violence on men in Mexico, this variable can be interpreted as a proxy for missing men, as men are considered the default heads of households.
- 27 Encuesta de Cohesión Social para la Prevención de la Violencia y la Delincuencia (ECOPRED) 2014, INEGI, Available from: <http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/enchogares/especiales/ecopred/2014/>
- 28 INEGI. Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Sistema Penitenciario Estatales 2017. Tabulados básicos
- 29 65% of cops fall short in performance review', Mexico News Daily, July 2017. Available from: <https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/65-of-cops-fall-short-in-performance-review/> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 30 C. Woody, 'There's a 'double-edged sword' hanging over Mexico's decade-long war on drug cartels', Business Insider, December 2017. Available from: <http://www.businessinsider.com/mexico-internal-security-law-drug-war-2017-12/?r=AU&IR=T> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 31 C. Woody, 'There's a 'double-edged sword' hanging over Mexico's decade-long war on drug cartels', Business Insider, December 2017. Available from: <http://www.businessinsider.com/mexico-internal-security-law-drug-war-2017-12/?r=AU&IR=T> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 32 J. Merino, 'Nexos: Army's Presence Equals More Homicides in Mexico? (Revisited)', InSight Crime, June 2011. Available from: <https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/nexos-armys-presence-equals-more-homicides-in-mexico-revisited/> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 33 J. Ortega, G. Lara, 'Indice Global de Impunidad 2017 - Dimensiones de la Impunidad Global', UDLAP, 2017. Available from: <https://www.udlap.mx/cesij/files/IGI-2017.pdf> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 34 Security firms are big business in Mexico', Mexico News Daily, February 2016. Available from: <https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/security-firms-are-big-business-in-mexico/> (Accessed March 15, 2018)
- 35 Security firms are big business in Mexico', Mexico News Daily, February 2016. Available from: <https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/security-firms-are-big-business-in-mexico/> (Accessed March 15, 2018)

SECTION 2

- 1 Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, 'Comision Nacional de los Salarios Minimos: salario promedio asociado a trabajadores asegurados al IMSS', 2017. Available from: <https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/268423/Salarios-octubre2017.pdf> (Accessed 5 March 2018)
- 2 J. Brauer and J. Marlin, Defining Peace Industries and Calculating the Potential Size of a Gross World Product by Country and by Economic Sector, Institute for Economics and Peace, Sydney, 2009. Available from: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126268/DefiningPeaceIndustrieAndCalculatingAPeaceWGP.pdf> (Accessed 27 January 2017)

ENDNOTES

SECTION 3

- 1 International Alert. 2015. *Peace through Prosperity: Integrating peacebuilding into economic development*. London: June.; and Rummel, R.J. 1981. "Vol. 5: The Just Peace." *Understanding Conflict and War*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Available at: <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/NOTE14.HTM#FULL> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 2 "Institute for Economics & Peace, Positive Peace Report 2017:
- 3 *Tracking Peace Transitions Through a Systems Thinking Approach*, IEP, Sydney, October 2017. Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/10/Positive-Peace-Report-2017.pdf> (Accessed 3 February 2018)"
- 4 Joseph Spanjers & Matthew Salomon, 'Illicit Financial Flows to and from Developing Countries: 2005-2014', *Global Financial Integrity Report*. 2017. Available from: <http://www.gfintegrity.org/press-release/new-study-illicit-financial-flows-in-developing-countries-large-and-persistent/> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 5 Yucatan Times, 'Yucatan's new anti-corruption prosecutor vows to root out graft', Merida, November 2017. Available from: <http://www.theyucatantimes.com/2017/11/yucatans-new-anti-corruption-prosecutor-vows-to-root-out-graft/> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 6 Jared Wade, 'Why Invest in the State of Nuevo Leon?', Mexico IT, April 2017. Available at: <http://www.mexico-it.net/why-invest-in-the-state-of-nuevo-leon/> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 7 World University Rankings, 'Autonomous University of Nuevo Leon'. Available at: <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/autonomous-university-nuevo-leon#survey-answer> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 8 Mexico News Daily, 'Anti-corruption plan sees little progress', May 2017. Available at: <https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/anti-corruption-plan-sees-little-progress/> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 9 San Miguel Times, 'Querétaro will become the first municipality with Anti-corruption system', January 2017. Available from: <http://sanmigueltimes.com/2017/01/queretaro-will-become-the-first-municipality-with-anti-corruption-system/> (Accessed March 22, 2018)
- 10 Mexico News Daily, 'In Oaxaca, from one disaster to another', October 2017. Available from: <https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/in-oaxaca-from-one-disaster-to-another/> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 11 Mexico News Daily, 'Health care workers escalate their protest', January 2018. Available from: <https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/oaxaca-health-workers-escalate-their-protest/> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 12 Arthur Dhont, 'Criminal diversification leading to rising death and injury, kidnap, extortion, and fuel theft in Mexico's Tabasco state', *IHS Jane's Intelligence Weekly*, August 2017. Available from: <http://www.janes.com/article/72773/criminal-diversification-leading-to-rising-death-and-injury-kidnap-extortion-and-fuel-theft-in-mexico-s-tabasco-state> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 13 Levy, D., et al., 'Why is Chiapas Poor?', Harvard University Growth Lab, 2015. Available from: <https://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/publications/why-chiapas-poor> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 14 Organización Panamericana de la Salud, 'Salud en las Américas, panorama regional y perfiles de país', 2012, <http://bvsalud.org/gestiondelriesgo.cridlac.org/phocadownload/userupload/doc19248-contenido.pdf> (Accessed 5 March 2018)
- 15 Jose Antonio Belmont, 'Cierran 650 escuelas en Guerrero por narco y sismos', *Milenio Policia*, January 2017. Available from: http://www.milenio.com/policia/narco-sismos-cierran-escuelas-guerrero-chilapa-montana_baja-inseguridad-milenio_0_1058894120.html; Rogelio Augustin, 'Cierran escuelas en 8 pueblos del Valle de Ocotito, tras enfrentamientos', *Milenio Policia*, January 2018. Available from: http://www.milenio.com/estados/cierran-escuelas-ocho-pueblos-valle-de-ocotito-enfrentamientos_0_1112889137.html (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 16 Institute for Economics & Peace, Mexico Peace Index, IEP, 2017. Available from: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/04/MPI17_English_Report_WEB_03.04-1.pdf (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 17 Democratic political culture is a key indicator of well-functioning government at the national level. A full list of national level Positive Peace indicators is available in the 2017 Positive Peace Report at www.visionofhumanity.org.
- 18 Juan Antonio Le Clercq Ortega, Gerardo Rodríguez Sánchez Lara, 'Índice Global de Impunidad 2017', August 2017. Available from: http://www.udlap.mx/cesij/files/IGI-2017_eng.pdf (Accessed on 3 February 2018)
- 19 Committee to Protect Journalists, 'Iraq, Syria deadliest countries for journalists', December 2017. Available from: <https://cpj.org/2017/12/iraq-syria-deadliest-countries-for-journalists.php> (Accessed March 22, 2018)
- 20 Reporters without Borders, 'Violations of press freedom barometer', 2017. Available from: <https://rsf.org/en/barometer?year=2017> (Accessed March 22, 2018)
- 21 Freedom House, 0 = mostly free, 100 = least free. Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/nosotros> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 22 Freedom House (2017), *Freedom of the Press, Mexico country report*. Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/nosotros> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 23 INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Acceso a la Información Pública y Protección de Datos Personales (ENAIID) 2016. Available from: <http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/enchogares/especiales/enaid/2016/> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 24 INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Acceso a la Información Pública y Protección de Datos Personales (ENAIID) 2016. Available from: <http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/enchogares/especiales/enaid/2016/> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 25 Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2017: IEP, Sydney, June 2017. Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/10/Positive-Peace-Report-2017.pdf> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 26 INEGI, Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) 2017. Available from: <http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/enchogares/regulares/envipe/2017/> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 27 M. Meyer 'Mexican Police: many reforms, little progress', Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 2014. Available from: <https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Mexicos%20Police.pdf> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 28 M. Meyer 'Mexican Police: many reforms, little progress', Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 2014. Available from: <https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Mexicos%20Police.pdf> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 29
- 30 World Bank (2011), *World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development*. Washington, DC. Available from: https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 31 OECD, 'Women in politics', 2017. Available from: <https://data.oecd.org/inequality/women-in-politics.htm> (Accessed 3 February 2018)
- 32 "Smaller youth population" defined as the proportion of the population aged 15 to 29 below 20 per cent of the total population.

Other publications from the Institute for Economics & Peace



2017 Global Terrorism Index
Institute for Economics & Peace, Nov 2017

This is the fifth edition of the Global Terrorism Index, providing a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 17 years.



2017 Measuring Peacebuilding Cost-Effectiveness
Institute for Economics & Peace, Mar 2017

An analysis of the major issues related to measuring the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding and an attempt to quantify the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding activities.



2017 Positive Peace Report
Institute for Economics & Peace, Oct 2017

An analysis of the factors that create resilience, and a framework for understanding how societies can transition into a more peaceful state.



2016 Economic Value of Peace
Institute for Economics & Peace, Dec 2016

This report provides an empirical basis to calculate the potential economic benefits from improvements in peace and estimates the economic impact of violence.



SDG16 Progress Report
Institute for Economics & Peace, Sept 2017

A comprehensive global audit of progress on available SDG16 indicators, analysing 163 countries and their progress.



2016 Global Terrorism Index
Institute for Economics & Peace, Nov 2016

The fourth edition of the Global Terrorism Index provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the past 16 years.



Risk Report
Institute for Economics & Peace, Sept 2017

This report presents new and ground-breaking approaches to forecasting and conceptualising the risk of conflict.



2016 Positive Peace Report
Institute for Economics & Peace, Aug 2016

This report investigates the eight domains of Positive Peace, why they are important, and how they work together to reduce levels of violence and improve resilience.



Informe Nuevo León 2017
Institute for Economics & Peace, August 2017

An in-depth analysis of peace, conflict and the socio economic factors that influence it in Nuevo León.



2016 Global Peace Index
Institute for Economics and Peace, June 2016

A statistical analysis of the state of peace in 163 countries outlining trends in peace and conflict, the economic cost of violence, and an assessment of SDG 16.



Informe Sinaloa
Institute for Economics & Peace, August 2017

An in-depth analysis of peace, conflict and the socio economic factors that influence it in Sinaloa.



2016 Mexico Peace Index
Institute for Economics & Peace, Apr 2016

The 2016 Mexico Peace Index analyses Mexico's progress in improving peacefulness from the height of the drug war through 2015.



2017 Global Peace Index
Institute for Economics & Peace, June 2017

An analysis on the trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies.



2015 Global Terrorism Index
Institute for Economics & Peace, Nov 2015

The 2015 Global Terrorism Index Report analyses the impact of terrorism in 162 countries and identifies the social, economic and political factors associated with it.



2017 Mexico Peace Index
Institute for Economics & Peace, April 2017

A comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico, aiming to identify the key trends, patterns and drivers of peace while highlighting policy opportunities.



Radical Realism
Institute for Economics & Peace, Sept 2015

Twelve interviews with peacebuilders on developing the attitudes, institutions and structures of Positive Peace in Mexico.

INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS & PEACE

FOR MORE INFORMATION

INFO@ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG

EXPLORE OUR WORK

WWW.ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG AND

WWW.VISIONOFHUMANITY.ORG



GlobalPeaceIndex



@IndicedePaz

@GlobPeaceIndex

IEP is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.

IEP is headquartered in Sydney, with offices in New York, The Hague, Mexico City, and Brussels. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organisations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.

The Institute for Economics & Peace is a registered charitable research institute in Australia an a Deductible Gift Recipient. IEP USA is a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization.



Scan code to access our
Vision of Humanity website

APRIL 2018 / IEP REPORT 56

ISBN 978-0-6480644-9-7



9 780648 064497 >

MPI-EN-V02-TH-HS-20180423